

Germans and the South Atlantic

Political, Economic, and Military Aspects

in Historical Perspective, 1507–1915

ABSTRACT: Early sixteenth-century German geographers and mercenaries were well aware of the European economic and military expansion on both sides of the South Atlantic. The first part of this article traces the German knowledge production about this region based on maps and published eyewitness accounts. German visitors, whether for military, economic, or research purposes, were early on most attracted to the South American shores; southern Africa and the coast of Angola proved to be less hospitable. The following parts of this article outline the German attempts to settle permanently in the areas bordering the South Atlantic and to gain economic and political influence, culminating in the founding of the colony “German South West Africa” in 1884–1885. The final part shows how political aspirations and illusions of Germans in the region and the government in Berlin came to nothing with the outbreak of the First World War and the surrender of German colonial troops in July 1915.

KEYWORDS: German history, South Atlantic, colonialism

This article analyzes German political and economic aspirations and factual ties with the regions bordering the South Atlantic. The fact that German history cannot be confined within the borders of the European nation-state is now well established among historians. Already decades ago, James Sheehan pointed out that by stopping to assume “that Germany must mean Bismarck’s Germany, we can see that German history is made up of a more complex and much richer set of political, social, economic, and cultural developments.” The “colonial turn” in German historiography has deepened this understanding. And even more can be learned from transnational aspects, from shared or “entangled histories” of peoples, nations, or regions. The transnational character of many commer-

cial undertakings has made economic history a forerunner of an entangled, regional history ever since.¹ In the German context, migration history and its trans-oceanic dimensions have been a focal point of research, often with a specific (North) Atlantic dimension.²

This article, however, analyzes the South Atlantic in its relations to German history and Germans as part of the history of the South Atlantic region. In the following sections "South Atlantic" history is a history of the lands around the sea in relation to the sea itself.³ I focus my analysis on Germans crossing the South Atlantic to reach the shores of five different countries (which are at the same time historically interconnected entities, as we will see): Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, German South-West Africa (GSWA), and Angola. They did not always stay close to the port cities where they once arrived. Thus places are included here at times that are beyond the South Atlantic shoreline. The area under scrutiny here is thus defined geopolitically rather than geographically.

Even though it has been stated—rightfully or not—that "the South Atlantic . . . remains marginal both geopolitically and academically,"⁴ the importance of this region for the understanding of German history should be underlined. For example, the rise of Germany's economic power is clearly visible from the growing exports to the South Atlantic markets. Furthermore, the Germans are of importance too for a better analysis of the history of the South Atlantic region. Three facets will be discussed in the following sections: first, the considerable German immigration to countries such as Brazil, Argentine, and South Africa; second, the colonial aspiration that were realized in 1884 with the establishing of the colony of German South-West Africa; and third, German efforts to enlarge the colonial possessions by incorporating Portuguese Angola or parts of it. Portugal had been the master of a "South Atlantic empire"⁵ for centuries, and some colonial enthusiast in Germany envisaged the re-creation of such an empire; this time under German lordship, spanning the sea from Porto Alegre to Lüderitzbucht and Benguela.

In this article I will examine, first, the notions of sixteenth-century Germans of the South Atlantic as an essentially Portuguese area of influence. The following four sections will analyze political, economic, and military aspects of German undertakings on both sides of the South Atlantic; the last section details the German political and military isolation during the First World War that resulted in Germany's defeat in this region within less than one year.

Mapping the Portuguese South Atlantic

The Portuguese participation in the “discovery” of and subsequent claims to parts of South America and southern Africa became soon known in German regions; notwithstanding any attempts to keep the discoveries secret. In 1507, the German mapmaker Martin Waldseemüller (apx. 1475–1520) documented on his famous world map *Universalis cosmographia* the spheres of influences as agreed between Spain and Portugal in the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494.⁶ The Spanish and Portuguese sides of the Line of Demarcation across South America were indicated by the respective flags. Thus off the coast of present-day Brazil, Waldseemüller had placed a ship sailing under the Portuguese coat of arms. The southernmost tip of South America is adorned with the Portuguese flag, and so is the coast of Africa, from the Gulf of Guinea via the Cape of Good Hope up to the *Antropophagi etiopes* north of Monsanbiqui. Five *padrões* were depicted along Africa’s southwestern coast.⁷ As the European symbols of authority indicate, and considering the importance of Waldseemüller’s map for Germans, then, the South Atlantic was essentially Portuguese.

In the early centuries of the European expansion, German principalities were evidently “not party to the competition for the Americas.”⁸ Nevertheless, there was a considerable interest in Germany in the ongoing extension of knowledge about the New World and Africa. German geographers were among those who produced valuable cartographic and geographic materials on South America.⁹ Waldseemüller’s map, for example, is, despite limited geographic knowledge, “surprisingly proportional.”¹⁰ He included the information provided by Amerigo Vespucci (apx. 1452–1512) in his *Mundus Novus* (1502) and other travel accounts, which contained information about Brazil’s coastline and which was widely published and read in German lands. Later generations of cartographers continued to rely on this material.

The famous *Cosmographia* by the cosmographer Sebastian Münster (1489–1552), one of the most popular German books of his time, shows the influence of Waldseemüller. Münster explained to his readers: “One travels beyond Hispania [which included “Portugall”] toward the new island Americam/Spagnolā/Jucatanam and so forth.”¹¹ Beginning with the first edition of the *Cosmographia* of 1545 he took over Waldseemüller’s depiction of political affiliation by flags: in Münster’s map of the “New Islands” (America) the Antilles are adorned with the Castilian flag; the South Atlantic is covered with the Portuguese flag. Even the description of the inhabitants of “Brasil,” “Canibali,” south of the Amazonas-

River (today in the state of Pará) is taken over from Waldseemüller.¹² Münster's text about the New World, first and foremost an account of the journeys of Columbus and Vespucci, serves as a justification of that characterization: From Vespucci's third journey in 1501 by order of King Manuel I. of Portugal (1495–1521), Münster recounts the exotic stories, including libertinage (*Mulieres (ut dixi) etsi nudaee incedant et libidinosissimae sint*) and cannibalism (*ego hominem novi—quem et allocutus sum—qui plus quam ex trecentis humanis corporibus edisse vulgabatur*) that Vespucci had published.¹³ Apparently not being dramatic enough, Münster decided to further embroider the scene: Vespucci and his men “reached the land one calls Besilicam [the possibility of a typographical error cannot be excluded] . . . and there he discovered people on an island who were more vicious than wild animals.” A woodcarving of a human corpse put on a meat skewer completes the picture of Brazil as the home of absolute bestiality.¹⁴

Also on the eastern fringes of the South Atlantic the Portuguese dominated in Münster's account. In the sixth part of his *Cosmographia (Von dem land Africa—Of the land Africa)* he commenced his account about contemporary Africa with the “numerous journeys” (“manigfaltigen schiffungen”) of the Portuguese who “circumnavigate the whole of Africa from Lisbon to Calicut [in India] and from Calicut back to . . . Portugall.” He admitted that “the interior [of Africa] has down to the present day not yet emerged.”¹⁵ While northern Africa is described with various details, Münster apparently did not know much about events and places beyond the coastline of the Southern Atlantic. On his map of Africa, the southwestern parts are covered by trees, birds, and an elephant. However, the political situation of the sea seemed evident to him: the coast northwest off *Caput bonespei* is graphically dominated by a galley that according to the text should be Portuguese, although he mentions neither Bartholomeu Dias (apx. 1450–1500) nor Vasco da Gama (apx. 1469–1524).

