

## Fernando Pessoa's Metaphysics and Alberto Caeiro e companhia

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Much has been written about Pessoa's philosophical writings, whether in his orthonymous voice or in the words of those heteronyms who like their creator engaged in technical speculations about metaphysics—that is, the study of first causes and the ultimate nature of reality.<sup>1</sup> António Mora and Charles Robert Anon are the best known of these heteronym-philosophers, though it would be an error to establish too clear a division between them and heteronym-poets like Alberto Caeiro, Ricardo Reis, and Álvaro de Campos, or heteronym-prose writers like Bernardo Soares and the Barão de Teive: in fact all of their writings are at one time or another autobiographical, philosophical, and observational.<sup>2</sup>

What about Pessoa himself, from whom Alberto Caeiro “emerged” on March 8, 1914, to impose himself as “mestre” (“master”) over his creator and all subsequent heteronyms? This essay analyzes Pessoa's philosophical writings in an attempt to answer the question of where Caeiro came from, and what Pessoa thought of his relationship to his creator. It is based on the thesis that Pessoa consciously sought a philosophical justification for Caeiro and the other heteronyms, and that, without abandoning the mainstream philosophical tradition that extends from the pre-Socratics to Hegel, he found it in the evolutionary metaphysics of Herbert Spencer, Ernst Haeckel, G.H. Lewes, and other late nineteenth-century thinkers.

The task of tracking Pessoa's philosophical thinking is both easy and difficult. It is easy because Pessoa freely identified his sources, and because, thanks to António Pina Coelho, we have an inventory of the contents of his library. This means that when he mentions a philosopher, we can almost always identify not only the specific book he read but often the exact edition. Every author and title quoted from now on in this essay was either cited by Pessoa or can be found in his library, or both; quotations from Pessoa are taken

principally from volume II, sections 7 and 8 of Pina Coelho's anthology of *Textos filosóficos* ("Perspectivas cosmológicas" and "O super-físico").<sup>3</sup> The difficult part is dealing with the enormous scope and eclecticism of Pessoa's readings in philosophy, the despair of those on the lookout for the common threads in a mass of ideas culled from the entire history of Western thought. As Pina Coelho's work on Pessoa's library attests, he was drawn to thinkers great and small, from the pre-Socratics, Aristotle, Spinoza, and Kant to Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, and Ernst Haeckel; from mainstream figures like Edward Caird, Charles Renouvier, and Alfred Fouillée to champions of the esoteric like Emmanuel Swedenborg and Alastair Crowley. Tellingly, he put poets like Virgil, Shakespeare, and especially Shelley, on the same footing as the philosophers. And though he often relied on books already twenty or thirty years old, he made an effort to stay abreast of things, especially in science, as attested by the presence in his library of R.H. Lock's *Recent Progress in the Study of Variation, Heredity and Evolution*, Emile Picard's *La science moderne et son état actuel*, Alfred Binet's *L'âme et le corps*, E. Freundlich's *The Foundations of Einstein's Theory of Gravitation*, Gaston Moche's *Introduction aux théories de Einstein*, Moritz Schlick's *Space and Time in Contemporary Physics*, and F. Soddy's *Matter and Energy* (Pina Coelho II 155).<sup>4</sup> His diaries give us a good idea of how voraciously he read. In a two week period one May, for example, he ploughed through major works by Antero de Quental, Gomes Leal, António Nobre, and Guerra Junqueiro; he finished Eça de Queiroz's *O crime do Padre Amaro* and Abel Botelho's *O Barão de Lavos* then moved on to *The Merchant of Venice*, the *Spectator*, Tennyson's *Early Poems*, and Poe's *Arthur Gordon Pym*. In the scientific arena, he went through Hollander's *Scientific Phrenology*, Wurtz's *Article on Lavoisier*, and Haeckel's *Anthropogénie*. He also found time for Jacques Cazotte's *Diable amoureux* (150). Pessoa made lists of "Books for study" that included poetry, fiction, history, and philosophers. As he remarks in one of his philosophical fragments: "The neopagan [i.e. he himself] accepts all metaphysics" ("O neopagão aceita todas as metafísicas;" Pessoa 1968 II 81).

