The (In)Tangible Legacy of “Generic Lusotropicalism”: Unexamined Links in the Textual History of “Portuguese Humane Colonialism”

If this passage has attracted appropriate attention here and there, never—and one should ask why—have the commentators bothered to know what could have been its documented source.
—Pierre Franklin-Tavares, Hegel et l’Abbé Grégoire

Sources are always about something else.
—Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History

ABSTRACT: For quite some time, Portuguese scholars have proposed that the success of the cooption of Gilberto Freyre’s Lusotropicalism by the colonial discourse of Portugal’s Estado Novo can be explained in part due to the preexistence of a colonial discourse that contained similar ideas, at least as far back as the late eighteenth century. In this article, I trace the textual history of what has been called “generic Lusotropicalism” in order to establish some of the known and lesser-known sources of this ideological construct. Whereas the authority of sources has continually been claimed both by proponents of generic Lusotropicalism—as historical corroboration—and by scholars who have studied it, I claim here that this textual history is more heterogeneous than may have been previously thought and has not always been wielded with the same rhetorical or political purposes.

KEYWORDS: Lusotropicalism, humane colonialism, Hegel, Henry Koster, Jaime Cortesão

RESUMO: A existência de um ideário de feição lusotropicalista em Portugal prévio à apropiação do lusotropicalismo de Gilberto Freyre pelo discurso colonial do Estado Novo, e que se manifestaria desde pelo menos os finais do séc. XVIII, tem sido explicada pelos estudosos como uma razão do sucesso dessa apropição. Este artigo segue no encaio da história textual daquilo a que se chamou “lusotropicalismo genérico,” de forma a estabelecer
In recent years, pointed controversies have emerged in the Portuguese public sphere regarding the memory of Portuguese colonialism and the country’s role in the history of transatlantic slavery. Whether they were ignited by a Lisbon municipal project for a so-called “Museum of the Discoveries,” a historically inaccurate speech delivered by the president while on state visit in Senegal that attempted to paint the country’s legal abolition precedent as the de facto historical abolition of slavery,² or the widespread hostility towards the increasingly visible affirmation of Black political identities and their vocal rejection and denunciation of police brutality, these debates once again exposed the degree to which ideas and beliefs loosely or closely associated with the discursive field known as Lusotropicalism—that is, simply put, Portuguese racial exceptionalism—remain pervasive in the national psyche almost fifty years after the end of Portuguese colonial rule in Africa. Beyond the chatter on social media, where the belief in Portuguese “benign colonialism” is very conspicuous, many conservative pundits and public figures have authored newspaper op-eds where the ideology we have come to associate with the Brazilian sociologist, anthropologist, and cultural historian Gilberto Freyre (1900–1987) constitutes a tacit grammar. Perhaps more surprisingly, in at least one instance Lusotropicalism was openly defended as a political project for the present era.³ Perhaps more uncanny than the remarkable resilience that colonialist ideology has managed to enjoy in a postcolonial age is the candor with which arguments that were already shown to be faulty when Lusotropicalism was timidly challenged for the first time in a scholarly publication are again recuperated, as if the independence of the five Portuguese-speaking African countries had never taken place. Indeed, readers familiar with the controversy surrounding the publication of Charles Boxer’s *Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire* in 1963, and particularly with the
brief exchange that took place between the British historian and the Portuguese agronomist, historian, and cartographer Armando Cortesão (1891–1977), may be puzzled when recognizing in newspaper articles of the late 2010s the same arguments and tone that characterized the militant, pro-colonialist stance of Oliveira Salazar’s defenders in the 1960s. These articles read as if the steady stream of scholarship, as well as the manifestoes and speeches of Lusophone Africa’s intellectuals and independence leaders, published and discussed in the last sixty years, had never existed.4

In this article, I study one piece of the puzzle of this apparent cognitive dissonance by analyzing a textual chain that has not attracted much scholarly attention. There are many factors that explain the longevity and resilience of ideas loosely or directly associated with Lusotropicalism in the Portuguese national psyche, and certainly the fact that the Estado Novo used Freyre and some of his writings to shore up Portugal’s colonialist discourse after the 1950s has played a significant role (Castelo 1999, 2019). That role has also been scrutinized sharply and abundantly, starting as early as 1955 with the publication of “Qu’est-ce que le ‘luso-tropicalismo’?” by Buanga Fele (the pseudonym of a leader of Angola’s independence movement, Mário Pinto de Andrade) in Présence africaine, picking up again in the 1960s and 1970s with Eduardo Lourenço (1984 [1961]) and Valentim Alexandre (1973, 1979), and continuing throughout the 1990s with many scholars from different disciplines, including Cláudia Castelo, Miguel Vale de Almeida (2004), Cristiana Bastos (1998, 2019), Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2002), and many others. More recently, several edited volumes and special issues of academic journals, in English and French, where Lusotropicalism is directly or indirectly scrutinized have been published, and at least one was entirely devoted to discussing the topic.5 What has not received necessary attention is the study of why Freyrean Lusotropicalism found such fertile ground for taking root in late colonial and postcolonial Portugal, despite the Estado Novo’s initial reluctance to embrace it. I argue that it is due to what I, following Almeida, call “generic Lusotropicalism,” that is, “an inclination, a commonsense interpretation, sometimes . . . official representation” by way of which “Luso-Tropicalism has become a social fact” (Almeida 2004, 63). This is discernible in the long duration, which explains why ideas we now intuitively associate with Freyre were consensual even for opponents of the Estado Novo regime, including intellectuals associated with the Republican project of 1910–26, such as Jaime Cortesão (1884–1960).6

Built over centuries, and emerging in periods characterized by crises of imperial
expansion or contraction, generic Lusotropicalism is a discourse that fertilizes the ground, as it were, for the longstanding success of Lusotropicalism proper in the Portuguese national psyche, and so often is conflated with it. This may be because Freyre’s initial claim that the Portuguese possessed a special ability to adapt to life in the tropics—based on the categories of mobility, miscibility, and acclimatability, or more generally from the presupposition that the Portuguese were prone to miscegenation beyond self-interest—encourages a leap of faith toward legitimating the idea of an exceptional, more humane Portuguese colonialism. I do not offer a contrastive analysis of these two different and often conflated claims in this article; I merely signal this possibility as a valid avenue for future research. Instead, I pursue a reading of sources that allow me to trace a provisional history of the idea of Portuguese “humane colonialism” and discuss examples of its early instrumentalization by arguably unexpected actors.

