The Politics of Negative Peace: Mozambique in the Aftermath of the Rome Cease-Fire Agreement

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Abstract. This paper discusses the Mozambican post-conflict order that ensued from the Rome peace negotiations. Drawing from an analytical framework that posits a tension between negative and positive peace, it argues that the peace achieved by the Rome negotiations may not be as stable as is generally assumed. The reasons for this are to be found in the negotiation process itself. The paper suggests that peace was bought from the warring parties in exchange for the promise of development aid. While this may have been necessary to bring the conflict to an end, it may have been at the expense of a long-lasting peace that might have included, for example, the settlement of human rights issues.

Introduction

After almost a decade of unremitting violent civil war Mozambique was delivered to peace in 1992 following 18 months of hard negotiating in Rome. The negotiations were facilitated by what C. Pedrick of the *Washington Post*, in its October 10th 1993 issue, called an "unlikely team of amateur peace brokers." This amateur team consisted mainly of the Sant'Egidio Community, an Italian Catholic lay organisation. The peace brokered by the community has been hailed as marking a significant watershed in conflict resolution in Africa.[1] Indeed, not only was it possible to bring the warring parties to the negotiating table but also to encourage them to produce a political agenda on the basis of which the process of negotiation evolved. When eventually a cease-fire agreement was reached, it was secured successfully by the United

Nations all the way up to the holding of elections in 1994, which were generally considered to have been free and fair. It has now been 10 years since the cease-fire agreement and the general opinion is that Mozambique is reaping the fruits of a successful peace-brokerage.

This paper takes issue with this overall optimistic view. To be sure, this optimism is not wholly unwarranted. In contrast to many violent conflicts in Africa, which were the object of international mediation, the Mozambican civil war came to an end.[2] The country has been enjoying a state of peace underwritten by an apparent commitment by the formerly warring parties to preserve the peace and to seek non-violent means of conflict resolution. We argue, however, that Mozambique is living through a peace that is not as shining an example as it is generally held to be. The new political arrangement has left questions of post-war justice unanswered and is upheld by the flow of funds for reconstruction, the so-called peace dividend. The stability of the new order is yet to be tested under political stress such as would be the case if FRELIMO were to be defeated in general elections or if frustrated RENAMO fighters were to stage an uprising. The main thrust of the argument consists in supporting this claim. In so doing we argue that this instability is directly related to the kind of peace that was brokered. In other words, the highly praised negotiation process had a major flaw: in order to commit the warring parties to peace, political, economic and moral trade-offs had to be made, which in the post-conflict order are coming to haunt Mozambican politics. We describe and analyse these trade-offs as "the peacemakers' dilemma." In the following section, we elaborate on this analytical framework. The subsequent section will attempt to reconstruct the conflict, the process of negotiation and the post-conflict order drawing from the analytical insights of the peacemakers' dilemma thesis. This will provide the basis for an assessment of the stability of the kind of peace achieved by the Rome negotiations.

The Peacemakers' dilemma: an analytical framework[3]

If we want to understand processes of peacemaking we need to look at questions of war and peace from a non-normative analytical perspective. In many statements and studies on peacemaking it is assumed that violence does not pay and that peace is a condition for development. The optimism of these programs faces a rough reality. Ongoing conflicts in many places in Africa show that violence pays and offers opportunities for the control of political power and resources. In this context peace-building may be a contradictory

enterprise. In addition, the reality of violent conflicts is highly diverse, especially in Africa. Different forms of violent group conflicts bear on the process and the chances of peace-making have to be taken into account in any peace-building enterprise. For the sake of intelligibility we construct ideal types of violent group conflicts and distinguish four main types:[4]

Centralised bi-polar conflicts

1. **Inter-national wars** between nation-states fighting for control over a state and territory.

2. **"Classical" civil wars** between political factions on a national level inside a nation-state fighting for political control of the state and territory.

Decentralised multi-polar conflicts

3. **Local inter-community conflicts** between local warrior and defence communities aiming at the accumulation of wealth, honour, fame, assertion of identity or control over a limited local territory and self-defence.

4. **Warlordism** with political and economic entrepreneurs whose power is based on the violence of armed forces of different sizes (warlords) fighting for wealth accumulation, political influence and sometimes for the control of a limited local or regional territory.

There are further types of violent actors, such as mercenaries, security enterprises or terrorist networks that may play specific roles in the conflicts presented here. And we should bear in mind that actors may change their nature; in real conflicts we may find several types of actors at the same time.

Peace-building itself is a process that includes much more than just an end to fighting. One can usually identify three phases:

1. Crisis management and an end to fighting leading to negative peace (i.e., absence of fighting).

2. Consolidation of peace leading to positive peace (i.e., stable peaceful order).

3. Conflict prevention and de-escalation.

For the analysis of the Mozambican peace-process we shall focus on the conditions necessary for the creation of negative and positive peace. The first step is negative peace, i.e., ending warfare. Generally speaking, the objective of armed conflict is victory, not peace as such. Only victory promises the enforcement of its own objectives while additionally bringing negative peace

(Elwert/Feuchtwang/Neubert 1999b). After victory, positive peace may follow. When victory is no longer a realistic option conflicting parties try at first not to lose the war.

In protracted wars in particular there are groups with a vested interest in their continuation. These are fighting units and their leaders, which we shall call "violence-actors," and other people profiting from the war (war profiteers), such as arms dealers, entrepreneurs controlling important markets of limited goods (e.g., often fuel, food) black market entrepreneurs, or smugglers. They constitute an alliance interested in the continuation of war, which has been termed a "war constituency" (Lederach 1995; Weiß 1997). Fear of defeat and the interests of the war constituency are a driving factor behind a self-enforced dynamic of violence (Elwert/Feuchtwang/Neubert 1999a). Only in cases where both sides see no possibility of winning the war and fear defeat, or when continuous warfare becomes less attractive (e.g., because of dwindling resources) may warring parties consider a negotiated peace as an option. This situation is called by Zartman (1985) a conflict that is "ripe for resolution."