And yet for all of his interest in philosophical ideas, Pessoa was not particularly interested in *philosophies*, i.e. philosophical systems: to the extent that he articulated his own ideas, it was as an adjunct to his poetry. This gave him the freedom to pick and choose as he wished. In an age that was struggling for a definition of metaphysics that would save it for literature,

safeguarding its relevance and vitality against the threat represented by pure materialism, Pessoa's mixture of philosophy, spirituality, and poetry, as we shall see, made him both a man of his time and a true original.

### Acceptance and Rejection of Dualisms

It stands to reason that the creator of the heteronyms would be drawn to metaphysics that stressed duality rather than unity. Not surprisingly, Pessoa was fascinated by the earliest Greek thinkers, who grappled with the most basic metaphysical issues by foregrounding the categories of being and non-being, limit and limitlessness, motion and stasis, spirit and matter, unity and plurality. The sixth-century philosopher Parmenides (fl. 504 B.C.), for example, divided the reality underlying all phenomena into Being and Non-Being. Being for Parmenides is motionless, timeless, and unchanging, and exists in eternal opposition to everything that is subject to time, change, and motion. Pessoa paraphrases these ideas when he writes: "We divide all primordial concepts into being and non-being... The abstraction of Reality is Being, the abstraction of Consciousness... is non-being" ("Dividimos os conceitos primordiais em ser e não-ser... A abstracção da R[ealidade] é o Ser, a abstracção da C[onsciência]... é o Não-Ser"; 12).<sup>5</sup>

Parmenides' predecessor, Pythagoras (fl. 532 B.C.), developed a famous Table of Opposites to describe the dualistic structure of the world, with categories like the good and the bad, male and female, light and darkness, unity and plurality, and so forth (Kirk and Raven 235ff). Pessoa was especially fascinated by the opposition of Limit and the Unlimited, equating Limit with Parmenides' Being and non-Being with the Unlimited. He was also fascinated by Parmenides' contemporary Heraclitus (fl. 504-501 B.C.), who taught that all things eventually turn into their opposites (190 and 195ff). But Pessoa also relished challenges to the accepted truth, as when for instance he calls to mind how Zeno attacked Pythagoras in his famous paradox of "crossing the Stadium"—a barb aimed at Pythagoras' notion of the universe as a sum of spatially extended units (290). Despite the lack of consistency among these pre-Socratic philosophers, Pessoa's admiration led him to propose "reducing all systems to the system of the Eleatics"—that is, in essence, Parmenides and Zeno (41).

Although Pessoa had read a fair amount of later Greek philosophy, the Church Fathers, and scholastic theology—particularly St. Thomas Aquinas—after the Eleatics his fascination with metaphysical dualism jumps ahead to the

seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries. Pessoa reserves special praise for Spinoza, a “true genius” and “master-thinker who, prosecuted, hated, accurst, stood by the truth, lived for truth, suffered for (the sake of) truth!” (204, in English). He was excited by Spinoza’s division of the world into matter and spirit, body and mind, though elsewhere he writes: “The dualism of spirit and of matter is an illusion” (188). He accepts Leibniz’s Laws of Probability and Reality as the necessary conditions of truth, and he has a deep admiration for Kant, especially the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which he calls the one truly great book of philosophy (132). He repeats Kant’s definition of time and space as the *a priori* forms of perception. Hegel, the last of the great metaphysicians in this tradition, interests Pessoa rather less. It may be that Hegel’s dialectic of unity and difference was too much of a challenge to the metaphysics of plurality that Pessoa was searching for. There may be an anti-Hegelian posture in the following quote, for instance:

The moment we affirm identity, saying that  $x$  equals  $x$ , we divide this one thing in two, although only in thought and only in order to say that these two things are not two but rather one—that they are so entirely equal that they are the same. From this it can nevertheless be seen that at the very least duality is the essence of relation.

No momento em que afirmamos a identidade, dizendo  $x$  é  $x$ , dividimos essa coisa única em duas, embora apenas para o pensamento, e apenas para dizer que essas duas não são duas, senão uma, que são tão inteiramente iguais, que são a mesma. A essência da relação, porém, vê-se daqui que é, pelo menos, a dualidade. (20)

This would seem to confirm Pedro Martín Lago’s comment that Pessoa “no tiende a la identidad en la diferencia en cada cosa con su concepto, más bien desconfa de lo idéntico” and “su identidad con el sujeto es la falsedad misma y por eso su filosofía es la contraimagen de la ontología tradicional” (115).