To be fair, awareness of this generic, resilient precursor and survivor of Lusotropicalism is not new. Anna Klobucka (2002) has studied Camões’s *The Lusiads* (1572) and its episode of the Isle of Love as an antecedent to Freyre’s formulations, and Miguel Vale de Almeida (2004) also pointed out the felicitous coincidence of Freyre’s exceptionalist interpretation of Portuguese colonialism with its preexisting iterations in the discourse of the social sciences, literature, and the commonsensical self-representations of Portuguese national identity, which he located in the second half of the nineteenth century. Monica Grin (2012) compared the role of exceptionalist representations of the Portuguese empire in Portugal with that of the related myth of “racial democracy” in Brazil, and in what was arguably a pioneering formulation in post-1975 scholarship, Valentim Alexandre suggested in the preface to Cláudia Castelo’s well-known study that the Lusotropicalist image

*tem raízes antigas: a ideia de uma particularidade portuguesa, no domínio colonial, pode ser rastreada pontualmente já desde o século XVIII. Mas é no último quartel de Oitocentos que ela começa a ganhar consistência, pela articulação de elementos de diversa natureza. (Castelo 1999, 5)*

has old roots: the idea of a Portuguese particularity in the colonial domain can be traced already in the eighteenth century. But it is in the last quarter of the nineteenth century that it begins to acquire consistency, through the articulation of different elements of various nature.
Taking Pierre Franklin Tavares’s observation in my first epigraph to task, I have pursued a textual history that includes writings by G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) and the Portuguese-born British traveler, part-time slave-owner, and abolitionist Henry Koster (1793–1820), and is bookended closer to us by passages from the Portuguese historian Jaime Cortesão and, on the opposite chronological end, by excerpts from the French bishop, revolutionary leader, and abolitionist author Henri Grégoire (1750–1831). Some of these texts are known and have been discussed in different contexts, but reconstituting the links that associate them to generic Lusotropicalism allows us to understand one aspect of the grammar of Portuguese racial exceptionalism: the uncritical acceptance of textual sources at face value. These names are just pieces in the much larger puzzle that is the modern philosophical discourse on history, which encompasses many literary genres, travel writing in particular, and in Hegel knows one of its principal moments. What the rehearsal of this particular textual genealogy—a genealogy without a discernable origin or Archimedean point, as it were—shows is that the increasing consolidation of the discourse of exceptional Portuguese colonialism occurred in and responded to a specific historical context, that of the debates about the abolition of the slave trade in the early nineteenth century, and served distinct, sometimes opposite political motivations. In its early manifestations, generic Lusotropicalism embodied the complex intersection between a selective interpretation of empirical evidence about miscegenation in the Portuguese Atlantic (motivated by pragmatic political goals, whether it was the abolition of the slave trade or its staunch refusal) and the rhetorical needs of a philosophical discourse of history that built its claims to universality on the fissures of the testimonial discourse found in European travel narratives, whose political motivations or textual histories more often than not have gone unchecked.

Jaime Cortesão and “Humane Colonialism”

In August 1959, just one year before his death, and two years before the start of the African wars of liberation that eventually brought about the demise of the Portuguese empire, the Portuguese historian Jaime Cortesão gave an interview to Diário Ilustrado, a now-defunct Lisbon evening tabloid. In this interview, he was asked for an opinion about Freyre’s concept of Lusotropicalism. That a tabloid would have an interest in the views of an intellectual who earlier in the century had twice endured exile for his views on Salazar’s dictatorial regime suggests the degree to which Freyre’s cooption by Portuguese imperial discourse
was reaching the popular imagination by the end of the 1950s. The historian’s response to the question about Lusotropicalism, as well as the ensuing exchange with the interviewer, constitutes an invaluable document:

Acho muito interessante o tema [do Lusotropicalismo], mas as teorias de Gilberto Freyre excedem o meu campo próprio de investigação. De qualquer forma tenho-me encaminhado também para procurar a existência de um laço cultural comum numa ampla comunidade que envolva sobretudo Portugal e o Brasil, comunidade que, a meu ver, deveria ir até à estruturação política. (Cortesão 1959, 1)

I find the topic [of Lusotropicalism] very interesting, but Gilberto Freyre’s theories exceed my field of research. In any case, I have also been searching for the existence of a common cultural bond among an ample community that should involve mainly Portugal and Brazil, a community that, in my view, should go as far as [assuming the shape of] a political structure.

The first couple of sentences frame the tone and tenor of Cortesão’s testimony in this interview, which we could characterize as politely dismissive of the presumed central role played by Freyre. What can be read as a candid admission of lack of scientific competence serves also to quickly and effectively point out that Cortesão’s own work had already for a time pursued a path that was presumably comparable to that of Freyre’s Lusotropicalism; otherwise, the mention of his own research trajectory would be uncalled for. If it is possible to read Cortesão’s position as one of heuristic caution, motivated by his awareness of the different disciplinary fields in which both men operated, it is also important to point out that, for Cortesão, Lusotropicalism may have been a matter for anthropology and sociology to deal with, but exceptional Portuguese colonialism seems to belong to the field of history, as the continuation of the interview will show.

According to the Portuguese historian, his path culminates in the affirmation of a political entity that would affirm the “common cultural bond” that mainly Portugal and Brazil should share. Before proceeding to investigate what this cultural bond might consist of, it is worth noting that these statements give embryonic form to what since the early 1980s has been called “Lusofonia,” the postcolonial Portuguese brethren to ideas such as “Francophonie,” or “Commonwealth,” or even “Hispanidad.” Equally conspicuous is the conflation of (or at least the
immediate progression from) Freyre’s Lusotropicalism with the idea of a community of Portuguese-speaking nations, a project that actually did materialize in some fashion with the creation in 1996 of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP). This conflation is striking in that it speaks to the degree to which, by the time the anticolonial movements in Africa were celebrating their first victories, a Portuguese Republican intellectual respected for his antifascist credentials was preconditioned to recognize, in Freyre’s ideas of felicitous Portuguese miscegenation in the tropics, the ideals of Portuguese humane colonialism, the true seed that should blossom as the project for a new transnational Portuguese-speaking community. This precondition is powerful enough to explain the gesture of what I called the renunciation of reading, which we will witness in a moment, although we will have to understand such gesture as an instance of a certain history of reading, the pivotal moments of which I attempt to outline here.