It was known to Münster that already before Christ travelers had circumvented Africa. Nonetheless, “this is nothing in comparison with shipping that currently takes place” during his lifetime in order to bring “spices and food-stuffs for all of Europe.”¹⁶ Münster's account of the Kingdom of Lusitania went into more detail when he described the results of the exploration under King Manuel I in “Año Christi 1500.” “However, it appears that these shipments cause great damage to the Germans, Frenchmen, Englishmen, and the Danish.” Not only do they allegedly block “the way to India, but they also make sure that the spices reach us with great profit for the Portuguese and to our marked harm.

Since what is of high [quality] they keep [for themselves] and what is not they sell to us at the highest price." Münster was not convinced by the Portuguese claim to spread Christianity on their travels but assumed that they "look for their own great advantage from this pretence."¹⁷

Several revised editions of Münster's *Cosmographia* attested to the increased geographical knowledge about the new world. The meanders of the Amazon River or the graphically depicted width of "El gran rio de Parana" are just two examples of the map of the New World that was included in the edition of 1588. However, the unknown cartographer admitted that "it [the New World] in its full extent is currently not yet explored." The America map contains explanations of the political situation: "Persilia A Lusitanis Ao 1504." "Bresilia, which is located at the equinoctial in the south, is held by the King of Portugal." The new map of Africa in the same edition depicted the South Atlantic in its entirety as it included the coast of "Bresilie" up the La Plata River. Similar to the America map, it was copied from the Ortelius-Atlas of 1570. The difficulties, Europeans had experienced in their attempts to set foot in Africa can be recognized from the fact that—contrary to Waldseemüller eighty years ago—there are no insignia of political affiliation anymore, although the mouth of the Congo River is clearly discernible. Also the "deserta" along the southern Atlantic coast, where the Portuguese seafarers had erected their *padroes*, was now mentioned.¹⁸

Indications of European spheres of influences in Central and Southern Africa are also not a constant feature of German maps of later centuries. The map of Africa of the cartographer Johann Georg Schreiber of 1749 depicts "Angola" as part of the larger Congo region. Missionary efforts are recognizable due to the name "S. Salvator" at the mouth of the Congo River. The place is marked as one of the few settlements where apparently Christianity is practiced. At the southern end of the continent the African inhabitants, "Gixiqua" and "Hotentos," are mentioned.¹⁹ A final map of Africa to mention is the map of August Stieler (1828). It depicts the coast north and south of the Congo River (when the slave trade was still in full swing) as a busy place of settlements. Interestingly, by way of color political entities "belonging" to European powers are marked on the map, reaching—as patches—from the coast toward the interior. South of the twentieth degree of latitude, however, there is an empty "desert plateau" inhabited by "Dambaras" and no color marking at all. Only south of the Orange River does British "Capland" attest to any European civilization. Portugal nonetheless ranks first in the Stieler's listing of "European settlements."²⁰

Even though German ship-owners and captains were not heavily involved in the transatlantic trade of the Southern hemisphere, nautical charts of the South Atlantic were published in German during the eighteenth century. They were, however drawn by, for example, French or Dutch geographers, whose compatriots were effecting a flourishing trade in the Congo region. The differences in the European exertion of power are graphically emphasized by the comparative view of both coasts of the South Atlantic on one map. The countless Christian names of settlements on the Brazilian side speak of the extent of Portuguese colonization. They rarely find their equivalents on the African side.²¹ (Imaginary) power relations are also discernible from the sea: the map's innumerable straight lines crossing the sea are a graphical expression of a colonial matrix that had been built up in the South Atlantic. They create an impression of mathematical clarity and controllability of the sea and read like callings to follow their example and span the distances from Africa to Brazil.²²

With the onset of active European exploration and settlement in the New World and in Africa, German migrants became part of the developing colonial societies by crossing the South Atlantic. On both South American and southern African shores they searched for fortunes, adventures, or simply a better life.

Germans in Brazil

Nowhere along the South Atlantic shores were German immigration, and commercial, political, or military influence as old and numerous as in Brazil. German mercenaries like Hans Staden (1525–1576) soon took the chance to enlist in the Portuguese navy to take part in the conquest of the New World.²³ Once European settlement had commenced, German specialists like miners were explicitly invited by the Portuguese and Dutch authorities to work in the colonies. An early but tragic example for a specialist who went to Brazil is the fate of the Goldsmith Christoph Rausch from Pernambuco. He was, after a trial by the Holy Inquisition, threatened with the stake and finally pardoned in Lisbon in 1619. Rausch's story, meticulously researched by José A. Gonsalves de Mello, also illuminates to what degree some migrants managed to amass fortunes. Furthermore, it reveals the conflicts of faith and differing notions of freedom that characterized the early societies formed by migrants from several European nations in the cosmopolitan towns of colonial Brazil.²⁴ Such "melange" of people was also described by the Jesuit João Antonio Antonil in 1711 in his book about Minas Gerais: "Tous les ans les bateaux amènent une foule de Portugais et

d'étrangeres qui veulent aller au Mines."²⁵ Jesuits of German origin also began to work in Brazil.

It has been part of the self-assurance of Brazil's German-speaking minority to underline the uninterrupted "contribution" of Germans to Brazil's (European) history, "from the very first day." A lecture of Carlos H. Hunsche about this subject given in the Colégio Estadual in Curitiba (1970) is a starring example. He lists numerous Germans who had supported the colonization of Brazil since 1500 until today. Hunsche mentions soldiers and politicians, authors and explorers of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. But most of all he emphasizes the new work ethos imported by the masses of German settlers during the nineteenth century, thereby implying that it was "the Germans" who taught "the Brazilians" how to work (without slaves from Africa).²⁶ Also in German contemporary writing the notion of Brazil as a country of fabulous but neglected potential that began to fulfill its promise only when German industriousness reached the shores of Rio Grande do Sul and other provinces permeates almost every page.²⁷ In light of the abolitionist discourses, labor migration was indeed a major feature of Brazilian history of the nineteenth century, and it was closely related to nation-building processes—in Brazil as well as in Germany.

Workers from China ("coolies") were the first migrants (since 1810) transferred to Brazil as alternative to African slaves.²⁸ Portugal's port of Macao often served as the departing point for the workers. However, over the course of the century Brazilian governments followed an "implacably aggressive policy of seeking European immigrants."²⁹ Beginning in 1867 the Brazilian government and later the provincial government of São Paulo began to invest "markedly" in the immigration policy by paying for the transport from Europe to Brazil. By doing so they wanted to create a free labor marked of "white" workers and avert a crisis in the supply of rural manpower. In the discussion about the ideal worker, questions of race soon became central as Africans and Asians immigrants were rejected. The sociologist Sales Augusto dos Santos has summarized these discussions as follows: "Based on the need to improve the Brazilian race, the case for European immigration was overwhelming. This racist discourse not only was supported by arguments in favor of a policy to whiten Brazilian population but also determined that free labor would be imported according to racial criteria."³⁰

Especially in the southern provinces immigration policy was not just about replacing slave-laborers with paid workers but about "colonization," meaning the creation of economically viable homesteads for families based on small-scale

property.³¹ The aim of Brazil's ruling elite was to form "a new and different nation," to "build a white nation."³² Selective immigration was thus considered an instrument of population policy focusing on "economic progress and social renewal."³³ Germans were considered particularly worthy for this undertaking. So eager were some politicians for European or more specific Germanic invigoration of Brazil that they "lamented the [seventeenth-century] expulsion from Pernambuco of the Dutch, an 'adventurous race' and one of 'advanced civilization.'"³⁴ Already before 1870 there had been some attempts to attract German and Swiss immigrants (most of whom were illiterate peasants), "with the explicit intention of countering the disproportion between blacks and whites."³⁵ However, when the appalling work conditions on the *fazendas* in Brazil became known in Prussia, the paternalistic Heydt Edict of 1859 (Heydt'sches Reskript) prohibited the recruitment (not the emigration) of Prussian workers for Brazil. Emigration agencies were no longer allowed to advertise in an often misleading manner the life to be expected in Brazil. The edict was abrogated in 1896.³⁶