### Evolutionary Principles

Pessoa seems to have found the antidote to metaphysical dualism in late nineteenth-century thinkers who applied Darwinian ideas to philosophical, social, and moral problems. Not that Pessoa turned his back on the past: he continued to revere Heraclitus, Spinoza, and Kant—but he seems to have been increasingly drawn to an evolutionary approach to metaphysics. Under this influence, he was able to move in his thinking beyond dualism to an ideal of pure relation that provided philosophical justification for the heteronyms.

The starting point is of course Darwin—Charles Robert Darwin, whose first and middle names Pessoa expropriated for the heteronym-philosopher Charles Robert Anon. Darwin's work in zoology and biology led him to “the common principle underlying the separate theories of development which scientists had already advanced in astronomy and geology” (Stevenson 18)—that is, the principle of organic evolution through natural selection set forth in his *Origin of Species* (1859). Darwin's fame rests on his claim to have been the first to draw this conclusion in the form we recognize today, and such was his impact at the time that other thinkers were quick to apply his scientific thesis, based on empirical observation, to all aspects of the material and social universe, as well as individual experience.

One of the most noteworthy of these Darwinian philosophers was fellow-Englishman Herbert Spencer, who published his *First Principles* in 1862, only three years after the publication of *Origin of Species* (note that it was Spencer and not Darwin who coined the expression “survival of the fittest”). It was Spencer's ambition to create a complete System of Philosophy: based on first principles—the laws of the knowable and the unknowable—it embraced biology, psychology, sociology, and morality. Pessoa had a number of Spencer's books in his library, as well as a number of books about Darwinian philosophy. One of the most frequently cited of the latter is Sam Laing's 1885 *Modern Science and Modern Thought*, an apologia for universal Darwinism. Laing quotes Spencer often, praising him for applying to evolutionary theory the principle that “throughout the universe, in general and in detail, there is an unceasing redistribution of matter and motion.” The result, he says, is a metaphysics “embracing not only the phenomena of the material and living universe, but also history, religion, politics, and all the complex relations of social life” (223); Darwin himself took up this argument in his *Descent of Man* of 1871, in which he applied evolutionary notions to morals. Typically, Pessoa did not accept Darwin, Spencer, or Laing uncritically. We know that he also read the 1901 *Histoire et solution des problèmes métaphysiques* by the French idealist Charles Renouvier, who poked holes in what he called mockingly Spencer's “evolutionist positivism,” noting the apparent absurdity of Spencer's ascribing knowable effects to unknowable ultimates like Space, Matter and Force, which themselves stem, by his own admission, from a transcendent Unknown (400-01).

It would take too long to describe here the complexity of Pessoa's borrowings from Spencer. Focusing on what he accepts as consonant with his poetics, however, we can single out Spencer's idea that the constant activity

of Force on Matter—what he called the principle of the persistence of Force—means that the world necessarily evolves from homogeneity to difference and variety. Spencer claimed that Matter is indestructible, but he also pointed out that, in its homogeneous forms, it is instable. Pessoa would seem to have had this in mind when he wrote:

Progress is nothing but the evolution of form with no alteration to content [...] if it were otherwise, there would be not evolution but rupture, discontinuity, and what we know about nature does not allow us to sustain this thesis.

O progresso não é senão a evolução duma forma sem que um conteúdo mude; senão, haveria, não evolução, mas já salto, descontinuidade, e o que sabemos da natureza não nos permite pôr essa tese. (83)

That this evolutionary movement leads inevitably to what Spencer called the multiplication of effects might well have provided Pessoa with a metaphysical underpinning for the poetics of heteronymy.

### The Metaphysics of Relation

“...correct reasoning is the ideal assemblage of objects in their true relationships of co-existence and succession” (George Henry Lewes)<sup>6</sup>

There is however another key idea at work in evolutionary metaphysics, and that is the idea of relation, which in Darwinian thinking was allied with the notion of pure identity. Darwin’s observations of animals and plants, living and fossilized, suggested that nature evolves from simplicity to complexity. In metaphysical terms (if I understand the argument correctly) the pure relation of each multiple effect is itself understood to be the essence of its identity (possibly a corollary of Spencer’s laws of the persistence of force, the instability of the homogeneous, and the multiplication of effects). As Pessoa puts it, writing in English:

Passing from plurality pure to natural diversity:...obeying the principle of distinction [sic] and of differentiation, and to that of relation[,] there become combined, and become so necessarily one with one, one with two, one with three, one with four, proving thus what I shall call natural diversity, or diversity of nature. (25)

To which we might add, describing the relation of orthonymy to heteronymy, one with seventy! Whence Pessoa's statement that "compositional reality is true reality" (27, in English) and "reality is neither one nor multiple but *diverse*" ("A Realidade não é nem una, nem plural, mas *diversa*" 13). The idea seems to be that the perceiving subject necessarily experiences objects from a multitude of perspectives, and the most all-inclusive or perceptive of subjectivities is the one that sees things from various perspectives simultaneously. If this in what Pessoa does through the heteronyms, they must be understood to be a necessary step forward in the evolution of the poetic "I".<sup>7</sup>

One interesting consequence of this idea in Pessoa's metaphysics is to render traditional notions of causation null and void. In what appears to be a gloss of Spencer, he writes that relation is the fourth fundamental given of reality.<sup>8</sup> Presumably this means that plurality need not (cannot) be derived from unity: we must assume that it simply exists.

The idea that one thing is the cause of another implies 1. that either A disappears in order to give rise to B, while in this case it remains A and does not disappear, or 2. that A creates B, in which case it is not a matter of 'cause' but of raw creation [criação absoluta], or 3. A incites B to exist without taking anything from either itself or nothingness. So [A] can only take it out of B; in other words, B already existed;

A ideia de que uma coisa é causa de outra coisa implica [1] ou que A desaparece para dar B, e nesse caso permanece A e não desaparece, [2] ou A cria B e nesse caso não há causa mas criação absoluta, [3] ou A provoca B a existir sem o tirar nem do nada nem de si próprio. Então só o pode tirar de B; isto é, B já existia; (19)

We might well read this as an ontological explanation of the transforming event of March 8, 1914—"the appearance of someone within me, someone I at once named Alberto Caeiro" (Lencastre 191)—as if, having evolved to this point, Pessoa was able naturally to discover the plurality within himself that had been there all along.

Returning to the idea of relation: this seems to be what connects the spiritual to the material in the evolutionary sense we have been talking about. Pessoa writes that "Spirit is Pure Relation: it does not exist except in relation with the Object" (197). He paraphrases the Scots writer Henry Drummond when he points out (in English):

Perfect environment (see Drummond) demands and coexists with non-personality [...] a perfect environment cannot be a material one for however matter strive [sic] towards perfection yet it is ever imperfect. And even so, a perfect personality is personality no longer (46).

Granted that this is more poetry than philosophy, the idea seems to be that the most complete realization of spirit is predicated on the most complete relation with perfect environment. For Drummond, this environment is the Christian God; for Pessoa, it is Caeiro's pantheistic Nature, context of his "superior paganism."<sup>9</sup>

### Evolution and Mystery

This perfect environment contains the ultimate mysteries from which the poet, as a highly evolved organism, draws his strength. It is this connection of evolution with transcendence that most sharply underscores Pessoa's debt to the evolutionary metaphysicians.

Pessoa holds emphatically that evolution brings the human race face to face with the Absolute or High Being (130). Sam Laing had written, in language that Pessoa perhaps unconsciously mirrored:

While [science] excludes miracles and supernatural interference after the order of the universe has been once established, [it] leads us back step by step to a great Unknown, in which, from the very fact that it is unknown, everything is possible...we rise, step by step, to the higher ideals [of] self-reverence, self-knowledge, and self-control. (295 and 300)

These ideas are not exclusive to either Laing or Pessoa: one of the most curious aspects of the evolutionary metaphysicians is that they take Darwin's original, purely empirical scientific hypothesis, and turn it into guidelines for discussing the experience of transcendence. Spencer represents this view when he writes about the reconciliation of science and religion, but it should be noted that Spencer—and Pessoa with him—defends religion only insofar as it believes in a transcendent Being that it views as ultimately mysterious. In the Preface to the 1862 edition of *First Principles* (a copy of which Pessoa had in his library) Spencer had written, "in this united belief in an Absolute that transcends not only human knowledge but human conception lies the only possible reconciliation of Science and Religion"



(iii). Pessoa is a passionate believer in the Absolute—he quotes approvingly Spencer's claim for the harmony of religion and philosophy with science insofar as all posit the reality of such an Absolute (77, 84, 90)—but he has no use for theology: he is fiercely opposed to the notion of a paternal, caring deity in dialogue with mankind because in his view this compromises the mystery that is the essence of what he, like Spencer, refers to as Being, the Unknown, and the Absolute.