But it could just as well be said that Cortesão’s statements conspicuously outlive the collapse, in the 1820s, of the Luso-Brazilian empire they nostalgically commemorate. The African liberation movements that at the time this interview took place were about to initiate a fourteen-year-long armed struggle against Portuguese rule do not seem to occupy a place of any preeminence in Cortesão’s imagined community, perhaps because the subaltern status of those territories was discouraging to a historian intent on determining Portuguese national character and tracing the history of the community it supposedly made possible. But could it also be that the “common cultural bond” sought by Cortesão would not survive critical scrutiny or the sobering reality check provided by the oppressive circumstances of daily experience for Africans living under Portuguese late colonialism? I believe the historian’s writing warrants both the questions and the ambivalence, which in my view spring from his peculiar word choice. Allow me to repeat one of the key sentences from Cortesão’s response: “I have also been searching for the existence of a common cultural bond among an ample community that should involve mainly Portugal and Brazil.” To search for the existence places the emphasis on “existence,” not on “common cultural bond.” It might mean to locate something one is convinced is already in existence, as the idea of a common cultural bond implies: the existence of the community alluded to is justified only by the linguistic, legal, religious, and racial bonds that somehow preexist it and that therefore incite the historian to search. But it can equally convey the act of conjuring up something that does not yet exist, as the subjunctive
mode ("que envolva") in the original Portuguese, as well as the historical evidence that such a community did not in fact exist at that time, amply attest. Thus, the ascription to the same utterance of what speech act theory calls a constative and a performative value is what contributes to the ambivalence I indicated above—an ambivalence that to me suggests that in this interview Cortesão alludes in fact to the idea of conjuring up a past, of inventing what one is already certain to exist or having existed; of inventing certainty, as much as certifying invention. Before I can clarify the stakes of this apparent hermeneutic circle, it is important to have a fuller sense of the line of argumentation followed by Cortesão in the continuation of the interview:

— Parece-lhe que, na verdade, o comportamento dos portugueses perante outras etnias se reveste da invulgaridade que pode derivar-se das teorias do lusotropicalismo?
— A minha opinião é de que o português foi, em relação às etnias diferentes, de uma forma geral, mais tolerante e compreensivo que os outros povos coloniais. Em apoio desta minha opinião cito-lhe nada menos do que este nome: Hegel na Filosofia da História e precisamente por comparação com os outros povos.
— Será que nos estamos mantendo dentro do mesmo caminho?
— Creio que o português, por herança cultural e temperamental, continua a ter, do ponto de vista individual, o mesmo comportamento. (Cortesão 1959, 1, 3)

— Does it appear to you that Portuguese behavior towards other ethnicities is in fact imbued with the exceptionalism we may derive from Lusotropicalist theories?
— My opinion is that, generally speaking, the Portuguese were, in relation to other ethnicities, more understanding and tolerating than the other colonial powers. In support of this opinion I cite you none other than this name: Hegel in the Philosophy of History, and precisely in comparison with the other powers.
— Do you think we are still treading the same path?
— I believe that the Portuguese, because of their cultural and temperamental heritage, maintain at the individual level, the same behavior.

As we can now tell, the “common cultural bond” that would inform a transatlantic political community of the Portuguese language is informed by the belief in an exceptionalist Portuguese colonialism, based on a unique sense of
understanding and tolerance for the otherness of others. So unique, I might add, that when one looks for any evidence of it, something that could dissolve for us the oxymoron implicit in the idea of “understanding and tolerant colonialism,” what we find instead is a recourse to the authority of none other than Hegel. That is, we remain entrapped in the circular logic of the invention of certainty, the conjuring up of a past that for now seems to exist only within the narrative chain of citation. On the other hand, it is important to note that in Cortesão’s discourse “understanding” and “tolerance” are predicated as cultural and temperamental legacies of the Portuguese, a gesture prompted by the reporter’s line of questioning. This interview should thus be considered as an iconic instance of the conflation, in a modern Portuguese context associated with popular culture, of two discourses of exceptionalism: Lusotropicalism and Portuguese “humane colonialism.”

Before pursuing this chain of argument to the extent allowed by the archival research I have been able to conduct thus far, let me briefly sketch out the latest developments in the discussions of Lusotropicalism. Around the same time that Cortesão’s interview took place, international scholars like Charles Boxer and Marvin Harris were already scrutinizing the exceptionalist claims put forth by official Portuguese historiography. After the 1974 revolution that put an end to Portugal’s decades-long dictatorship as well as its African empire, other scholars, such as Gerald Bender, kept up with that pioneering effort. In the context of the Portuguese language, we need to recognize the anticolonial discourses of the African liberation movement leaders in Cabo Verde/Guinea Bissau and Mozambique—Amílcar Cabral and Eduardo Mondlane, respectively—as the first instances of a critique of Lusotropicalism in Portuguese. In Portugal, as early as the 1960s, the philosopher and essayist Eduardo Lourenço published articles about the subject, later compiled in volumes in 1984 and 2014, and in the 1970s and 1980s we must acknowledge the historian Valentim Alexandre (1973, 1979) and the literary scholar and pioneer of postcolonial studies Alfredo Margarido (2000). Alexandre and Margarido have even suggested that earlier, European sources should be pursued in the search for the origins of Lusotropicalism, without clarifying, however, which sources they had in mind. More recently, Almeida has claimed that the late nineteenth-century context of imperial expansion in the wake of the so-called scramble for Africa should be considered a credible precursor to Freyre’s 1930s formulations. And in 2010, when my research for this project was just beginning, I proposed in an article that Freyre’s Portuguese-educated
mentor Manoel de Oliveira Lima was the missing link between Portugal’s fin de siècle imperial malaise and Brazil’s first efforts to celebrate miscegenation (Pereira 2009). What I had not been able to find until recently was any substantive documentary evidence for the various claims regarding the European genealogy of the idea of the humane and tolerant nature of Portuguese colonialism in the tropics. As I intend to demonstrate, my discovery of such evidence came hand in hand with the realization that, rather than proving the preeminence of a European over a Brazilian genealogy, in both contexts the same arguments used to justify Lusotropicalist discourse constitute the most persuasive grounds for its dismissal. And now we can go back to the interview with the Portuguese historian better equipped to consider the strange appearance of Hegel on the Lusotropical scene.