The first "wave" of non-Portuguese European immigrants had arrived prior to independence to "fill the demographic voids," but these numbers were small. For the period 1819 to 1829 2,326 German immigrants were registered. The demographers Bideau and Nadalin calculated the percentage of German immigrants among the total immigration to Brazil for several periods: 1819–1849, 6,983 Germans (35.8 percent); 1850–1869, 32,229 Germans (14.2 percent); 1870–1919, 90,612 Germans (2.7 percent); 1920–1939, 103,468 Germans (8.8 percent). For the period 1819 to 1970, Germans made up 4.6 percent of the total immigration of 5.7 million persons to Brazil. (The largest group of immigrants arrived from Italy [1,540,000], compared to 1,480,000 Portuguese and 600,000 Spaniards.)³⁷ However, as Bideau and Nadalin emphasize in light of the fact that the German territory varied considerably during this period, it cannot be discerned from the sources how many non-Germans were included among those 263,241 individuals; neither can be ascertained how many Germans were counted as Swiss, Austrians, Russians, Poles, or Yugoslavs by the Brazilian authorities.³⁸ Other estimated that in total around 300,000 German immigrants went to Brazil.³⁹ Immigration was "only a secondary factor in the increase" of Brazil's population in comparison with the "very high natality."⁴⁰ The fertility of Germans was said to be very high.⁴¹ However, in comparison with the Italian immigrants the number of children per woman was lower. Furthermore, there were significant differences between Catholic and Protestant immigrants from Germany:

calculations for Curitiba showed that Catholic women marrying between the ages of fifteen and nineteen had on average 11.8 children, versus 8.5 for the Protestant women of the same age group in the period 1889 to 1909. Later, the numbers decreased proportionally.⁴²

The endless streams of emigrants from the German principalities and after unification in 1871 from the German Reich caused first German business leaders and finally German politicians to turn their attention to the shores of the South Atlantic. Prior to unification, the "Hansa cities Hamburg and Bremen conducted most of the commerce . . . between the German states and Central [and South] America."⁴³ Hamburg and Brazil concluded a treaty of commerce in 1827 and since then the commerce had grown constantly. In 1833, the French consul called Hamburg Brazil's "entrepôt en Europe."⁴⁴ Toward the end of the century, German merchandise grew in importance in South Atlantic harbors. Germany entered the marked "rather late, [but] came forward at a surprising rate":⁴⁵ "In the view of British officials and merchants, it was the German commercial threat rather than that of the United States that was to be most feared on the Latin American continent."⁴⁶ In the Portuguese-German treaty of commerce of 1872, which was based on the most-favorite-nation principle, Germany willingly conceded Brazil's special role for Portugal: a provision in favor of Portugal detailed that advantages could be granted exclusively to Brazil that could not be claimed by Germany.⁴⁷ This provision needs to be seen in light of Brazil's economic importance for Portugal: As research has shown, "Portugal balanced its accounts with Europe by means of a permanent imbalance in its accounts with Brazil."⁴⁸ This did not prevent Germany from becoming Brazil's third most important trade and investment partner (after Great Britain and the United States) in the decade prior to the First World War.⁴⁹

Also German politicians were looking for gains in the area. In their view, German emigrants were important for the question whether the German empire would once belong to the "World Powers" or would inevitably perish. The Germans in foreign countries were considered to be helpful as pressure group for German interests, to open sales markets for German exports or even as starting point for colonial ambitions. Therefore, the German government and the society at large were basically positively inclined toward the emigration of Germans. However, in light of the rate of "assimilation" of Germans, especially in the United States, it was attempted to better preserve the German identity (*Deutschtum*) of the emigrants. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century Ger-

man emigration and worldwide German expansion were argumentatively connected by plans for the foundation of settler colonies similar to their British counterparts. The new *Heimat* for Germans should be no longer “New England” but Neu Deutschland overseas. The colonial policies of the German empire since 1884 were in part initiated by this quest for demographic and economic expansion, world power and preservation of the national identity of German emigrants.⁵⁰ State-controlled steering of the emigration flow was therefore seen a political necessity in order to avoid the ongoing “loss of national energy” due to assimilation. South America was recognized as a viable alternative to the United States, since in Argentina, Brazil, or Chile the Germans were living mostly in closed (agricultural) communities and stayed among themselves. In light of these intentions the German Emigration Law of 1897 has been correctly characterized as an “emigration-redirecting law” (*Auswanderungs-Umlenkungsgesetz*).⁵¹

Moreover, Latin America and Brazil in particular became the focus of some German colonial fantasists who dreamed of German annexations once the Brazilian empire would break up. They attributed the tens of thousands of Germans in southern Brazil and the La Plata region with a specific ability to create communities that they considered the cradle of a German state in the area. These voices were however a minority among myriads of Germans speaking and publishing about foreign policy. Others warned openly that Germany could never win politically as much as it could lose commercially if such schemes were to be followed.⁵² Although annexation plans were never part of the official German foreign and colonial policy,⁵³ rumors about them reached Brazil. The resulting idea of a *perigo alemão* (German threat) emerged in Brazil in the late nineteenth century.⁵⁴ While the “process of whitening the country so desired by its ruling elites”⁵⁵ was to be accelerated by massive immigration from Europe, a “confederacy” of German Brazilians was regarded a threat for Brazil’s nation-building process. Resentment against Germans grew. It was also due to their economic success, which was often achieved despite the initial hardship of those recently arrived.⁵⁶ More than that, the perceived hesitation of (Protestant) German immigrants to integrate and to speak and teach to their children the Portuguese language was understood by some Luso-Brazilians as lack of loyalty to Brazil. Cultural conflicts, vividly described by the sociologist Emilio Willems, occurred not only between German- and Luso-Brazilians but also between different German groups and generations.⁵⁷ Separatist movements in Rio Grande do Sul, where the German element was strongest in Brazil, gave political relevance and

urgency to the *perigo alemão*.⁵⁸ In the decade prior to the First World War authors such as the former parliamentarian Sílvia Romero (1851–1914) tirelessly warned of the growing German influence and appetite for Brazilian territory.⁵⁹ While older studies had suggested that “Germans were marginal to Brazilian society,” it must be underlined, that these historical animosities did not impede the successful penetration of Brazilian elite institutions by individuals of German descent.⁶⁰

Germans in Argentina

Also for the territory that became later the Republic of Argentina, German narrations of pioneering adventures and hard working peasants arriving in the La Plata region with nothing but their “work ethic” are well documented.⁶¹ As in the Brazilian case the German merchant followed his mercenary compatriot. The *conquistador* Ulrich Schmidl (1510–1580) of Straubing near Munich was among those who “founded” Buenos Aires. The account of his survival in the New World from 1534 bis 1554 makes him one of the first historians of Argentina. As is well known, he too did not abstain from reporting about cannibalism—yet remarkably, in his narrative the *conquistadores* themselves devoured one another.⁶² Also in later centuries, German mercenaries signed up to take over military tasks in favor of Argentina. The most prominent episode might be the secret treaty of 1827 between Argentine officers and German mercenaries in service of the emperor of Brazil. They agreed to intrigue against Brazil in order to create chaos and to dismember the Brazilian empire by founding an independent Republic of Santa Catarina that would welcome all Germans settling in Brazil.⁶³