In peace-building, violence-actors play a crucial role. They have a simple, practical veto power. To wit, often a single, well-targeted violent act can stop a peace process by provoking a violent retaliation. Therefore, the decision to end fighting lies in the hands of such actors.

Any peace-building enterprise must consider cost-benefit ratios as well as the motivation of violence-actors for a negotiated settlement (Krumwiede 1998; Calic 1998). We shall call this the "Realpolitik" approach (in its original German sense of radical, non-normative pragmatic politics). To put it differently, all-powerful violence-actors become important partners in peace-negotiations irrespective of their political positions and their role in the war. As we shall note below, this was a crucial ingredient to the Mozambican peace settlement. "Violence-actors" will only agree to peace if peace is more attractive than the continuation of violence. Only under exceptional conditions will all warring parties agree to an end to violence. In such cases, at least two conditions must be met: (1) guarantees that fighters are shielded from enemy attacks and from prosecution; (2) promises of political and economic gains for violence-actors (e.g., participation in the government, access to national resources, support for new enterprises).

Giving up the option of violence carries an extreme risk for the fighters. They relinquish their core resource, one that secured their survival and political and economic success. They subject themselves to a new order. They do this against the background of their former experience, which often tells

them that political promises are not usually kept. Therefore, it is no surprise that peace settlements after protracted warfare are rarely about the fundamental political and ideological questions that were originally part of the conflict. What dominates is the interest of military leaders and fighters in securing their position in political, economic and legal terms.

Negative peace is just the first step in a peace process. The main accomplishment is "positive peace" in the sense of building and consolidating a peaceful order. This introduces a new set of necessary actions and objectives (Kühne 1998):

1. Demobilisation of fighters and their reintegration into civilian life.

2. Installation of post-conflict governance including the reconstruction of public order and security, law enforcement and monopoly of violence as well as political reconstruction.

3. Technical reconstruction of infrastructure, clearing of war damages, and economic stabilisation.

4. Legal and psychological reconstruction including the regulation of war crimes, war damages, looted or illegally acquired property and reconciliation.

5. According to Western conceptions of post-conflict, peace-building also includes the accomplishment of the rule of law, social justice, political participation, and a constructive non-violent conflict culture and the control of emotions and instincts (Senghaas 1994, 17-49).

This peace-building sequence may sound self-contradictory. Indeed, for there to be negative peace, incentives and rewards for the war constituency are needed. Yet, positive peace demands the prosecution of war criminals and the regulation of open questions concerning property. As long as violence-actors face the threat of prosecution they will not agree to peace. However, an amnesty encourages a "culture of impunity" that gives legitimacy to crimes committed during warfare. There is a sense in which, therefore, the demands of a negative peace together with the necessary rewards for the fighters would lead to a situation in which violence would pay, after all. This contradiction is what we call the "peacemakers' dilemma."[5] A full, positive peace that includes justice, forgiving and the foundation of a new community will, to some extent, contradict the interests of the violence-actors. However, without their support and agreement a negotiated peace will not be possible.

The situation after a military victory, the peace of the victor as it were (Elwert/Feuchtwang/Neubert 1999b, 21), differs from the situation just

described. The victor may, and often does, dictate the peaceful order. Usually, war crimes are prosecuted and open questions concerning property are settled, and even reconciliation may be initiated. However, the defeated party mostly will be pursued legally.[6]

A mere consideration of the violence-actor's cost-benefit ratio (following the "Realpolitik" approach) does not guarantee peace negotiations that will result in actual peace. Successful peace-building is based on core conditions that are not easy to meet. Peace-building requires: (1) Recognisable conflicting parties with military and political leaders that can negotiate and implement peace (control military actions and sufficient command power); (2) leaders who are motivated to negotiate a peace-agreement that considers the specific security, political and economic interests of the opponents; (3) leaders and fighters who will accept post-conflict governance arrangements, including a monopoly of violence not controlled by themselves.

The chances of finding these conditions for peace-building vary according to the type of conflict. In bi-polar centralized conflicts, the core conditions may be established if the leaders are ready for real peace-negotiations. In decentralised multi-polar conflicts, peace-building is much more complicated. However, as long as fighters and leaders see themselves as being responsible for "their people," this concern may impel them to compromises. In cases of warlordism this motivation is lacking. Without linkages to the people, the main issue becomes the interests of leaders and fighters. The risk is that, after a peace agreement, unsatisfied fighters may split away and continue the conflict.

In any case, a peaceful order with a monopoly of violence will rarely be implemented only by agreement; it has to be enforced. The creation of a peaceful order is not (only) a question of negotiated peace but of the existence or creation of a power that is able to keep the monopoly of violence in a defined territory. In a nutshell, a peaceful order goes hand-in-hand with the establishment or the reassertion of a central state power. The kind of peaceful order will depend on the type of state and its political rule.

A classical civil war? The dynamics of armed violence

In this section we start by attempting to classify the Mozambican conflict in terms of our analytical framework. We argue that it is wiser to concentrate on the dynamics of conflict itself rather than on its causes (Elwert/Feuchtwang/Neubert 1999a). We make a distinction between mediation as a formal process and mediation as a substantive process. The former relates to the

logistical aspects necessary for mediation to take place, including choice of place, mediators and the order in which issues shall be discussed. The latter refers to the issues that are the subject of negotiation. This distinction is crucial to understanding the kind of peace that the Rome talks granted Mozambique. Indeed, we argue that mediation as a formal process allows us to see the negotiated settlement as a successful example of conflict resolution; mediation as a substantive process refers us, however, to our theoretical premise to the effect that successful mediation often involves the peacemakers' dilemma, with consequences for the post-conflict order. We shall explore the implications of the latter perspective by stressing two aspects of the negotiation process that were central to its success: the active bracketing-off of human rights issues and submission to the financial blackmail of the negotiating parties. We shall conclude the section with a brief checklist of the criteria of positive peace in order to draw attention to the fragility of the Rome peace.