You will remember that in the interview Cortesão uses Hegel to claim that the humane and tolerant nature of Portuguese colonialism is a historically grounded idea. This is a claim that one can trace back to Cortesão’s publications from the early 1930s, and again to a public lecture delivered in 1941 to the Liceu Literário Português in Rio de Janeiro, when he was already exiled in Brazil. In this lecture, Cortesão prompts his audience to “go, compare, weigh it on the scales of historical justice and then tell me which among the colonizing powers was the most humane and tolerant” and then informs them that such view is vindicated by “one of the greatest geniuses of modern philosophy and the philosophy of all times” (1941, 93). Indeed, in Appendix 1b to Hegel’s (1975, 165) Introduction to the Lessons on the Philosophy of World History we read:

The Portuguese were more humane than the Dutch, Spanish, and English. For this reason, it was easier on the coast of Brazil than elsewhere for slaves to gain their freedom, and large numbers of free Negroes were to be found in this region. . . . An English writer reports that, among the wide circle of his acquaintances, he had encountered instances of negroes becoming skilled workers and tradesmen, and even clergymen and doctors, etc.

The first thing that meets the eye in this passage is that Hegel engages, just as Cortesão does, in an exercise of comparative colonialisms; then, he associates Portugal’s comparatively superior display of humanity to the abundance of freed slaves in Brazil’s coastal cities. Upon closer examination, an attentive reader will realize the extemporaneous nature of Hegel’s claim, as it does nothing to shore up the overall argument he attempts to develop in this section of
the Introduction, that of the comparatively higher susceptibility that Africans rather than Amerindians supposedly showed to European culture in the eighteenth century. Finally, Hegel anticipates another one of the gestures found in Cortesão’s interview, that is, he resorts to giving full credence to the authority of unexamined sources, in this case the writings of an undisclosed English writer who linked the abundance of freed slaves in Brazilian coastal cities to the evidence of a more humane disposition of the Portuguese colonizer. The similarity of this gesture does not however hide the difference of the consequences: whereas Hegel momentarily but rather unconvincingly usurps the seat of authority in Portuguese imperial history, Cortesão willingly gives up his genuine credentials as a historian of the early modern Portuguese expansion and of the formation of Brazil. Moreover, in this gesture, he also relinquishes his authority as a direct witness to Brazil’s race-based socioeconomic inequality, and entirely skirts the evidence of the discontent felt by African subjects that at the time of his interview was continuously emanating from the African territories under Portuguese rule.

In any case, the argument about the comparative abundance of freed blacks in colonial Brazil was worth pursuing, as was Hegel’s unnamed English source. The fact that Hegel’s library may not be entirely reconstituted, and that the Lectures on the Philosophy of World History were posthumously published from extant notes by Hegel himself and by his students, raises important challenges to this research, as some references are virtually impossible to locate, given their possible misspellings. These difficulties notwithstanding, it is fairly easy to determine which English travelers to colonial Brazil Hegel may have read. The British scholar Leslie Bethel compiled a list of British and Irish authors who visited Brazil between the sixteenth century and the present day, an obvious point of departure. I then crossed Bethel’s information with the bibliographies cited by authors such as Boxer and Freyre, among many others, and I extensively perused Google Books, a valuable resource of our times. I can now safely determine that, among the relatively small universe of English-language works penned by travelers to colonial Brazil, the writings of Henry Koster (1793–1820) are the ones that most likely inspired Hegel’s extemporaneous remark.

Although all the English-language visitors to Brazil I cross-checked comment on the ubiquity of Africans and their descendants in Brazilian life, it is in Koster that I found the most detailed references to the institution of slavery, as well as a systematic attempt to develop arguments about the supposedly lenient
treatment dispensed to Brazilian slaves by their Portuguese masters, and, most importantly, a clear effort to prove that it was indeed easier in Brazil for enslaved Africans and their descendants to obtain their freedom.

(In)Accurate Koster

Henry Koster was born in Lisbon in 1793 to a British merchant with interests in the Portuguese-speaking territories of South America. Traveling to what is now the state of Pernambuco in northeastern Brazil in search of better health, at a time when Portugal was occupied by the Napoleonic troops and thus off limits, Koster wound up spending the greater part of his brief adult life there, with two short trips to England in 1816 and 1819. He rented a sugar cane fazenda, or estate, in the Jaguaribe region of Pernambuco, which came with a good number of slaves, whose lives he describes in his writings. Upon a new bout of what researchers think may have been tuberculosis, he traveled further inland in search of a better climate and left lively impressions of his travels. He died in 1820 in the city of Recife, where he was buried in an unknown location in the city’s British Cemetery.

Koster’s fluent Portuguese was somewhat deceitful to Brazilians, who preferred to address him as Henrique da Costa. This perception might not have been entirely inaccurate, as Koster states in his writings that “England is my country, but my native soil is Portugal” (Koster 1816, 334), thus suggesting that he was mindful of the difference between citizenship and birthright, and arguably about the varying degrees of emotional attachment that come with both. He left two writings that remained largely influential for a long time after his premature demise: a two-volume book entitled Travels in Brazil, which would be cited frequently by travelers and naturalists of various nationalities, and a pamphlet with the title “On the Amelioration of Slavery,” which came out in the same year as Travels and was influential in abolitionist and anti-abolitionist circles alike, and later on among historians of Brazil and scholars of slavery. Travels in Brazil was first published in England in 1816. A second edition came out the following year in London and in Philadelphia, followed by German and French translations. The first Portuguese version was prepared by Antônio de Pimentel for the Revista do Instituto Arqueológico Pernambucano in Brazil but never saw the light of day until Câmara Cascudo published it in 1942 (Koster 1942). To this day, there is no edition of Koster’s book in Portugal, which alone should not be enough to explain the lack of awareness in Portuguese historiography about the
In fact, and for all its popularity, *Travels in Brazil* still awaits any substantive scholarly attention, in Portugal or elsewhere. One can trace its influence in recent studies by historian Herbert Klein (2012), and Stuart Schwartz (1982) has also studied some specific arguments Koster advances in his book about the treatment of slaves in Brazil’s Benedictine estates. In *Casa-grande & senzala*, Freyre mentions Koster a total of twenty-four times. He credits the Portuguese-born English traveler along with his friend Robert Southey, who met Koster in Lisbon in 1800, during Southey’s second trip to Portugal, for what he deemed as their pioneering expression of the idea of Portuguese lack of racial prejudice towards the colonized peoples of Brazil, and their awareness that economic necessity rather than humanitarian imperative played a role in bringing about that felicitous colonial practice. In a letter to John May, Southey described Koster as “a man more conversant than most of the English here, and whose opinions call forth somewhat more freedom of conversation than I allow myself elsewhere” (Southey 1856, 114). In his commentary on Southey and Koster, Freyre writes:

*Observou Southey que o sistema colonial português se revelara mais feliz do que nenhum outro no tocante às relações do europeu com as raças de cor mas salientando que semelhante sistema fora antes “filho da necessidade” do que de deliberada orientação social e política. . . . “Esta vantagem,” escreveu Koster, referindo-se à ausência de discriminações aviltantes da parte dos portugueses contra os indígenas, “provém mais da necessidade que de um sentimento de justiça.” (2002, 120)*

Southey observed that the Portuguese colonial system had shown itself to be more felicitous than any other in what pertains to the relations of the European with the colored races, although he pointed out that such system came about out of necessity rather than through deliberate social and political orientation. . . . “This advantage,” Koster wrote, referring to the absence of degrading discrimination by the Portuguese against indigenous people, “comes more from necessity than from a sense of justice.”

Arguably, and in recent times, the Brazilian anthropologist Manuela Carneiro da Cunha has offered what is the closest scrutiny of Koster’s two known publications, in two articles published five years apart. On the one hand, she emphasizes
the instrumental role Koster's pamphlet “On the Amelioration of Slavery” (published in 1816) played in English debates about the abolition of the slave trade and of slavery; but she also highlights how both texts rely heavily on the testimonial for the validation of ideas that British abolitionists had been advancing in the public sphere for years: “what remains to be seen by historians of Brazil is whether or to what degree such description was in turn influenced by the debate which was taking place in England in 1815 and 1816” (Cunha 1990, 373). This suggests that Koster's keen interest in the matter of slavery might have preceded his arrival on Brazilian shores. What this means, even if Cunha does not make such assertion, is that Koster's favorable views of Brazilian slavery might respond not so much to the observed historical reality as to the needs of an argument that was taking place elsewhere. The plausibility of my claim can be established if we keep in mind that Koster conducted substantial research for both his book and his abolitionist pamphlet in Southey's famous library, where works by the likes of the Abbé Henri Grégoire (1754–1831) were to be found. Indeed, some of the arguments presented by Koster in Travels in Brazil can be traced back to Grégoire's De la littérature des nègres (1808), which was published in English in 1810. Pierre-Franklin Tavares (1993) actually bypasses Koster entirely when he looks for Hegel's source in the Philosophy of World History and locates it in Grégoire, perhaps because he is primarily interested in studying the French dimension of this textual history: “Impossible not to recognize here the mark of the most famous of Abbé Grégoire’s publications: De la littérature des nègres. It is staring us in the face! However, one must note that until now nobody has realized it” (495).

In pursuing Hegel's likely English source, it took me almost no time to stumble on a relevant French one. The fact that Hegel does refer to “an English writer,” and that therefore Tavares is jumping one link in the textual chain does not mean that his insertion of Abbé Grégoire into the fray is not pertinent, and we will pursue that link a bit closer to the end of this article. At this point, it has already become apparent that the idea of preeminently humane Portuguese colonialism has been a continually appropriated trope in different cultural, political and linguistic contexts and serving different interests: to argue for abolition of the slave trade and the institution of slavery in early-nineteenth century France and England; to provide supposed empirical evidence to shore up the foundations of a philosophy of history in mid-nineteenth century Germany; and, finally, to polish the pedigree of Portuguese republican historiography at a time when its obsolescence was masked by the increasing visibility of Freyre’s Lusotropicalism.
Interestingly, no Portuguese author is constituted as a direct interlocutor in this almost two-hundred-year-long conversation, something that seems to have escaped Jaime Cortesão as much as his foreign counterparts. For his part, Koster, who, despite his defense of gradual emancipation, owned slaves during his period in Brazil, did not choose to make his fellow Brazilian slave owners his interlocutors in the debate about abolitionism. Could this be the reason why it took more than one hundred years for his book *Travels in Brazil* to be translated into Portuguese, and why to date it is still not available in Portugal?

To the naked eye, statements such as the following may be read as encouraging a Lusotropicalist worldview, and indeed one of the confessed goals of Koster’s study of Brazilian slavery was to collect information that would allow him to make a compelling case against slavery in the British plantations in the Caribbean. That has to be the reason why Koster decided to reiterate in the pamphlet “On the Amelioration of Slavery” most of the arguments found in *Travels in Brazil*. The pamphlet was in fact envisioned as a targeted response to an invective that the representative of the Columbian islands to the British Parliament had published against the first timid abolitionist moves by Britain’s African Institution.

The first passage establishes the trope of Brazil as a more lenient slave-owning society, and the second could be seen as indulging in the myth of miscegenation as a Portuguese inclination:

> The general equity of the laws regarding free persons of colour in the Portuguese South-American possessions has been, to a certain degree, extended to that portion of the population which is in a state of slavery; and the lives of the slaves of Brazil have been rendered less hard and less intolerable than those of the degraded beings who drag on their cheerless existence under the dominion of other nations. . . . (227)

> Thus has Portugal, of late years from policy, continued that system into which she was led by her peculiar circumstances in former times. Some of the wealthy planters of Pernambuco, and of the rich inhabitants of Recife, are men of colour. The major part of the best mechanics are also of mixed blood. (212)

Both in *Travels in Brazil* and in his pamphlet “On the Amelioration of Slavery,” Koster makes the case for the progressive abolition of the slave trade and of the institution of slavery (which, according to him, would be a longer process), based on both the information obtained in archival research and his experience
as an eyewitness, at a time when he could still claim the privilege of being one of the first foreigners to have unfettered access to the interior of Brazil, as the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was signed between Portugal and Great Britain in 1810. The arguments in support of his case are varied, but subsumable under the two main ideas found in the passages above. First, “the general equity of the laws” applies equally to free persons of color and to enslaved persons, in the ecclesiastical as well as civil domains. Second, miscegenation in Brazil at the time he writes derives from what he sees as a more equitable racial policy that in its turn stems from the “peculiar” historical circumstances that forced the Portuguese to rely on native and African women for the effort of settling the immense territory. This idea is further developed in a different passage that brings to mind the concluding paragraphs in Charles Boxer’s Race Relations in the Portuguese Empire, 1415–1825:

In the Portuguese South American dominions, circumstances have directed that there should be no division of casts [sic], and very few of those degrading and most galling distinctions which have been made by all other nations in the management of their colonies. That this was not intended by the mother country, but was rather submitted to from necessity, is to be discovered in some few regulations, which plainly show, that if Portugal could have preserved the superiority of the whites, she would, as well as her neighbors, have established laws for this purpose. The rulers of Portugal wished to colonize to an unlimited extent; but their country did not possess a population sufficiently numerous for their magnificent plans. (Koster 1816, 385)

Koster’s arguments here are of a historical rather than exceptionalist nature, positing demographic deficit instead of official policy or natural character as the explanation for the presumed lack of racial prejudice in Brazilian colonial society. He maintains this critical line of reasoning when, in the following two passages, he comments on the attempts made by advocates of slavery to turn individual cases of humane treatment of slaves in Brazil into a generalized principle of justification of the institution:

When the advocates of slavery relate such stories as these, they give them as tending to prove that slaves in general are happy. Anecdotes of this kind demonstrate individual goodness in the master and individual gratitude in the slave, but they prove nothing generally; they do not affect the great
question; that is rested upon grounds which are too deeply fixed to be moved by single instances of evil or of good. (418)

To the planters I fear that scarcely any arguments would be of any avail; they imagine that without slaves their estates must decay, and therefore they fortify themselves under the notion of the humanity of the trade by which they obtain their supplies. (445)

The philosophical principle that informs these statements is that slavery is abhorrent to human nature and therefore could not be tolerated in any latitude or social landscape. This is what transpires in both of Koster’s known writings, sometimes in contradiction with his premise that historical circumstances—demography and religion—had made Brazil a colonial experiment that had yielded policies worth considering as a model for the reforms that would have to be implemented in slave-owning societies under British rule if they were to follow the path to ultimate freedom. Even though Koster’s discriminating appraisal of the specificities of Portuguese colonial rule in Brazil is generally persuasive, it was the authority of his testimony as an eyewitness to daily life in northeastern Brazil that made Travels in Brazil such a popular publication, with two consecutive English editions immediately followed by American, French, and German editions. As Manuela Carneiro da Cunha suggests, it was to capitalize on the rhetorical advantages of the testimonial that Koster decided to publish his pamphlet “On the Amelioration of Slavery” shortly after Travels in Brazil, so that the book could be seen as an independent source (1990, 368). Yet, and despite the widely recognized rigor of his observations of the flora and fauna of northeastern Brazil, as well as of its social and cultural institutions, which granted him the nickname “accurate Koster” coined by the English explorer Richard Burton (1869, 3), Koster seems to have excessively relied on the power of testimony. In terms of ecclesiastical policy, he presents the case of Benedictine plantations as an example of more humane treatment of slaves, but Stuart Schwartz has shown that the humane policies implemented in the plantations owned by the order of St. Benedict had profit and good business as an ulterior goal (1982, 22). More important, because it directly relates to the idea that came to form the core of Hegel’s reference to the “English writer” in The Philosophy of World History, whose textual history I revisit in this article, is Koster’s argument about manumission and why it was easier to obtain for enslaved persons in Brazil than anywhere else in the hemisphere. Historians such as Frank Tannenbaum and Stanley
Elkins have written about the mediation that the State and the Church provided in the relations between master and slave as the reason behind Brazil’s alleged more lenient treatment of slaves, but it was Cunha who located the source of this common view in Koster, whom she sees as the originator of a misperception. Koster dedicates almost one hundred pages of *Travels in Brazil* to the direct discussion of the issues of slavery and free persons of color in colonial Brazilian society, and further references to those topics are interspersed elsewhere throughout the book, which shows the centrality of slavery in the life of the colony and what was then the United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil, and the Algarves. The key passages related to the issue of manumission merit a closer look:

The slave can oblige his master to manumit him, on tendering to him the sum for which he was first purchased, or the price for which he might be sold, if that price is higher than what the slave was worth at the time he was first bought. This regulation, like every one that is framed in favour of slaves, is liable to be evaded, and the master sometimes does refuse to manumit a valuable slave; and no appeal is made by the sufferer owing to the state of law in the country, which renders it almost impossible for a slave to gain a hearing. (Koster 1816, 404)

Koster comes across as being well informed about colonial Brazilian institutions, and how regulations could fairly easily be circumvented by plantation owners, or in any case about how enslaved Brazilians could not expect much from the justice system if their masters refused to manumit them. Of course, the passage also shows that Koster knew why manumission did seem to be easier to obtain in Brazil than elsewhere, as he discusses amply in both of his publications: over time, the ability to work on their own on Sundays and holidays allowed enslaved Brazilians to accumulate the amount necessary to purchase their freedom. The problem with the scenario that he lays out in *Travels in Brazil* is that, as Cunha has analyzed, there was never in Brazil a codified law for the custom he describes in the passage above. It is difficult to doubt Koster’s word, not only because he is well informed about colonial Brazilian institutions (or because he shares a treasure trove of information framed as eyewitness testimony at a time when that was a privileged position), but also because he is indeed sincere. The widespread custom, along with the testimony he obtained from his interlocutors—slave owners themselves or their dependents—did not allow him to pursue with enough scrutiny the validity of the information that the veil of customary social
practices made out to be credible. This much becomes evident in the footnote that he adds to the above passage:

This instance of refusal, and some others of which I have heard, would make me very doubtful of the foundation upon which the custom of manumitting is placed, if I did not know how easily the laws relating to many other important points are evaded through the influence of wealth and power. I did not see a copy of the law or regulation on the subject, but I never met with anyone who doubted that the slave had a right to appeal, if he thought proper; whether he would be heard or not was another question. (quoted in Cunha 1985, 428)

As it turns out, the very same wealth and power, associated with the cogency of Koster’s bearing witness to the power of its influence, is what ends up convincing him that a law was codified to provide a legal framework to the practice of manumission at that time. I cannot follow Cunha’s discussion to its full extent here, which includes a list of the many historians who have reproduced Koster’s error up to the modern times, but, as she points out, “this right had no basis in law until 1871, that is, until the ‘Free Womb’ Law; and significantly this Law, which laid down that all children thereafter born to slaves would be free, heralded the beginning of the official dismantling of slavery” (1985, 429). In other words, the practice of manumission never affected slave owners negatively, or manumission requests were rejected when it did. In any case, the practice never threatened the institution of slavery, slave owners had the sole power to accept or reject manumission requests from their slaves, and the state only intervened when its own interest was in play (Cunha 1985, 430). What this means is that, contrary to what Koster asserts, manumission was a quintessential example of customary law; the absence of manumission codes from the books was deliberate, not an omission; and it had one purpose: to maintain moral ties between master and former slave as a way to ensure relations of dependence between freedmen and their former enslavers, as the possibility of reversal of manumission existed for cases of ingratitude, which was broadly defined to include verbal ingratitude (Cunha 1985, 438). The coexistence of customary law and written law helps to conjure up a polity in which the former serves to create an international image for the system that domestically works in different ways:

The true society of 19th century Brazil is this complex of written and unwritten laws which do not intersect, one affirming relations without privilege between

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equivalent citizens, the other dealing with private relations of dependence and power. They coexist without hindrance because, as allies, they carve out basically distinct fields of application for themselves: the law, essentially, is for the free poor; customary law is for the powerful, their slaves and their dependent clients. The former is also the external face—international, but not necessarily false—of a system which, domestically, is something else. (Cunha 1985, 441)

What Koster and so many after him saw as an example of “humane colonialism” was in fact one cornerstone of a system of personal dependence that for two hundred years has had the capacity to build itself as a benevolent façade for a society that was utterly dependent on enslaved labor for its survival. Koster’s readers, including Hegel (and Cortesão through him), may have read him at face value, and that explains to a great extent why the idea of “humane colonialism” had had currency for so long before it was actually enlisted in the service of official Portuguese discourse from the 1950s onwards. But more instructive of its enduring power of persuasion is Koster’s trusting that the testimony obtained from slave owners and/or their dependents about manumission in colonial Brazil was sufficient to confirm the existence on the books of a law that was never codified before 1871. It is as if the tangible benevolence that he himself received from his hosts could come to define a society that had managed to render the utter violence of its labor system intangible to those observing from a relative distance. When Hegel, emulating Koster, celebrated the high number of freedmen in Brazil’s coastal cities, he couldn’t know that he was actually celebrating the endurance of servitude in freedom.

Henri Grégoire and the Intangible Source of Benevolent Brotherhood

Pierre-Franklin Tavares had reason to identify Abbé Henri Grégoire (1750–1831) as Hegel’s likely source in the passage from The Philosophy of World History. We know that the attribution is incorrect because, among the many uncertainties regarding the production of Hegel’s text, we do know the philosopher mentions “an English writer.” But if we are right to identify Henry Koster as that writer, then Grégoire is a more than plausible influence, since Koster is likely to have read him in Robert Southey’s library, and even discussed his books with William Wilberforce and other British abolitionists who had been inspired by Grégoire.

Contrary to what Manuela Carneiro da Cunha suggests in the article about Koster’s pamphlet “On the Amelioration of Slavery,” the English writer was not
the inventor of comparative slavery regimes, nor even of basing such comparisons on ethical criteria. Although I cannot categorically attribute this role to Grégoire, it is important to recognize that he anticipates Koster in that domain. Published in 1808, his book *De la littérature des nègres* (published in English two years later as *An Enquiry Concerning the Intellectual and Moral Faculties, and Literature of the Negroes*) vigorously promotes the rehabilitation of the image of Africans and their descendants in Europe and the New World by arguing for the preeminence of African history and civilization and the dignity of Black intellectual production, and by questioning, through the lens of Scripture, the assumptions of coeval European racialist discourse in what constitutes a pioneering effort to ground equality. Interestingly, of the inventory of writers of different nationalities that to his day had defended the cause of Black and mixed-race peoples and to whom he dedicates his book, Portuguese writers are entirely absent. More interesting still is how the former Constitutional bishop of Blois rationalizes that absence. This becomes apparent in two passages from Grégoire’s book, which bring to light the contradiction inherent to the idea of “humane colonialism” from a different angle.

After listing intellectuals from all the European countries that had direct or indirect involvement in the transatlantic slave trade, and who had written in defense of the interests of enslaved Africans and their descendants, Grégoire refers to the Spanish and Portuguese cases:

One should not be surprised not to find here any Spanish or Portuguese author (with the exception of Avendano); beyond the Pyrenees, those rights and duties were never a problem; and who would they need to defend, if there is no aggressor? . . . Only in our time, through unconvincing efforts, has a Portuguese tried to justify colonial slavery, so different from that which, with the Hebrews, was like a type of domesticity; but Azeredo’s brochure went from the book shop to oblivion. (Grégoire 10–11)13

This is an interesting passage: already in the early nineteenth century, when antiquity was tapped for references about slavery to inform anticolonial sentiment among North American slave owners such as Thomas Jefferson, Grégoire points out the difference between ancient slavery and early-modern colonial slavery, a point of contention in conservative positions in today’s debate about the legacies of slavery in Portugal. On the other hand, and more to the point, he predicates the absence of abolitionist discourse in Spanish and Portuguese on
the supposed absence of grievances of Africans living under Spanish and especially Portuguese rule in comparison to those living under other European colonial regimes. Further ahead, Grégoire adds:

In general, in the Spanish and Portuguese domains, Negroes are seen as brothers of a different color. The Christian religion that purifies joy, wipes tears, and whose hand is always ready to spread benefits, this religion mediates between the slaves and their masters in order to sweeten the rigors of authority and the burden of obedience. Thus, in these two colonial domains, nobody wrote useless defenses of the Negroes. . . . ([1808] 1991, 12–13)

The issue of the role of the Catholic Church as a mediator between masters and slaves in colonial Brazil is a historiographical subfield in itself, and the bibliography is growing. The details of this discussion are not my concern here. Irrespective of the validity of Grégoire’s claims (and of the fact that, although his sources are usually documented throughout the book, it is unclear who he is thinking of specifically in these passages), what stands out is that he reproduces eighteenth-century Portuguese ecclesiastical discourse about slavery, resonating particularly with Manuel Ribeiro Rocha’s *Etíope resgatado* (1758). The problem with emulating this source is that it fundamentally contradicts Grégoire’s fierce abolitionist advocacy, since what Rocha defended in his book was the need for a more humane treatment of slaves, a concern that, despite its humanitarian overtones, aligned perfectly with the more pragmatic goal of ensuring a smooth operation in the daily management of forced labor for the plantation owners of Brazil. In other words, what Grégoire may have seen as the advocacy for the interests of enslaved Brazilians—the kind of document he asserts does not exist in Portuguese because it is not necessary—was also a defense of the system of personal dependence that Cunha scrutinizes in her reading of Koster’s involuntarily blind defense of Portuguese racial exceptionalism, and that ensured the long-term survival of forced labor in Brazil and in Portugal’s African colonies. Koster’s unfounded belief in the existence of a codified law managing the state’s mediation in cases of manumission may as well have been structured around his reading of Grégoire’s advocacy book. He does not, however, mention Grégoire a single time in either of his publications. Truly important sources, in the case of one writer or the other, go unmentioned. It is not so much that they are intangible, but that their intangibility, as in the issue of “humane colonialism,” begs the question: the more we look for sources the more intangible it becomes, in
the reverse proportion that the social system that it made possible becomes ever more tangible—and unsettling.