Apart from such military affairs German relations with the La Plata region were established after independence was won from Spain. In the 1820s, Germans sought to institute trade relations with the area of Buenos Aires. According to Great Britain’s *chargé d’affaires* in Buenos Aires, Sir Woodbine Parish (1796–1881), the German imports consisted of “cloths and linens, and printed cottons from the Rhine . . . A branch of the Rhenish Manufacturing Company was set up in Buenos Ayres in 1824.” However, the selling prices were so low that the establishment “was broken up.” Already at this point in time the “important proportion of the British trade [was] very manifest; it amounts in fact to as much as the trade of all other foreign countries with Buenos Ayres put together”: in 1822 Britain imported goods valued at 5.7 million “Spanish Dollars”

out of 11.2 million total imports; the “North of Europe [including] Holland, Germany, Sweden, and Denmark” reached only 552,187 “Spanish Dollars.”⁶⁴ While Great Britain was able to conclude with Argentina a treaty of friendship and commerce in 1825, Prussia followed only in 1857. “Such has been the British commercial, logistical and cultural influence in Argentina that it was customarily referred to as part of Britain’s ‘informal empire’ or ‘sixth dominion.’”⁶⁵

Nevertheless, and despite harsh competition, after 1870 the German exporters as well as investors managed to make a place for themselves in the Argentine market (which was for a long time mostly confined to the La Plata region). Numbers are difficult to ascertain and are often inconsistent. It is important to bear in mind that Argentina in the years after 1900 was one of the fastest growing economies of the world. It was considered “preeminently a land of progress”; its capital, Buenos Aires, was described as “a marvel of splendour and luxury.” An American commentator stated in 1918, “The Republic . . . has attracted vast sums of foreign capital.”⁶⁶ And indeed, Argentina was for Imperial Germany the first place for investment in Latin America:⁶⁷ “powerful Teutonic interests controlling public utilities that operate in Buenos Aires, Rosario, and elsewhere. German banks have in the past wielded great influence in Argentina . . . It is reasonable to suppose that nearly \$250,000,000 of German capital is invested in Argentina.”⁶⁸ However, the first German bank (Banco Alemán Transatlántico) had been founded only in 1893. It was rightfully observed that “Germans controlled no railroads . . . The Germans arrived in Argentina too late.” Again, the British dominated this key area.⁶⁹ On the other hand, as in Brazil and elsewhere on the continent they complained about the growing competition from Germany. In particular, “German merchant houses controlled many of the goods shipped to and from South America”—a fact that should prove important during the First World War. To the detriment of their competitors these merchants had set up their branches all along the South Atlantic coast and worked closely with German banks and the nearby German consuls to export grain, wool, tobacco, and coffee at favorable rates.⁷⁰

German immigration to Argentina before the First World War did not reach the levels of Brazil, although it was considerably stronger than British immigration.⁷¹ In the middle of the nineteenth century only around one thousand German immigrants had settled in Argentina. These early German settlers have been described as “poor devils.” Also in this field the numbers are highly inconsistent, as not only the French historian Anne Saint Sauveur-Henn emphasizes.⁷²

It is said that until the First World War sixty thousand Germans had immigrated to Argentina. An equal number of Swiss, Austrians, or Germans from Russia had arrived since the middle of the century. It is however open to discussion how many returned or settled elsewhere. The number of people of German descent in these years may have passed 200,000.⁷³ Of those, around thirty thousand were German nationals living in Argentina.⁷⁴

After 1900 the German and the Argentine army established strong bonds. Germany thereby could expand its influence in the South Atlantic region and reap profits from armament contracts. German officers were invited to Argentina to work as advisors for the army reform. Most importantly, they were asked to organize the War Academy. "When that institution opened its doors in April 1900, the director and four of its ten professors were German officers."⁷⁵ This German military influence on Argentina caused considerable challenges for the Allies during the First World War. Especially the government of Brazil felt not at ease with a situation of possible Argentine expansion based on German trained military power "in conjunction with the large Germanic population in southern Brazil."⁷⁶ This example makes very evident how tensions between the two states were specifically aggravated by the German influence—whether through immigration or through transfer of knowledge.

Germans in Southern Africa

Early efforts of German colonial aspirations to participate in the triangular trade and to set up direct outposts on the African shores, remained both economically and politically marginal. In 1682 a chartered company from the German principality Kur-Brandenburg, the Brandenburg African Company (Kurfürstliche Afrikanisch-Brandenburgische Compagnie), established a small colony consisting of two Gold Coast settlements in present-day Ghana. The fort Groß Friedrichsburg became the capital of the "colony" that was eventually sold to the Dutch in 1721.⁷⁷ This short-lived attempt of the House of Brandenburg to compete with the Portuguese and Dutch along the West African coast was to remain for almost two hundred years the closest German endeavor to reach the African South Atlantic "politically." The Hansa cities Hamburg and Bremen however had managed to create strong bonds with the merchants along the Guinea coast. Around 1870 companies like C. Woermann or Jantzen&Thormählen maintained more than twenty trading posts (*Faktoreien*) from Liberia to the Kongo River. C. Woermann alone was said to hold 25 percent of the entire trade along

the coast of the Cameroons. Company owned sail boats and steamships traveled up and down the coast to purchase and deliver the goods. The profits were made by importing to Africa cheap merchandise like spirits, guns, gunpowder, salt, or cloth and exporting to Europe expensive colonial products like palm oil or ivory. However, in comparison with the German trade in South America the number of goods transacted and the turnover remained low.⁷⁸

The situation looked completely different at the southern tip of the African continent where the Dutch East India Company (VOC) had established the Cape of Good Hope as a victualling point for its vessels in 1652. Ever since, Cape Town had developed into an important harbor and trading point which attracted not only Dutch and Hugenott settlers (since 1688) but also thousands of Britons and Germans. The climatic conditions in the Cape region allowed for extensive agriculture and most of all cattle farming. The advantages and details of the area have been described by the natural scientist Peter Kolbe (1675–1726), who was invited to work as an astronomer at the Cape. Published in 1719, his German account was the first entirely dedicated to the Cape region and its people.⁷⁹

During the nineteenth century the number of German immigrants in southern Africa as well as German investments grew constantly. Germans not only settled in the Cape Colony but also went as military settlers to “British Kaffraria” in Xhosa land (more than two thousand German settlers) and to Natal, where they founded in 1854 the mission station and settlement Hermannsburg. Also many other places bore German names and some British administrators began to worry about the German influence.⁸⁰ The former deputy governor of GSWA, Oskar Hintrager (1872–1955), published in 1952 an account of the Germans in South Africa (he called it “History of South Africa”) that resembles much of the German-Brazilian historiography of his time. Also in South Africa, he claimed, it was the Germans with their “perseverance,” “diligence,” and “devotion to hard work,” who brought civilization and progress to a country of hardship and chaos. According to Hintrager’s understanding, the Afrikaners, the Boers, are essentially of German stock, and he quotes a South African historian of German origin who quantified that allegedly “65 per cent of the blood of Afrikaners is German.”⁸¹ Claims like these had already made British politicians and journalists feel uncomfortable fifty years earlier when they thought of Germany’s political ambitions in southern Africa. On the other hand, it should be realized that Hintrager could barely point to ten cities in South Africa where one thousand or more Germans are living, and Cape Town was not among them.⁸²

Before the South African War (1899–1902) it was assumed that fifteen thousand Germans worked in Transvaal, many of whom may have left the country during or after the war.⁸³

Even when numbers are—again—hard to establish this can be an indicator that German demographic influence in South Africa was not overwhelming in the sense that the German empire could have attempted to dominate affairs in the region. Also commercially, Germany played no superior role. Indeed, “German trade with South Africa and the S.A.R. [Transvaal] [had] certainly increased dramatically throughout the 1890 . . . German products virtually dominated the Rand markets for machinery and electrical equipment.”⁸⁴ However, most of the products were delivered via the British harbor of Cape Town and the “relative decline of British trade” in comparison with the Germans did not alter the dominant role of British merchandise and investment in the region in total. Mining and railways were among the main fields of investment German capitalists were interested in the Rand. The German ambassador in London, Graf Hatzfeld, mentioned that “500 million marks” had been invested from Germany in the Transvaal. And those capitalists in Berlin were interested in “long-term political stability” in the Rand and therefore did not oppose British intervention in Transvaal in 1899. Rather, they saw their business growing again already shortly after the war.⁸⁵

During the South African War (“Boer War”) emotions in some circles in Germany run high. They demanded military support for the Boers against British “imperialism.” However, Germany stayed neutral, although guns and explosives had been smuggled by the Boers and their supporters via GSWA. Around 3,000 foreign volunteers, among them German, American, Dutch, and French corps, fought for the Boers. The largest contingent consisted of 750 Germans, many of whom were residents of Transvaal or the Orange Freestate.⁸⁶ However, also some desperados in Germany decided to join the fight for “vryheid” and traveled to the Boer republics; among them was the above-mentioned Oskar Hintzinger, then a judge from Württemberg.