Mozambique's brutal war has been variously described. These descriptions reveal a normative pattern that appears to play a major role in the analysis of the conflict. Accounts of the war tend to distinguish between internal and external factors. Authors who emphasise external factors are more likely to be sympathetic to the Marxist-oriented FRELIMO government that came to power at independence (e.g., Minter 1994; Saul 1993). In the context of the external emphasis, two accounts have been dominant. First, there are those who see the conflict as part of the Cold War. In this sense, Mozambique may have been caught in a proxy war. Secondly, though, the war has also been seen as having been driven by the hegemonic designs of South Africa's apartheid regime. Authors who give primacy to the internal factors have a tendency to play down regional and geo-strategic factors. Instead, they look into politics inside the country itself for an explanation of the war (e.g., Geffray 1990; Hall and Young 1997; Hoile 1994). In terms of these accounts, therefore, the war was a more or less legitimate act of resistance—by political opponents of the regime or by a disaffected rural population—against an illegitimate state power. There is perhaps a third type of description. It gives equal weight to internal and external factors, but rather than seeking to account for the war in normative terms it stresses the devastating effects of the conflict on the country as a whole. William Finnegan's account is a particularly good example of this type of account (Finnegan 1992; see also Gersony 1988).

Our aim in this paper is not to explain the war. Rather, we wish to focus on the dynamics of violence. The typology of conflicts that we presented

above may be quite helpful. There is a sense in which the Mozambican con-
flict could be described as a centralised bi-polar war. In its practical and dis-
cursive manifestations it had all the ingredients that could warrant its being
labelled as a "classical" civil war between political factions on a national level
inside a nation-state fighting for political control of the state and territory.
Indeed, the war opposed a government army fighting a conventional war to
a rebel army employing guerrilla tactics.

The government army relied on state resources for conscription, training
and financing. Its officers and soldiers were trained both in the country and
abroad. Training in the country itself was undertaken mostly by Tanzanian,
Soviet Russian and North Korean instructors. A considerable number of offi-
cers enjoyed training abroad in such diverse countries as Libya, East Germany,
Cuba and the Soviet Union. In the later years of the war several contingents
of Mozambican army officers were given training by British Special Forces in
Zimbabwe. The army acquired its military hardware mostly from the Soviet
Union, although the British army also supplied light weaponry in the later
stages of the war. In the early years of the war (late 1970s and early 80s), the
army's main strategy was defensive. This was a reaction to the guerrilla tactics
at the time, which were limited to ambushes and looting raids out of the
rebels' main bases in Southern Rhodesia. As the rebels increasingly established
themselves in Mozambique, especially in the central provinces, and became
more daring in their military campaign, the army switched to an offensive
strategy with frequent incursions against rebel strongholds. This strategy was
combined with attempts at securing transport routes, economic infrastructure
such as bridges, factories and electricity pylons, as well as providing protection
to travellers and villagers in the countryside.

The rebels evolved from an initial mercenary stage to a kind of guerrilla
army supported by apartheid South Africa and Western right-wing groups
with some sort of a political programme. They blended elements of a fairly
well organised warlord structure that supported the war effort with looting,
forced labour and poaching. A significant source of revenue from the mid-
eighties onwards was protection money. They were able to extract this from
the British multinational Lonrho as well as from Malawi. They were created
by the Southern Rhodesian secret service towards the end of the seventies to
counter the activities of Zanu-PF in Mozambique and to undermine the sup-
port given to the former by the latter. With majority rule in Zimbabwe in
1980, they moved their bases to Mozambique. They established their head-

quarters in a mountainous area in Central Mozambique. Training and military supply were taken over by the South African Army Intelligence Services, which would remain loyal to the rebels throughout the conflict, even after the signing of a non-aggression pact between Mozambique and South Africa (Stiff 1999). In the early years of the conflict the rebels avoided engaging the army directly. They aimed their activities at economic infrastructure and carried out raids and terrorist acts against the civilian population. During these raids and attacks on the civilian population, the rebels conscripted fighters into their ranks and procured food and consumer goods. The latter, together with ivory from felled elephants and different types of hides, would be exchanged for other consumer goods as well as for weaponry through an intricate trading system involving middlemen in Malawi and South Africa (Vines 1996).

By the mid-eighties, the rebels' military campaign had been largely successful. They had been able to spread their activities to the whole of the country, severely undermining economic activity in the countryside and curtailing the movement of people between cities. Contrary, however, to overly romanticised accounts of an efficient guerrilla force of highly motivated and well-trained fighters enjoying the support of the rural population against a demoralised, under-equipped and inefficient government army (e.g., Cabrita 2000; Hoile 1994), the main success of the rebels seems to have been its staying power. In other words, the rebels were successful in that the government army was unable to defeat them militarily. They relied on a well-articulated military structure (for details see Geffray 1990; Gersony 1988; Hoile 1994; Vines 1991). They had a communications systems superior to that of the government which allowed them not only to co-ordinate their campaigns well but also to intercept and interfere with the government army's communications systems (Cabrita 2000). In spite of their military strength, the rebels never controlled territory. Some authors suggest that this simply did not fit into their military philosophy, which relied heavily on mobile and flexible fighting units (Geffray 1990; Vines 1991). Other authors point to the lack of a coherent political project, which would have been necessary to rally the population behind the rebels. The territory under the control of the rebels consisted of their strongholds and their respective perimeters. Most accounts of the internal organisation of these areas suggest that civilians living there were neither followers nor supporters of RENAMO but rather captives or villagers who were expected to grow food for the fighters (Geffray

1990; Gersony 1988; Minter 1994). Civilians were an efficient human shield against government army air raids.