Whence Pessoa's scorn for atheism and pure materialism. Belief in the existence of God, though it cannot be proven, is he says "a rational and therefore natural—even inevitable—act of faith in any man" ("A existência de Deus é, pois, indemonstrável, mas é um acto de fé racional, natural portanto—inevitável até—em qualquer homem no uso da sua plena razão"; 78). He states categorically: "There never was a great poet or philosopher who was an atheist" ("Nunca houve grande poeta...ateu"; 78). As for materialism, he writes (in English):

All philosophy is absolute, or contains an Absolute, be it absolute relativity. And empirism (materialism) making itself absolute at one point, denies idealism not to be so at others. It is inconsequent [...] It must eliminate the infinite altogether.  
(50)

No wonder then that for Pessoa "there are no great materialist poets" (80).<sup>10</sup> He echoes Spencer's opposition to the pantheistic atheism of Comte and "a certain French school" ("certa escola francesa"; 81—possibly Renouvier's neocritical idealism), and he reserves special scorn for Ernst Haeckel's popular book, *Die Weltrathsel*, which he read in the 1902 English translation, *The Riddle of the Universe* (Haeckel, professor of zoology at Jena, originated the expression "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny," which might be applied, metaphorically, to the heteronyms' relationship with the orthonym-creator). In the book in question, writes Pessoa, Haeckel "miserably and pompously" ("miserável e pomposamente"; 79) rejects the notion of an extramundane deity while making a claim for some kind of pantheistic-materialist metaphysics, largely inspired by Spinoza. There are few if any other individuals about whom Pessoa expresses himself with such violence. It may be because he and Haeckel shared similar views about so many other things, including rejection of Platonism, the Catholic Church, and the doctrine of free will.<sup>11</sup> It should be pointed out that these views were common to many

evolutionary philosophers. The difference is that Pessoa's version of pantheism—his superior paganism—is not divorced from the supernatural.<sup>12</sup>

### Conclusion

Pessoa relates backward in time to the Victorian poets Tennyson, Browning, Swinburne, Meredith, and Hardy, who like him felt called to reconcile the spiritual with a rigorously materialist evolutionary explanation of reality. As Lionel Stevenson remarked in *Darwin among the Poets*:

Accordingly they [the poets] set about explaining the theories of science in terms of mysteries; to them the evolutionary theory seemed to deal only with processes and not with first-causes, and so they found that there was still ample room for a spiritual principle in the universe. It was merely necessary to reclassify the attributes of this spiritual entity in conformity with scientific hypotheses. (16)

He also relates forward—or laterally—to the modernist enterprise in his adherence to what Malcolm Bradbury has called modernism's centripetal, superintegrating tendencies, its "sociological mysticism," and:

A sense of the total relatedness of things, altogether different from those tightly drawn links by which the positivist world had held together, stimulated a search for that mystic 'world of relationships'—Hoffmansthal's *Welt der Bezüge*—in which the role of the poet was [to see]...the world not as an accumulation of categories, abstract concepts and general laws, but as an infinitely complex lattice of relationships, personal to him, of which his mind was the centre and coordinator. (83)

The metaphysics that supplants the idea of the unified poetic voice with the idea of the necessarily multiple one is in harmony with the world in which, as Pessoa writes, "Plurality is the only truly ideal thing." He continues, writing in English:

How does the infinite realize itself? Infinitely, for we can conceive no limit to number. But if, realising itself, it realises itself by itself, the infinite, in becoming other than itself, does not pass from itself, is itself in *the other* [...]. Idea is one, plurality is many in the idea of plurality. One=many. (55 and 57)

Born into this world, the heteronyms join the ranks of modernist literary 'others' whose existence Pessoa appears deliberately to have ignored. One thinks of António Machado's Abel Martín and Juan de Mairena, Yeats's masks, Valéry's Monsieur Teste, Pirandello's characters in search of an author, Unamuno's autonymous doublings of himself, Ezra Pound's *personae*, and Oswald de Andrade's Serafim Ponte Grande and João Miramar.<sup>13</sup>

One=many.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> See in particular the books in the works cited by António Pina Coelho, José Gil, Pedro Martín Lago, Leyla Perrone-Moisés, and Luís de Oliveira e Silva.