In addition to German traders, mercenaries, and settlers, German-speaking missionaries arrived at the Cape. Georg Schmidt (1709–1785) of Herrnhut in Saxony from the Moravian Church (Böhmische Brüder) was the first to attempt an evangelization of Africans at the Cape in 1737. The Dutch authorities had shown no interest in this. However, he had to close his mission station already in 1744 due to the hostility of settlers and the administration. A new station was

opened in 1792.⁸⁷ Later also the London Missionary Society, the Berliner Mission and the Rheinische Missionsgesellschaft set up a network of mission stations in Southern Africa. First, this network of stations remained within the borders of the Cape colony that in 1806 had finally become British. However, also Namaland north of the Orange River was drawn into the “orbit” of the missionaries, when the German Heinrich Schmelen (1776–1848) of the London Missionary Society followed his congregation into northern direction. In 1814 they erected a station at a place he called Bethanien at the fringes of the Namib Desert.⁸⁸

It was here, in the area north of the Orange River, that seventy years later the first German colony, GSWA, was “founded.” The land had been repeatedly visited by hunters and missionaries, ships crews had passed the coast,⁸⁹ but no European state had claimed sovereignty over the coastal strip between the Orange and Kunene Rivers yet (the only exemption being the harbor of Walvisbay, annexed by the Cape Colony in 1878 and mainly used as a victualling point for the navy base on Saint Helena).⁹⁰ In 1883 the German merchant Adolf Lüderitz and his assistants signed “contracts” with several African chiefs according to which they sold their land to him. Lüderitz managed to receive the “protection” of the German empire for his recently acquired “property.” Imperial Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898), who in the past had been a staunch adversary of German colonial possessions, had agreed to this “protection” in order to please the colonial enthusiasts in Germany for whose votes in the upcoming election he was vying. It was claimed that GSWA could accommodate the masses of German emigrants, keeping them under German authority, and would thus solve the “social question.” During the Congo Conference in Berlin (1884–1885), Portugal was made to accept sacrifices in two regions it originally considered to be within its sphere of influence: North (Free State of Kongo) and South (GSWA) of Angola new colonial states were carved out although hitherto the principles of “discovery” and “first occupation,” as depicted in Waldseemüller’s map of 1507, had been recognized under international law. A contemporary commented: “Diplomacy became subservient to an economic and social question.”⁹¹

Germany’s southern African acquisition was, much like that of the other Protectorates in Kamerun, Togo and German East Africa, at first barely touched by its new master. A few engagements by navy vessels were all the German government initially afforded. Bismarck was reluctant when it came to the expensive deployment of troops in the new African territories, which (according to his plans)

should not have been "colonies" proper, but instead protectorates (*Schutzgebiete*): territories administered privately by "British style" chartered companies. However, such companies were, as in other European colonies, nothing but a "relic from a past [mercantile] age."⁹² And also the hopes proved futile that Africans would willingly accept German "protection." Increasing "rebellions" led to the deployment of more troops. Even with these increases, the numbers of men employed were still to remain small: In 1893, only 220 men were deployed to GSWA, in an effort to subdue the Ovaherero and Nama. Perhaps unsurprisingly given the number of troops deployed, it would ultimately be political machinations, rather than German military might, that would lead to the signing of "protection treaties" by African leaders like Samuel Maharero (1856–1923) of Okahandja, or Hendrik Witbooi (apx.1830–1905) of Gibeon.⁹³ Only after the colonial wars of 1904–1908 could German colonial authority attempt to enforce its colonial legislation vis-à-vis the African population, most of all the duty to work and to register with the administration.

The demographic and economic hopes of Germany's colonial enthusiasts were not realized. In comparison to the millions that left Germany in the decades between 1885 and 1905 only very few Germans decided to settle in GSWA. According to official data GSWA's "white population" in 1897 consisted of 2,628 persons, of whom only 1,221 were German men (the total population stood at around 200,000).⁹⁴ In 1913 the German population had grown to 14,830 (10,147 men and 4,683 women including children).⁹⁵ In light of these small numbers and life on isolated farms, questions of acculturation seemed to be pressing for contemporaries. Similar to German parents in Brazil who were horrified at seeing their children conversing together in Portuguese and complained about their offspring being *verlust*,⁹⁶ parents in GSWA (and also the German colonial administration) were concerned about the tendency of their children to speak Cape-Dutch or, even worse, one of the African languages. They called this distastefully *verkaffern*. And not only children were said "to be at risk" of leading a life outside the European cultural norms.⁹⁷

Considering that more Germans lived in South Africa or in South America than in GSWA, it is also noteworthy that financially German colonialism resulted in huge losses. The colonial population depended to a large extent on public expenses. They worked for the colonial administration as soldiers (around two thousand in 1914), as policemen (around five hundred), or as public servants or for the railway company. Fewer than half of the German population had pur-

chased farms; others ran small businesses. Only when diamonds were found in GSWA in 1908 Germany's big business became involved with the colony. The African market had become more important after 1900. However, the German colonies did not participate in the rapid growth of the international trade. They were irrelevant for the export economy. In 1913 merely 0.5 percent of Germany's total export went to its colonies.⁹⁸ Henri Brunschwig had already remarked decades ago with a sense of irony: "La période la plus rentable de l'expansion allemande a certainement été celle qui précéda la création de l'Empire colonial."⁹⁹ The German colonial empire caused only expenses and losses.

Germans in Angola

In contrast both with the South Atlantic's American coast and with southern Africa, the area north and south of the Congo estuary could barely be considered for European settlement. The tropical climate and unknown diseases prevented European incursions for a long time. However, the Portuguese, the French, and the Dutch had long established trade connections with the area. Most of the slaves destined for Brazil were shipped from Angolan shores. Permanent European settlements along the coast, like Ambriz, Luanda, or Benguela, remained rare for a long time. Mostly, traders and visitors from Europe stayed there merely for weeks or months rather than years. Also Germans were among them. Very few settled permanently. However, "one of the most distinguished families in Angola," called Van Dunem, originates from "a Dutch Jewish trader from Hamburg who came to Angola around 1600." His "wealthy mestiço children"¹⁰⁰ and their offspring "provided military leaders ever since."¹⁰¹ The law professor Fernando José F. Dias Van Dunem twice served as prime minister of Angola (1991–1992; 1996–1999).

Other visitors from Germany left less politically influential traces. However, the accounts of their sojourns are valuable sources for historians. The history and ethnography of Angola, as Beatrix Heintze has stated, cannot be written without their due consideration. These accounts consist mostly of eyewitness reports of doctors, hunters, ethnographers, and others who have time and again visited the Portuguese possessions along Africa's southern coast.¹⁰² Especially during the last part of the nineteenth century, the Portuguese sphere of influence proved to be attractive for Germans. However, the synopsis of their accounts, meticulously compiled by Heintze, shows that also in earlier times Germans had found their way to Africa's South Atlantic coast.