In the months following the signing of the Nkomati Accord, the non-aggression pact between South Africa and Mozambique in 1984, the government, aided by a much better equipped and trained Zimbabwean expeditionary force—with British SAS commandos—launched an all-out offensive against the main rebel strongholds in Central Mozambique. Most of them were overrun, forcing the rebels to disperse and break into very small units. These campaigns dealt severe blows to the rebels without, however, seriously curtailing their military activities, which became even more brutal.[7] While the rebels were never able to recover military initiative as in the period immediately before the intervention of the Zimbabwean army, they managed to keep their disruptive potential throughout the country. From 1987 to 1989/90 the war was technically a stalemate. The joint Mozambican/Zimbabwean forces could hold the rebels in check, but were unable to seriously limit their activities in the country at large. The rebels, for their part, had had to give up their strongholds, but were able to reorganise and set forth their campaigns.

The politics of peace-building

Towards the end of the eighties, it had become clear to many that neither party could win the war. A number of factors accounted for this. On the government's side, the war effort was sapping resources that were dearly needed elsewhere. There are estimates according to which it was costing Mozambique and Zimbabwe nearly a million dollars a day to keep the joint force. Donors were pressing for a negotiated solution to the conflict as a precondition for further structural adjustment funds and emergency relief. In the eighties, the country found itself in the throes of a severe drought that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and displaced around 4 million people. Internally, there were growing calls for a negotiated settlement. The churches played a prominent role in such calls, but there were also similar calls from within the ruling FRELIMO party.[8] On the rebels' side, the Nkomati Accord had, in spite of continued covert support from South Africa, placed severe constraints on RENAMO. Concerted military offensives by the joint Mozambican/Zimbabwean force had taken the initiative away from the rebels. The drought was taking its toll on the traditional logistics of the guerrilla fighting units, which could no longer rely on looting and forced labour for food procurement (Hume 1994; Della Rocca 1997; Vines 1996). There

were also calls on the rebels to prepare for a negotiated settlement. These came from South Africa, the rebels' main backers, and sympathetic African governments such as the Malawian and Kenyan.

Previous attempts at ending the conflict peacefully had ended unsuccessfully, apparently because they had failed to take the rebels seriously. The earliest attempt was made in the run-up to the Nkomati Accord, when the South African government arranged for the rebels to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Mozambican political order, including its head of state, Samora Machel, in exchange for amnesty and reintegration into Mozambican society. Indirect talks are said to have taken place, mediated by the then South African foreign minister, Roelof "Pik" Botha (Cabrita 2000). These plans never came into fruition owing to differences within the rebel movement, which at the time was locked into bloody internal conflict.[9] After the Nkomati Accord, the government combined its military strategy with an amnesty policy. While many rank-and-file rebel fighters heeded the amnesty call, it had no significant impact on the leadership. The most prominent figure to surrender was Constantino Reis, a highly controversial person, who had defected from FRELIMO in the early eighties to join the rebels only to be later accused of having been a member of the government's security services (e.g., Cabrita 2000).

Mozambique's growing dependence on Western foreign aid, which was essential both for structural adjustment as well as for emergency relief operations, gave an impetus to a process of economic and political liberalisation. Political liberalisation reached its climax in 1990, when a new liberal democratic constitution was passed following a broad consultation process. Although not calculated to appease the rebels, whom the government continued to label "armed bandits," thereby denying them political legitimacy as negotiating partners, this political move was an important preliminary to the peace process. In their various attempts at formulating a political agenda, the rebels had often insisted on a liberal democratic political order as the aim of their struggle. Confronted with this *fait accompli*, they had trouble justifying the war to the international community and this must have played a major role in predisposing them to a negotiated settlement.

The Mozambican war was ripe for resolution (Zartman 1985). The military options had become limited, risky and costly. Economic resources to fuel the war had become scarce, popular support had declined dramatically[10] and a sort of political platform that could serve as the basis for negotiation had come into existence.

The Rome negotiations

We shall look first at the formal structure of the mediation of the Mozambican conflict. Cameron Hume, a deputy chief of the U.S. mission to the Vatican at the time when peace negotiations took place in Rome and an official observer for the American State Department, has written a straightforward and well-balanced account of the talks (Hume 1994). His account describes the process and seeks to uncover the reasons for the success of the mediation. Between July 1990 and October 1992, twelve rounds of talks were held at the Community of Sant'Egidio in Rome involving representatives of the FRELIMO government and the RENAMO rebels. They were mediated by this lay Catholic community, building on initiatives to bring peace to the country undertaken by the churches in Mozambique dating back to the mid-eighties.

Hume breaks the negotiating process into five conceptual parts. In the first part, which covered the first three rounds of talks between July and December 1990, the negotiating process consisted of getting dialogue started. The single most important issue that was discussed throughout the first three rounds was the status of the negotiating partners. As Hume points out, traditional diplomacy is mainly concerned with conflicts between states. The Mozambican conflict, however, opposed a state to an insurgent movement. By agreeing to talk, the government of Mozambique had largely acknowledged the rebels' status as a negotiating partner. Nonetheless, it was at pains to keep the façade of negotiating as a sovereign entity by consistently rejecting the involvement of the United Nations as a peace-broker. The rebels, for their part, were inexperienced diplomatically and politically, had few resources to match those the government could muster for its negotiating team, and were highly suspicious. They were concerned with their personal security and wary about talking to the government directly. They insisted throughout on the presence of mediators who would ensure not only the good faith of the government but also fair negotiations. Eventually a formula was reached with Zimbabwe and Kenya serving as mediators on behalf of the government and the rebels with the Community of Sant'Egido as facilitator.