I believe this revision, by almost two centuries, in the chronology of Lusotropicalism’s genealogy sheds some light on the sentiment of guarded appreciation that Cortesão reserves for the figure of Freyre in the first excerpt from the interview quoted earlier in this article. The growing enthusiasm for Lusotropicalism that was visible in Portugal during the 1950s must have been puzzling for someone who had already found its vindication in an early-nineteenth-century collection of lectures by one of that century’s most acclaimed philosophers. Yet the study of the sources of Cortesão’s alternative genealogy of Lusotropicalism need not lead to an elusive quest for origins, or even to a transatlantic dispute about scholarly preeminence. Rather, such study is instructive to the extent that it allows us to establish a textual history that spans at least three continents and different cultures and linguistic registers, and is characterized by the periodical reiteration of exceptionalist tropes that will be appropriated by Brazilian and Portuguese intellectuals alike, in their efforts to come to terms with their countries’ hegemonic discourses of nationalism.

It is likewise enlightening to realize that Portuguese racial exceptionalism has also been reproduced by scholars outside of the Lusophone sphere with purposes that do not immediately or necessarily align with Portuguese and/or Brazilian interests. That is how, before an abolitionist debate took shape in the colonial Portuguese world, Grégoire could have invoked Portuguese racial exceptionalism to advocate for total abolition, something that, in the Portuguese-speaking world, would take the better part of the nineteenth century to accomplish, and that, when it finally happened, did not come close to matching Grégoire’s sense of dignity among equals. After all, African history is not a subject routinely made available to students going through the Portuguese educational system to this day. Conversely, and as we have seen, these nationalistic appropriations do not exist without substantive foreign mediations—German, British, and French—giving shape to what Robert Stam and Ella Shohat have recently called “intercolonial narcissism” (2014, 387). Long in the making, such discursive mode eloquently confirms that, as the epigraph from Pierre-Franklin Tavares proposes, sources are always about something else.
NOTES
1. This and all remaining translations are my own, unless otherwise noted. Research for this essay was made possible by two grants from FLAD (Fundação Luso-Americana para o Desenvolvimento) and one grant from the Ohio State University’s College of Arts and Sciences that allowed me to conduct research in the Jaime Cortesão archives at the National Library of Portugal, the Sociedade de Geografia, and the Academia das Ciências in Lisbon. I would like to acknowledge the valuable feedback I received for different versions of this manuscript from Joan Ramón Resina, Vincent Barletta, and Marília Librandi Rocha at Stanford; Devin Fergus and all the colleagues in the Department of African American Studies at OSU; Joe Blackmore at Harvard; and Cláudia Castelo and Cristiana Bastos at the CIEA9 conference in Coimbra, Portugal. This essay would not have been written without the invitation to speak at the Iberian and Latin American Transatlantic Symposium at the University of Oregon in fall of 2013. I am indebted to Pedro García-Caro, Cecília Enjuto Rangel, Robert Newcomb, and Sebastiaan Faber for a great weekend of reflection and debate; I am just as grateful to Anna Klobucka and Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo for the opportunity to speak at the colloquium on Heritages(s) of Portuguese Influence: Histories, Spaces, Texts, and Objects at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth in April 2019 and to share the new insights I have gained from this longstanding research project.

2. Ownership of slaves was abolished in metropolitan Portugal by Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, the Marquis of Pombal, in 1761. The purpose of the decree was to curtail competition with the colonies and to divert the slave trade towards Brazil, where demand for enslaved labor grew throughout the eighteenth century in response to the discovery of significant mineral deposits in what is now the state of Minas Gerais. Portugal’s president used the date of 1761 as a marker of the effective abolition of slavery, which in fact happened only in 1869. The presidential remarks in Senegal prompted a sizable group of international scholars to sign an open letter, published in the Portuguese newspaper Diário de Notícias (Câncio 2017).

3. The lawyer and former conservative party leader José Ribeiro e Castro wrote in an op-ed in the daily newspaper Público that “O Luso-tropicalismo não é somente narrativa do que vemos, acreditamos e concluímos, mas, acima de tudo, um programa do que queremos, o programa” (Lusotropicalism is not just the narrative about what we see, believe, and conclude, but, above all, a program for what we want, the program”) (Castro 2020).

4. About the controversy following the publication of Boxer’s Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire, see Cummins and Rebelo (2001).

6. To be sure, wholesale associations of a generic Lusotropicalist discourse with Freyre are in themselves problematic, as they tend to conflate the ideas expounded in Freyre’s post-1950 writings with his 1933 magnum opus Casa-grande & senzala (The Masters and the Slaves).

7. Robert Bernasconi, (1998, 300) in his “Hegel at the Court of the Ashanti,” reminds us that “the travel literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was transformed by academicians into a discourse of race that, when tied to the philosophy of history, was used to legitimate the violent and destructive character of nineteenth-century colonialism.”


9. For instance, the reference to a certain “Dr. Kingera,” a Black man said to supposedly have discovered quinine in colonial Brazil, whose existence is not recorded anywhere else.

10. Knowledge of Koster’s and Southey’s acquaintance was not always immediately available in the twentieth century. As recently as 1966 the historian C. Harvey Gardiner, who prepared and prefaced an abridged edition of Travels in Brazil for Southern Illinois University Press, wrote: “When Southey and Koster first met is not known. Perhaps they were acquainted before Henry’s initial departure for Brazil. . . . Southey’s own travels in Portugal might have led to his meeting the Koster family” (Gardiner 1966, x–xi).


12. The United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil, and the Algarves was a pluricontinental monarchy formed in 1815 and dissolved in 1822 with the independence of Brasil.

13. Brazilian-born José Joaquim da Cunha Azeredo Coutinho (1742–1821) was a bishop and the last inquisitor-general of the kingdom. He remains known as a defender of slavery and of the continuation of the slave trade from the Portuguese territories in West and West-Central Africa.

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