In December 1611 Samuel Brun (or Braun) (1590–1668), a military doctor from Basel, reached the Luango Coast and the mouth of the Congo River at the “border of Angola” on a Dutch trading vessel. The ship anchored for seven months in the Congo River to barter with the African population. Brun himself was able to assemble a small fortune through this kind of trade. Considering that his report contained only few details about the Kingdom of Kongo and the earldom of Soyo, Beatrix Heintze assumed that Brun had to treat an unusual high number of sick sailors. Therefore he had barely time to visit the surrounding area. Nevertheless, Brun’s observations about the Loango Coast and its peoples are among the classic early firsthand sources of African history. In comparison with later accounts, Brun’s descriptions are remarkable because of their openness and relative unbiased perspective on African ways of life and customs, even when they seemed strange to the visitor. Positive connotations like “beautiful” or “orderly” are not lacking in his narrative.¹⁰³

The Officer Johann Paul Augspurger’s report of 1644 was probably the first document about Luanda published by a German. Coming from Brazil he arrived in Africa as a soldier on duty for the Dutch-West Indies Company. In summer 1641, Commander Augspurger participated under the General Jacob Henderson in the Dutch conquest of Luanda, Benguela, and São Thomé before returning the next year via Brazil to Amsterdam. His description of Luanda emphasized not only military aspects as the fortification of the town, its excellent harbor or Angola’s unhealthy climate (within seven months 360 soldiers died due to diseases; the remainder of the garrison had to receive reinforcements from Brazil every three months). Also the agricultural and commercial aspects of the live along the coast are mentioned together with a few (essentialistic) remarks about Africans and their comportments.¹⁰⁴ Georg Markgraf (1610–1644), a botanist and cartographer of Brazil in Dutch services, had to experience the dangers of Angola too. The German, who had worked for Count Moritz von Nassau-Siegen in Pernambuco, arrived in Luanda during his journey to the Dutch Indies but died soon after his arrival in Angola.¹⁰⁵

Another German medical doctor, Georg Tams of Altona, accompanied a trading enterprise to Angola in 1841 on the invitation of the Portuguese Consul General in Hamburg, José Ribeiro dos Santos. Tams’s account of his seven-week sojourn in Luanda and his contempt for the ongoing slave trade has been colorfully related and contextualized by historian David Birmingham. He rightfully concluded that Tams “was one of the first of a distinguished band of German-

speaking travellers to visit Angola.”¹⁰⁶ The character of their travels changed slowly, however, in comparison to earlier visitors. Some of these men were researchers with more or less outspoken academic/“scientific” interests. Adolf Bastian’s account of his visit to São Salvador (Mbanza Congo), the capital of the Kingdom of Congo, in 1857 was made possible due to his assignment as yet another German medical doctor on a ship calling at the harbor of Luanda.¹⁰⁷ However, he expressed his ethnographic interests openly. These interests were the incitement also of his later travels and not a by-product. He was to become the founding father of Germany’s ethnography as an academic subject.¹⁰⁸ The formalization and professionalization of “scientific exploration” becomes evident also with the erection of the German research station Chinchoxo by the Loango Expedition of Adolf Bastian, Eduard Pechuël-Loesche, Julius Falkenstein, and others in 1873. The station near the coast of today’s Cabinda enclave remained in function until 1876. Even though the participants considered their expedition a failure, the resulting publications document a (limited yet) impression of the work of early anthropologists and (to an even lesser degree) of the life of their “objects.” A focus on knowledge production and the surrounding circumstances emphasizes that most of the “anthropological research” during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries took place within a “climate of violence.”¹⁰⁹

Traders continued to call at the Angolan coast, not always welcomed by the Portuguese administration. Pointing indirectly to the weakness of the Portuguese presence in Angola, Foreign Minister de Castro complained in 1866 that “American, British, French and Hamburger trading post deal with the natives to our detriment, for they do not pay a penny for embarked or disembarked goods.”¹¹⁰ Others were primarily interested in game hunting and signed up for the expensive journey to Africa with the intention to experience the adventure of their life. With the onset of formal colonialism, technical advances, and the extension of the colonial “frontiers” from behind the coast further inland, the quintessential European hunter in Africa, with his particular notions of virility and violence, came to the fore. Some left Europe to settle permanently in Africa. The German farmer Wilhelm Mattenklodt who had published extensively about his hunting trips in GWSA and Angola before and after the First World War is just one example among many.¹¹¹

As can be seen from the financing of the expeditions and the increased participation of soldiers in those expeditions, the German government became more

and more involved in the affairs of southern Africa. Soldiers worked as cartographers and organizers of caravans. The (proto-)colonial intentions of men like Curt von François (1852–1931) and Herrmann Wissmann (1853–1905) were all too evident. Wissmann's journey across Africa from Luanda to Saadi at the Indian Ocean (1881–1882) excited colonial enthusiasts not only in Germany.¹¹² It is no accident that both soldier-adventurers were called to the colonial service once a formal German colonial empire had been established. François became governor (*Landeshauptmann*) of German South-West Africa (1891–1894); Wissmann became governor of German East Africa (1895–1896).

With increased business opportunities in legitimate commerce also less adventurous men from Germany (and other European countries) arrived in Angola. The majority opened their commerce in Luanda or Benguela. The above-mentioned Portuguese-German treaty of commerce provided for imports from Portuguese colonies to Germany under the most-favorite-nation principle. However, agricultural and industrial imports from Germany into the opposite direction were not granted the same privilege. Restriction on foreign commerce in Angola remained in force.¹¹³ It needs to be taken into consideration that custom revenues remained one of Angola's most important public income sources. Nevertheless, German interests increased, and the German vice consulate in Luanda, administered since 1908 by the Portuguese business man Eduardo Prazeres, was elevated to a consulate in December 1913. It was headed by the career diplomat Dr. Ernst Eisenlohr (1882–1858), arriving from the German embassy in London. He reported to the Consul in Lisbon and oversaw the vice consuls in Benguela and Moçâmedes, Schöss, and Verdur, who—as private businessmen—acted as honorary German consuls.¹¹⁴ Those traders, however, who dared to go further inland experienced that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, Angola was far from being occupied in its entirety by the Portuguese. The Portuguese colonial state, “despite its seeming antiquity, remained a series of patrimonial satrapies improvisationally run by an amalgam of settlers, renegades, and officials.”¹¹⁵ In 1902, “the great colonial war” against the kingdom of Mbailundo was raging,¹¹⁶ the governor general informed the German consul that the central district of Benguela had to be closed due to “special circumstances.”¹¹⁷ A private letter to the consul about the “serious war” went into more detail. A German trader mentioned settlers who had to escape to the coast since the area of Bié was “barred by the blacks.”¹¹⁸

The professionalization of German consulates in Angola had, however, not only commercial but also political reasons. Considering the evident political and financial weakness of Portugal and in light of the German aspirations for a *Weltpolitik*,¹¹⁹ Germany and Great Britain commenced negotiations about the future of the Portuguese colonies in 1898. At this point, rumors about German aspirations for (parts of) the Portuguese empire were already decades old.¹²⁰ In 1898 the British foreign secretary, Arthur J. Balfour, and the German ambassador, Paul von Hatzfeld, signed two secret agreements “in connection with a possible loan to Portugal,” according to which Angola and Mozambique would be administratively divided between the two powers “in case of default in the payment [by Portugal] of the interest.” This was, however, never the case. Portugal managed to stabilize its finances for a while and the “treaty therefore remained inoperative.”¹²¹ Furthermore, the German government was unable to mobilize the German economy to invest heavily in Angola. Instead of following a policy of slow *pénétration pacifique* and to be content with an informal zone of influence in southern Angola, Berlin insisted on an exclusive German sphere of influence and thereby ignored Portuguese interests.¹²²