The second part spanned rounds four, five, six and seven between January and October 1991. It dealt with the nitty-gritty of the negotiating process. Hume groups these rounds under the heading "ordering the peace process." He thereby drew attention to the fact that it was during this period that the parties focussed on the steps required to achieve peace. A major issue at the time was the timing of discussion of political and military issues. After very

difficult negotiations, during which both parties threatened to withdraw, the so-called Protocol I document was signed on 18 October 1991. Not only did it lay down the framework within which talks would proceed, but it also defined an agenda that would henceforth structure the process.

The third part consisted of rounds eight and nine. Although little direct contact took place between the negotiating parties, agreement was reached on 12 March 1992 concerning the electoral law for the elections that would follow a cease-fire agreement. In the fourth part, round ten, the framework, to use Hume's words (p. 95), was expanded to include institutions and governments that had the leverage to enforce whatever agreement was reached. For the first time since the start of talks in Rome, the government and the rebels negotiated directly with one another: the Mozambican head of state and the rebel leader met in private all night long to settle outstanding issues before signing, in August 1992, a declaration committing themselves to peace and thanking the mediators for their role in bringing them together. The final part of the peace talks consisted of rounds eleven and twelve. It worked out compromises on military issues, including the technical details concerning demobilisation, the formation of a new unified army and overall security for former rebels. It ended with the signing of the General Peace Agreement on 4 October 1992 in Rome.

This brief tour through the formal structure of the negotiating process as it took shape in Rome brings into bold relief what is actually involved in such procedures. Mediation, as Hume clearly shows, was crucial to bringing violent conflict to manageable proportions through de-escalation. All through the process mediators sought to bring the negotiating partners to set the conditions for negative peace, i.e., the absence of fighting. Negative peace is not an end in itself, but rather a step towards a higher goal, namely positive peace. In the Mozambican conflict the important preconditions for negotiating a negative peace had been met. There were recognisable political parties and identifiable military and political leaders ready and willing to negotiate for peace. As we have seen above, the Mozambican conflict developed into a classical civil war opposing a state and a rebel guerrilla movement. Furthermore, both parties displayed a coherent and well-structured hierarchy with leaders strong enough to impose themselves on their followers. On either side of the conflict there seemed to be enough motivation to pursue negotiations as the better alternative. To be sure, at times both parties seemed to misunderstand the whole process. This apparent misunderstanding reflected, in fact, con-

trasting negotiating strategies, which were to prove unrealistic. FRELIMO sought to use the peace process as a way of accommodating the rebels without relinquishing power. As for the rebels, who did not seem to have any long-term objectives, the peace process was a highly effective way to secure political recognition internationally. The Italian ambassador to Mozambique at the time reports, for example, on a long and bitter conversation he had with the Mozambican President in which the latter castigated the mediators for seeming to take sides with the rebels. The President's wrath had apparently been caused by the mediators' inability or unwillingness to force the rebels to accept peace on the government's terms (Della Rocca 1997).

The politics of negative peace are nonetheless much more complex than Hume's neat account might suggest. As mentioned above many peace settlements are less about political and ideological issues at the root of the conflict than they are about securing the position of military leaders and fighters in political, economic and legal terms. This holds true for Mozambique. Much of what Hume describes as starting the dialogue involved precisely helping the parties to define themselves in ways that would help them secure claims in a post-conflict order. In the initial rounds of negotiations, the government was concerned to project the impression of being the representative of a magnanimous sovereign state stretching its hand to nationals gone astray. Behind this "impression management," there were hard political calculations, which included securing further international recognition for the purpose of maintaining its role as the manager of overseas development assistance. Acknowledging Mozambique's sovereignty under FRELIMO rule was the price the mediators had to pay to secure the government's commitment to peace. In the short and medium term, this was a moderate price to pay in comparison to what it would take to secure the rebels' acquiescence. Indeed, the mediators were faced with a formidable task. There were three important sets of issues at play, namely the political, the diplomatic and the financial.

First, throughout the civil war the rebels had failed to develop a political profile and programme. Authors who account for the war in internal terms often assume that the alleged rural dissatisfaction with post-independence modernisation strategies constituted the rebels' political programme. The argument is misleading. It seems to suggest that the rebellion grew out of this dissatisfaction, when in fact the rebels came much later to articulate it as part of the things for which they were fighting. When steps towards a negotiated settlement of the Mozambican conflict gained momentum, the rebels' main

concern was to develop a political profile. They commissioned a South-Africa-based German constitutional lawyer, Prof. Andre Thomashausen, to draft statutes for the movement as well as to write up a constitution for a post-conflict Mozambique. On several occasions, the rebels approached some Western governments for support in political matters. Cameron Hume has remarked that RENAMO's negotiators in Rome seemed more comfortable discussing military matters than political ones. In 1991, the Italian government funded the first RENAMO congress ever (Vines 1996), a move calculated by the rebels to give its negotiating position more political weight. As the peace process unfolded, the rebels became increasingly confident on political issues, even if oftentimes they were caught out of step by the government, which in its own reforms had gone much further than the rebels' anti-communist rhetoric would have expected. The mediators recognised that the success of the talks hinged largely on the rebels' ability to articulate political positions. The money and effort that they invested in this was well spent.