<sup>2</sup> Bernardo Soares is included in this list of heteronyms even though Pessoa told João Gaspar Simões: "Bernardo Soares não é um heterónimo, mas uma personalidade literária" (letter dated July 28, 1932; Pessoa 1982, 91). Pessoa indicated that there was something intrinsically more orthonymous about his prose writings than his poetry, even when signed by heteronyms—e.g. "A simulação é mais fácil, até porque mais espontânea, em verso" (to Adolfo Casais Monteiro; Pessoa 1946, 268) and "Em prosa é mais difícil de se outrar" (Pessoa 1966, 106).

<sup>3</sup> It has been necessary to omit the vast bulk of Pessoa's philosophical writings, including those having to do with time, space, number, and his own theory of Power and Act, as well as logic games like his demonstration that the notion of evolution is self-contradictory and his proof of the non-existence of infinity.

<sup>4</sup> As George Monteiro recently pointed out to me, the book inventory we have does not take into account the many titles that Pessoa is known to have sold off over the years: his readings were even more extensive than we can possibly know from the written record.

<sup>5</sup> Pessoa's philosophical fragments were written in Portuguese and English; unless I note otherwise, I will be quoting my own translations from the Portuguese.

<sup>6</sup> Lewes, who created a scandal by his first "open marriage" and his later liaison with Mary Ann Evans (i.e. George Eliot), invented among other things a theory of the metaphysical development of positivism. The quote is from his 1904 book *Science and Speculation* (London: Watts and Co.), which Pessoa greatly admired.

<sup>7</sup> See José Gil 150, on the equality of Identity and Difference in Pessoa's metaphysics.

<sup>8</sup> "1. O facto fundamental do universe é haver consciência dele [...] 2. O segundo facto fundamental, incluído no primeiro, é que essa consciência é de qualquer coisa. 3. O terceiro dado fundamental é deduzido destes dois e envolvido neles—é o existirem sujeito e objecto como bases de uma realidade. 4. O quarto dado fundamental é que a Realidade (o Universo) é a relação entre esse sujeito e esse objecto. 5. O quinto facto fundamental é que a condição dessa relação é o tempo" (9). For possible sources in Spencer, see *First Principles*, chapter 5: "Space, Time, Matter, Motion, and Force."

<sup>9</sup> Citing Drummond once again, Pessoa notes (in English): "Low organisms are shortest lived. The higher the organism, as a rule, the longer the life. The most complex organism must have the longest life. An infinitely complex organism must have an infinite life. Now the most complex organism is that which contains them all.—Nature is eternal—."(48)

Drummond had countered Spencer's materialism with the statement: "If I correspond with the world, I become worldly; if with God, I become divine" (172).

<sup>10</sup> This attitude does not prevent Pessoa from taking what interests him from the positivists, in particular Comte's classification of the sciences. See his gloss of the charts from *La philosophie positive*. He discusses admiringly similar schemes from Bacon and Wilhelm Wundt's *System der Philosophie* (155-162).

<sup>11</sup> See for example *Textos filosóficos* II, 89-92. "To Christ the Word he opposes the pagan Logos as Law and Destiny" (97), "the Fatum of the Romans, the ananke of the greeks [sic]" (123).

<sup>12</sup> This attitude makes Pessoa a strange bedfellow with certain Christian apologists, one of whom we have already mentioned: Henry Drummond, lecturer at the Free Church College in Edinburgh. Pessoa quotes from the twenty-first edition of *Natural Law in the Spiritual World* (1887), originally published in London in 1883. Another is Théophile Funck-Brentano, whose book *Les Sophistes grecs* Pessoa mentions several times. It is not clear whether he was also familiar with *Philosophie et les lois de l'histoire* (1859), the first half of which defines the limitations of epistemology, while the second half praises the triumph of Christianity.

<sup>13</sup> On the *persona*—and the lack of a direct influence of Pound on Pessoa—see "Fernando Pessoa e Ezra Pound," in Adolfo Casais Monteiro, *Estudos sobre a poesia de Fernando Pessoa* (Rio de Janeiro: Agir, 1958) 248-53.

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