The Portuguese government was aware of these machinations and was eager to revive the “six-hundred-year-old [Luso-British] alliance.”¹²³ In view of the “general impression in England that the demands of Germany in Africa were exorbitant” and considering the ensuing war with the South African Republic, the British government responded favorably to the Portuguese advances. The alliance was confirmed by secret treaty in October 1899, guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Portugal and her empire, while Portugal undertook not to permit the “passage of arms” destined to the Boer Republics.¹²⁴ Nevertheless, the British were willing to recommence in 1911 the negotiations with the Germans about the future of the Portuguese colonies.¹²⁵ One reason may be Foreign Secretary Grey’s “often expressed disgust at the ‘scandalous’ state of affairs in Portuguese Africa” and his doubts about the applicability of “treaties of such ancient date.” In addition, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, was known for his “intense hostility to the republican regime in Portugal.”¹²⁶

By this time, the councilors in the German Foreign Office had learned their lesson that shortsighted policy focusing on domestic prestige and annexations would not have a positive result. They now considered German economic penetration of Angola and Mozambique through investment and the purchase of

Portuguese national loans as the cornerstone of a policy that should lead in the future to the takeover of parts of the Portuguese colonies. Finally, also the Belgian Kongo was to be taken over, thereby uniting the German possessions to one huge Mittelafrika reaching from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic. A German colonial empire along the South Atlantic shores would thus have been created.¹²⁷

These negotiations were not just a colonial end in itself. Chancellor Theodor v. Bethmann-Hollweg, Colonial Secretary Wilhelm Solf, Councilor Richard von Kühlmann, and the envoy in Lisbon, Friedrich Rosen, hoped to use the detour of colonial negotiations (at Portugal's expense) to find common ground with Great Britain also in Europe. They were willing to see Germany as the junior partner of Great Britain in Africa and hoped to break through the isolation of Germany within Europe. However, they "seriously underestimated the sensitivity and tenacity of the Portuguese where their colonies were concerned." In addition, British Foreign Secretary Grey "had misled" the Germans regarding his intentions,¹²⁸ and also the German credit institutions were hardly convinced about the economic prospects of this financial imperialism. In early 1914 a semi-official study group, the Comissão luso-alemão dos estudos de Caminho de Ferro do Sul de Angola, was tasked with exploring the economic potentials of southern Angola.¹²⁹ Only in May 1914, German banks bought with the support of the Foreign Office in Berlin the majority of stocks of the Nyassa Consolidated Ltd. (Mozambique). The purchase of Portuguese national loans secured by the customs revenues of Angola was scheduled for July 1914.¹³⁰ Diplomatic circles already spoke of Germany's "de facto preponderance" in Angola.¹³¹ The outbreak of the war prevented further steps in the direction of the dream of a German Mittelafrika. After the fighting between German and Portuguese troops had commenced in southern Angola in October and the Germans had destroyed the Portuguese border post Naulila in December 1914, most Germans living in Angola (their number is hard to establish)¹³² were arrested. Many were accused of spying for an allegedly intended German invasion. After the war the Portuguese confirmed that the Germans were first incarcerated on ships in Luanda.¹³³ In 1917 fifty Germans and Austrians were deported to Lisbon.¹³⁴ In part, they were then transported to the Azores Island. However, after the war German immigration resumed at a higher level than any time before. In 1934, around five hundred Germans lived in Angola, either as businessmen or farmers, "many in extremely sad conditions," as the German consul, Fritz Bilfinger, commented.¹³⁵ Following the coffee boom the situation improved considerably. It has been re-

lated that up to fourteen hundred Germans settled in Angola before independence. A German school opened in Benguela.¹³⁶ After 1975 all but one, the farmer Eberhardt von Krosigk, left.¹³⁷ The history of the “cooperation” between East-Germany and Angola’s MPLA government in the 1980s is still to be researched.¹³⁸

The Germans and the South Atlantic during the First World War

All dreams for German dominance in the South Atlantic were terminated within a few months after the outbreak of hostilities.

On 2 and 3 August 1914 Germany’s colonial secretary, Wilhelm Solf, sent wireless messages to the German colonies: “Appease settlers. No danger of war for the colonies.” He was later heavily criticized for this.¹³⁹ Within days it became evident that the colonies would indeed be drawn into the European war. To sustain its population of roughly fourteen thousand Europeans, GSWA was dependent on imports from Germany and, especially for food imports, on the neighboring British Cape Colony. Imports from Germany were immediately blocked by the Royal Navy. The blockade proved right the German assumption that the “colonies must be defended in the North Sea.” When on 6 August 1914 the British declaration of war became known in GSWA, rumors spread that Portugal, Britain’s traditional ally, had also declared war on Germany. The governor of GSWA, Theodor Seitz (1863–1949), therefore asked Berlin via wireless message about the relations with Portugal. He received the answer that there was no war with Portugal. Thus neutral Angola seemed to be the only possible source of (food) imports to GSWA; all other neighboring colonies were part of the British empire. Seitz started an attempt to procure provisions in Angola via German traders.¹⁴⁰ However, these attempts failed. The Portuguese perceived the German emissaries as vanguards of an invading army and reacted violently. The German retaliation resulted in the above-mentioned fighting between German and Portuguese colonial troops in October and December 1914.¹⁴¹

While the Germans won against the Portuguese, their actions against the Allies on land and in the South Atlantic were less successful. The question of naval bases had always haunted the German Admiralty. Navy Secretary Tirpitz “had insisted as early as 1897 ‘that Commerce-raiding and transatlantic war against England is so hopeless, because of the shortage of bases on our side and the superfluity on England’s side.’”¹⁴² Due to this shortage, the Germans resorted to secret measures. On the Brazilian island of Trindade they established a secret

supply base to support their vessels in their commerce raiding missions along the South American coast. Also in Montevideo and Buenos Aires there were rumors in August 1914 that "the German Coal Company (Deutsches Kohlen Depot) was hoarding coal to supply a German cruiser squadron steaming in from the Pacific."¹⁴³ However, the British navy detected the Germans on Trinidad, and in battle on 14 September 1914 the British sunk the German armed merchant cruiser *Cap Trafalgar*.¹⁴⁴

At around the same time the British began to attack GSWA not only from across the Orange River but also from the sea. In late September, British troops landed in Lüderitzbucht. Soon thereafter, a British cruiser bombarded Swakopmund that was evacuated afterward and occupied by the British in January 1915. Both harbors were equipped with wireless stations. Their destruction was an early British war aim, in order to prevent GSWA from communicating with Berlin or any German vessels. However, also following the destruction in GSWA the British were still concerned about Germany's worldwide wireless network; especially as there were "rumors of wireless stations being erected on the south coast of Brazil by German sympathizers."¹⁴⁵ The Germans had no means available to defend their harbors in the South Atlantic against attacks from sea. Assistance from Germany was not to be expected. Navy Secretary Tirpitz "was insisting as late as July 1914 that [the defense of the German colonies] was not the responsibility of the [German] navy."¹⁴⁶ The German vessels that were in GSWA's waters in August 1914 had tried to reach neutral harbors in South America and were escorted to that end by the only German war ship available.¹⁴⁷ After the bombardment and occupation of GSWA's harbors, the last remaining hope had been placed in the German Asiatic Fleet (Ostasiengeschwader) from Tsingtao, China, under Vice-Admiral Maximilian Spee (1861–1914). The commander of the troops in GSWA, Major Franke promised a reward of one hundred marks to anyone who would signal to him the arrival of the Asiatic Fleet, with its more than two thousand men.¹⁴⁸ However, Spee failed to reach GSWA. By means of a fake signal the cruisers of Count Spee had been lured toward the British battle-cruiser squadron waiting near the Port of Stanley Spee intended to attack. During the ensuing Battle of the Falkland Island on 8 December 1914 six out of Spee's eight vessels were sunk by the superior British fleet. Following this disaster, the German navy had no more regular warships to continue commerce raiding on the high seas. The successes of the armed merchant vessels used as substitutes were "modest."¹⁴⁹ Until the end of the war "the Allies maintained command of

the sea over most of the world's oceans."¹⁵⁰ Governor Seitz of GSWA surrendered to the British in July 1915.