Second, the rebels were internationally isolated. With the exceptions of South Africa, Kenya and Malawi, virtually no other country overtly supported them. South Africa did it by virtue of its own pariah status at the time as well as due to the fact that it had taken control of the rebels after the demise of the white minority regime in Rhodesia. Kenya did it out of hostility towards the FRELIMO government and because of the internal Mozambican lobby.[11] Malawian authorities were also extremely hostile to the Mozambican government[12] and had struck deals with the rebels for the safety of the Nacala corridor, Malawi's lifeline to the world. For successive American administrations, the Mozambican rebels were little more than terrorists, even at the height of anti-communist sentiment during the Reagan administration. An official State Department report labelled RENAMO "Africa's Khmer Rouge" (Gersony 1988). There was a ban on RENAMO leaders' visits to the US. Britain was also hostile to the rebels. It went further than the US in granting the Mozambican government military assistance against RENAMO. The rebels saw the peace process as a welcome opportunity to break out of their international isolation. In the early rounds of the talks, they repeatedly raised the issue. At times, they would justify their reservations against certain Western countries on the grounds that they were biased towards the government. One particularly cunning strategy the rebels deployed to this end was the insistence that mediators and foreign dignitaries wishing to consult with the rebel leader do so in his stronghold in Mozambique.

ELISIO MACAMO   DIETER NEUBERT

Finally, the rebels were in dire need of money. As de-escalation set in, the rebels were faced with worsening logistical problems coupled with the rather exacting financial price attached to participation at the talks in Rome. Their negotiators had to travel and be lodged. Often they lacked such bare necessities as pencils and notebooks,[13] not to mention technical equipment that would allow swift and reliable communication with the leadership in the Mozambican bush.

Getting the rebels to the negotiating table also meant meeting their financial needs. The rebels' top negotiator in Rome is quoted as having said that there is "no democracy without money" (Vines 145). The rebels' demands for money rose from USD$3 million in December 1991 to USD$10-12 million by June 1992. The Italian government had been footing most of the bill for the peace process, including the rebels' Rome telephone bills between January and July 1992 at USD$60,000 and the flight costs of the rebels' London lobbyist, a film crew, and exiled rebel supporters to visit rebel-controlled areas in Mozambique (Vines 144). Alex Vines writes of Italian spending on the peace talks as "…an astute reading of probably the single greatest interest RENAMO had, namely to extract maximum material, rather than political benefits from the peace process" (Vines 145). It is well known that the rebels made the signing of the cease-fire agreement conditional upon payment. The Italian ambassador to Mozambique at the time of the negotiations sent a fax to his superiors in Rome on 21 April 1992 in which he informed them that the rebel leader had threatened that the talks might not evolve in a positive way if his movement's demands for financial assistance were not met (Della Rocca 231). Funds subsequently pledged by the Italian government never materialised as an angry rebel leader would reveal in 1993 at a press conference in Maputo (Vines 152). According to him, Italy had promised his movement USD$15 million for signing the cease-fire. Furthermore, relations between the rebel leader and Tiny Rowland, Lonrho's chief executive, chilled over precisely financial matters. Apparently, the rebel leader demanded a payment of USD$6-7 million as a precondition for signing a peace accord (Vines 146). Lonrho, which during the war had struck protection deals with the rebels, went out of its way to meet the rebels' financial needs. The rebel leader frequently travelled on Lonrho's executive jet to Malawi and Kenya for consultations. After the signing of the peace accord, a considerable number of leading rebels were accommodated free of charge at Maputo's Cardoso Hotel owned by Lonrho.

In a sense, negotiating peace for Mozambique was more than just an exercise in textbook mediation. It was an exercise in pretence. The mediators pretended that they were dealing with an intact sovereign state on the one hand and a legitimate political opposition on the other hand. The fact that the peace negotiations themselves were proof that the Mozambican state was not as sovereign and as intact as it pretended to be was a necessary fiction for the success of mediation. The same argument applies equally well to the rebels, whose inability to formulate a coherent political programme and obvious attempts at blackmailing their way into a post-conflict political order flew in the face of the aura of respectability attached to the Rome peace talks.

The substantive agenda of the peace talks centred on the peacemakers' dilemma. It revolved around the tension between negative peace and positive peace. The purely technical aspects of positive peace did take place as planned. Demobilisation, for example, took place on schedule, even if initially RENAMO only demobilised fighters from marginal areas such as Niassa and Inhambane. Later it transpired that the government and RENAMO had both attempted to keep "hidden armies." The moves were aborted by the soldiers themselves, who were war-fatigued and feared being excluded from the process of demobilisation. Disarmament also got off to a bad start, as RENAMO only surrendered poorly maintained and old weaponry (Vines 1996). Both the government and RENAMO continued to maintain undeclared weapons stores, a small fraction of which were located and destroyed by the UN (Vines 155). In the run-up to the first elections in 1994, there were numerous violent incidents, 374 overall, involving former fighters. In one such incident a government minister along with 200 other people was kidnapped and held hostage by former combatants. Under the provisions of the General Peace Agreement, demobilised soldiers were to be given a monthly cash subsidy for 18 months funded by the international community, a demobilisation card, civilian clothing, food for the journey back home and three months' salary in advance. In addition, the government pledged a six-month subsidy to be disbursed by the authorities of the demobilised soldiers' home areas or of an area of their choice. The formation of the national army took much longer than envisaged. In fact, contrary to what had been planned, no unified army was on the ground by the time elections were held in 1994.

Technical reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure started even before the elections. It was part of the national reconstruction programme that donors had committed themselves to financing once peace had been achieved.

There have been very critical voices against the politics of aid to Mozambique. These have stressed its inappropriateness and insufficiency (Hanlon 1991; 1996) and its problematic neo-liberal assumptions (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995). Whatever the relative merits of the practice of development aid in Mozambique, it is obvious that structural adjustment has provided a frame-work for the management of reconstruction activities in the post-war period.

However, with the exception of the return of church property confiscated by the FRELIMO government during its revolutionary phase as well as the return of—or compensation for—nationalised property, not much else has happened on this score. Neither the government army nor the rebels have been held accountable for looted or illegally acquired property. In spite of the fact that FRELIMO and RENAMO regularly hurl accusations against each other on war atrocities, these have not, as yet, been regulated in the form of prose-cution of war criminals or a nation-wide reconciliation initiative on the South African model.

While it is fair to assume that the Mozambican conflict was ripe for resolu-tion, available evidence suggests that the achievement of negative peace held important aspects of positive peace hostage to the negotiated settlement. Two aspects are worthy of note, both affecting the government as much as the rebels.

There seems to have been an assumption that successful mediation, mea-sured according to whether negative peace had been achieved, would have to bracket off human rights issues. Neither the government, nor the rebels, stood in a good light as far as these were concerned. The history of FRELIMO is one characterised by serious human rights abuses, which have never been properly discussed in Mozambique. FRELIMO shares with other liberation movements a general contempt for the rights of individuals held to be opposed to its ideological goals. During the liberation war, executions of adversaries as well as violent purges seem to have taken place as a matter of routine (Cabrita 2000; Chilcote 1972). In the period immediately before and after independence, political opponents were jailed, "re-educated" and even executed on grounds that hold little legal water. When the political system was opened up in the early 1990s, there were a few attempts, especially by the relatives of the victims, to reopen the files. These bore little fruit. Throughout the post-independence socialist experiment, FRELIMO had a tendency to treat human rights in a cavalier manner by subordinating basic human rights issues to the ideological goal of constructing a socialist society. People were sent to so-called "re-education camps,"[14] or rounded up and forced to leave their

homes and relatives and start a new existence elsewhere in the country. Corporal and capital punishment were reintroduced after having been abolished at independence. In the late seventies and early eighties, there were public executions of "enemies of the state," a category that lumped together captured insurgents and racketeers. While these human rights abuses never took place on as massive and genocidal a scale as in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, a regime FRELIMO identified as a "natural ally," they followed, at times, a similar fanatical ideological logic.

The RENAMO rebels were even worse. They rank amongst the most brutal guerrilla movements Africa has ever seen. Their terrorist repertoire included the routine maiming of victims chillingly documented by Lina Magaia, a Mozambican journalist (Magaia 1988). RENAMO directed its violence principally against civilians, ambushing vehicles and trains, looting and burning to the ground entire villages and small towns and sowing landmines on a massive scale in the rural countryside. Living on communal villages or being a member of a FRELIMO organisation was reason enough to be the target for RENAMO's brutal reprisals. The substantive agenda of the peace talks circumvented these issues in the interest of negative peace. During the negotiations, the mediators were too weary to address such issues. No provisions were made for these problems after the peace process was completed.

The second aspect related to the substantive agenda concerns the political economy of peace itself. Peace was in the interest of both parties to the conflict. Nevertheless, it had to be sold to them. As far as the government was concerned, peace was intimately linked to the prospect of a steady flow of development aid. Donors had made it clear to the government of Mozambique as early as 1984 that aid would only be forthcoming if the country could move towards peace. The Nkomati Accord was a preliminary that was soon to be followed by economic liberalisation and later political opening. Peace held out the promise of a state in control of the flow of development resources. FRELIMO's adamant refusal to form a government of national unity after narrowly winning the first multiparty elections in 1994 effectively allowed it to reap the benefits of peace in the form of control over development aid. The only concession that FRELIMO made to RENAMO was the offer to the latter's leader of the special status of "Leader of the Opposition," a position that entailed a state salary, benefits and protocol treatment.

As for the rebels, it is clear that peace meant much more than just an end to fighting. Not only did they seize the opportunity offered by the negotia-

tions to make up for their financial shortcomings, but they also sought to secure their livelihood in post-conflict Mozambique. Within the framework of the cease-fire, a UN Trust Fund was set up in 1993 to aid political parties in the initial stages of democracy. Western goverments raised as much as US$17 million for RENAMO to transform itself into a political party. Its middle-ranking officers benefited from US$250,000 earmarked for them as handouts every month (Vines:152). Illiterate military leaders were integrated into the new national army as high-ranking officers. Leading RENAMO members found themselves sitting on commissions and institutions that placed them in a position to fend for themselves and their followers. The major prize, however, went to the leadership in the form of control over the resources flowing to the organisation as part of the peace deal.

Conclusion: The rebels who did not lose the war, but lost the peace...

The Rome peace negotiations brought a bitter and brutal war to an end. While it is perfectly legitimate to see them as an example of a very successful peace negotiation, caution should be exercised. They were able to bring peace about because they recognised the reality of violent armed conflicts. While basic political issues are important, more down to earth considerations have to be taken into account if peace negotiations are to be successful. Politics were central to the Mozambican conflict. The idea that the conflict was about democracy or the return of the country to its own cultural traditions was a usable one, both for the warring parties as well as for interested observers. It served the purpose of giving coherence to efforts to making it solvable.

However, the main thrust of the negotiation process did not consist in laying the ground for democracy to work. Rather, it consisted in winning the warring parties over to the cause of peace. The main bait used by the international mediators to lure the warring parties into negotiations was the promise of development aid to be channelled through a democratic and peaceful Mozambican state. In this, however, there lay a dilemma that casts its shadow over the post-conflict order. Peace negotiations aimed at bringing about negative peace and in order to do so they had to gloss over basic human rights issues such as the atrocities that were committed during the war, the destruction of property and the general arrested development of the country. Violence, both for the ruling FRELIMO party as well as for the insurgent RENAMO rebels, paid.

The basic assumption underlying the outcome of the Rome negotiations is that there were neither winners nor losers. Yet the facts contradict this

assumption. The warring parties were bribed into a settlement, but the ruling FRELIMO party won the day. Since the biggest prize was the development state, by winning the first general elections in 1994 and surviving through the transitional stage to the second general elections in 1999, FRELIMO was able to keep the state firmly under its control and dictate the terms of the post-conflict order. Although the Rome peace treaty provided for a strong RENAMO voice in the post-conflict political order through its representation in major national institutions such as the National Electoral Commission and the Armed Forces, FRELIMO has been able to set the pace by virtue of its control of the state.

To add to RENAMO's difficulties it has been unable to make the transition from a rebel movement into a political party. Here again the Rome negotiations can be regarded as having played a significant role. Indeed, as part of the peace deal, the RENAMO leadership was placed in a neo-patrimonial position with regards to its own constituency. The United Nations Trust Fund as well as the cash handouts paid to the leaders gave the latter considerable financial power, which they have used to entrench their position. Most internal conflicts within RENAMO have been over the distribution of financial resources. The RENAMO leader has often been accused of using the party's treasury as private property. Meanwhile, RENAMO's chief negotiator in Rome, Raul Domingos, has left the party for reasons related to accusations of financial mismanagement rather than for political differences.

Coupled with this, RENAMO failed to develop a clear political profile. This might not be unrelated, once again, to the terms of the Rome peace agreement. Given that the major prize promised by the peace settlement was the state, RENAMO concentrated its energies on capturing it. In the process, the rebels neglected basic political work such as establishing structures at the local level. In 1998, Mozambique held council elections,[15] which were boycotted by RENAMO. In this way, it might have missed a golden opportunity to establish itself as a political force with political responsibilities within the context of local-level politics. There are signs that this has dawned on RENAMO, as it prepares to contest the next council elections. Whether this indicates a significant departure from the obsession with state power remains to be seen. The highly centralised nature of Mozambican politics has played a role in promoting state fixation. In a context where all taxes are levied and distributed by the central authorities, real political power can only be wielded by those who control the state.

It is in this sense that it can be said that RENAMO did not lose the war, but lost the peace. Its effective military campaign was a useful resource to win political accommodation in a post-conflict Mozambique, but the benefits of peace in the form of the development state went to the former enemy. All that RENAMO has been left with is the empty shell of a neo-patrimonial political organisation without enough funds to keep up the pretence. The Rome peace agreement seems to have come to its limits. It secured stability through the injection of development aid to the FRELIMO-controlled state and money to RENAMO, both of which mixed with the post-war reconstruction boom to foster a sense of optimism. This money is running short and will not be enough to buy RENAMO's acquiescence. The next elections may be a very strong test of the Rome agreement. Should FRELIMO win, there will be even less for RENAMO. Should RENAMO win, FRELIMO might fall into a crisis as a state party without a state. It seems that the post-war arrangement faces its major test.

It is not surprising that RENAMO's political discourse has become more aggressive in tone. Already at the last elections RENAMO cried foul, accusing the ruling FRELIMO party of fraud. Even now, in the run-up to council and parliamentary elections, the tone has been highly charged, with RENAMO warning that the only way it can fail to win the elections is if the ruling FRELIMO party commits fraud. This warning is not only indicative of the deep mistrust that underlies Mozambican politics at the moment, but also reflects the terms of the Rome peace deal in a significant manner. An important party to the peace deal is getting desperate, and this might not augur well for the future of peace in Mozambique.

Notes

[1] The celebratory literature includes Alden 2001; Cabrita 2000; Chan and Venâncio 1998; Della Rocca 1997; Synge 1997.

[2] Most recent civil wars did not achieve peace even when peace agreements were signed (e.g., Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, D.R. Congo). The few cases where civil wars were actually terminated were mainly due to the victory of one side (e.g., Uganda, Biafra).

[3] See Neubert 2003 for an elaborate discussion.

[4] Violent group conflicts shall be differentiated with regard to: the actors involved and their (political) objectives, the specific type of warfare, financial resources for war, and the internal structures of warring parties, including command-structure, professionalization, and with regards to links between fighters and a given population.

[5] A compromise is a regulation that offers amnesty to those who acknowledge their guilt.

In South Africa this was the case for violent acts committed out of political motives. As a result, the political leaders de facto had good chances for an amnesty and only the lower officer ranks and the rank and file risked criminal proceedings.

[6] From the perspective of the defeated, the new peace order is forced and seen as one-sided (e.g., the war crime tribunals in Rwanda or ex-Yugoslavia are criticised by the defendants).

[7] A particularly chilling sign consisted in massacres, such as in Homoíne and Manjacaze where 400 and 90, respectively, were slaughtered by roving Renamo gangs.

[8] There was, for instance, an anonymous letter written by Liberation War veterans calling for talks with our "brothers" in the bush (Anonyme 1988).

[9] I remember a chilling conversation in 1997 with a former vice-president of Renamo—an academic based in the U.S. It took place at a Lisbon Hotel and was a never-ending list of executions, assassinations and threats that took place in South Africa, Malawi and Portugal over the political leadership of Renamo and control of its funds [EM] (see also Vines 1991).

[10] Alex Vines reports that the Minister of Defence complained at a Frelimo Party Congress that an increasing number of young people were refusing conscription (Vines 1996).

[11] Kenya gave refuge to a considerably large Mozambican dissident community from the liberation struggle years.

[12] This hostility seemed to stem from Banda's, Malawi's first president, territorial ambitions; Banda had coveted parts of Mozambique and seems to have struck deals with disaffected former Portuguese settlers to achieve this.

[13] Della Rocca writes: "A l'exception des armes, la Renamo est dénuée de tout matériel et de toute facilité technique essentielle: elle manque de médicaments, d'essence, de chaussures, d'énergie électrique, de papier, de bics, de moyens de transport et de passeports. Après une séance de négociation, alors qu'il se prepare à retourner dans la forêt, [Raul] Domingos [the rebels' chief negotiator in Rome] doit mettre à exécutio des listes d'achat d'objets les plus variés, allant des crayons aux piles, qui le retiennent longtemps dans les supermarchés de Rome" (p.232).

[14] André Matsangaíssa, Renamo's first leader, as well as Afonso Dhlakama escaped from such a camp to Southern Rhodesia.

[15] Albeit in 33 cities and towns.

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