The situation on the western coast of the South Atlantic was characterized not by combat but by an ensuing trade war between the British and the Germans whereas the governments of Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil stayed neutral for the time being. While cruisers hunted down enemy merchant ships in neutral waters, German trade in South America was not easily stopped by the British government. Instead, British companies continued to transport German goods in 1914 in fear of commercial losses. The head of the Harrison Steamship Line, for example, responded to the admiralty in December 1914 that "British ships would have to abandon the whole of the Brazilian trade if they refused to carry for such German firms." Still in 1915 "shipowners, bankers, and the Board of Trade proved powerful opponents of commercial warfare in South America."¹⁵¹ Soon thereafter, the Foreign Office and its War Trade Advisory Committee "demanded [a trade] war against the Germans of South America." The (legal) measures were also to be applied in "the Portuguese and Spanish colonies in Africa" blacklisting "enemy firms" and individuals to prevent Britons to enter into business with them.¹⁵² As a result, Germany's "remarkable . . . commercial penetration of South America was nipped in the bud by the World War."¹⁵³

Starting in June 1917 the United States established "a South Atlantic patrol force based on Brazil, and assume[d] responsibility for patrolling the waters of a coastal strip running from Natal [South Africa] to the La Plata estuary."¹⁵⁴ Considering, however, that Germany focused its unrestricted submarine warfare on the European theater of war, "Allied naval activities in the South Atlantic soon looked distinctly marginal."¹⁵⁵ When German U-boats continued to sink Brazilian ships this not only sparked off anti-German riots in Rio de Janeiro and other cities. It also caused the Brazilian government to brake off relations with Germany in April 1917 and to declare war on Germany in October. Also, other South American states broke off relations with Germany. Only Argentina preserved its neutrality, despite the sinking of Argentine ships and the embarrassing "Luxburg affair": in September 1917, US Secretary of State Robert Lansing (1864–1928) ordered the publication of three intercepted dispatches from the German minister in Buenos Aires, Karl von Luxburg (1872–1956), who had called the Argentine foreign minister an "anglophile ass" and urged that certain Argentine ships should be destroyed without a trace (*spurlos versenken*). Luxburg was dismissed and anti-German riots erupted; the German club in Buenos Aires

was sacked. At the end of the First World War Germany's popularity in the region was at a low ebb.¹⁵⁶

Conclusion

The transatlantic relationship has been described as "one of the most dynamic of modern times."¹⁵⁷ Generally, this characterization is no doubt true. Also on a geographically more specific scale the South Atlantic has been the scene of most dynamic interactions, in particular between the Portuguese colonies. However, a German equivalent is not discernible. The advent of German colonialism in the South Atlantic did not alter meaningfully the characteristic lines of traffic. While individuals from German speaking lands were—from earliest time onward—part of the intricate web of transatlantic connections, they used the preexisting means of traffic. On German contemporary maps the "vertical" north-south connections dominated along both coasts. There are barely "horizontal" east-west connections. Those who wanted to travel from Africa to Brazil had to do so via Cape Town and Ascension Island, or from Luanda, Monrovia, or Dakar.¹⁵⁸ The transoceanic mobility across the South Atlantic by Germans awaits further research. One example for an exemption of a direct link between GSWA and South America occurred during the colonial war of 1904–1908: the German military turned to Argentina for the delivery of horses since the war necessitated urgent reinforcements. Similar connections had been created by the Portuguese, who had imported horses from Brazil to Angola for military purposes.¹⁵⁹

While there are different attempts to relate the regional history of the (South) Atlantic from a specific national point of views (traditionally the Portuguese, but the French¹⁶⁰ or Dutch¹⁶¹ perspectives have also been included), any effort to provide the same density of analysis and research for a "German South Atlantic" inevitably leads to the conclusion that such history can only be related as part of a transnational history—the "Atlantic World" remained a "shared space." The German participation in the life along South Atlantic shores is one element of this greater history.¹⁶² Research on German elements of the history of the South Atlantic draws interest to the repercussions and interdependencies across national or regional boundaries. The tensions between Brazil and Argentina during the First World War due to their opposing notions of Germany as friend or foe can serve as one example for these repercussions.

When the German state rather suddenly appeared as an independent actor in the area the balance of power changed not necessarily because of what German colonialism implemented (the economic and demographic results were rather weak) but because of what British and Portuguese politician thought their German counterparts intended to do. The Germans in Germany as well as those in the colonies did little to alleviate these concerns about German expansionism. Reactions in Angola to German requests for food deliveries in 1914 clearly show the poor reputation of Germany. Here as everywhere on the globe, German aspirations for greatness and parity with the “Great Powers” met with vested interests and traditions of those German expansionists wanted to emulate and succeed. The notion that “the Germans arrived too late” (especially in comparison with their aspirations) was based on the impression that Germans as “power brokers” were a new phenomenon in the region. Politically and economically the “claims” had been staked out already between the South Atlantic neighboring countries. Therefore, Germany’s economic growth in the region during the last quarter of the nineteenth century in connection with its colonial sovereignty in GSWA seemed to be menacing. A German southern Africa was just as phantasmal as a German state in southern Brasil. However, Germany’s South Atlantic neighbors aimed at excluding any possibility for attempting to realize such a fantasy. The First World War made evident that Imperial Germany had made no friends in the region.

NOTES

1. Sheehan, “What Is German History?,” 4; Wehler, “Transnationale Geschichte—der neue Königsweg historischer Forschung?”; cf. O’Reilly, “Atlantic World and Germany,” 46.
2. Cf., e.g., Adam, *Germany and the Americas*, xvii; Maischak, *German Merchants in the Nineteenth-Century Atlantic*.
3. On the term “système sud-atlantique,” see Alencastro, “Le versant brésilien,” 340; on the historiography of “Atlantic history,” see O’Reilly, “Atlantic World and Germany,” 37 (“Atlantic history is both inter-imperial and intra-imperial”: *ibid.*, 40).
4. Samson, “Review of Klaus Dodds, *Pink Ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire*, 2002.”
5. An early example of this expression is Tengall, “A Study in Military Leadership.”
6. Ute Schneider, “Tordesillas 1494.” On the Portuguese attempts to keep secret the discovery of Brazil and a possible history of “O Brasil antes de 1500” see Corrêa da Costa,

Brésil, les silences de l'histoire, 120–125; Zechlin, "Das Problem der vorkolumbianischen Entdeckung Amerikas und die Kolumbusforschung."

7. Hébert, "America," 31.

8. Ibid., 30.

9. Dym and Offen, "The Colonial Period," 20.

10. Hébert, "America," 32.

11. "Man fart auch hinder Hispanien [which included "Portugall"] hinaus gegen den neüwen inseln Americam/Spagnolâ/Jucatanam und der gleichen." Münster, *Cosmographia*, xxviii. See also Wessel, *Von einem, der daheim blieb, die Welt zu entdecken*.

12. Münster, *Cosmographia*, xxviii. Map: "Die neüwe Inselen zu unsern Zeiten durch die König von Hispania im großen Oceano gefunden sindt."

13. Wallisch, *Der Mundus Novus des Amerigo Vespucci*.

14. Vespucci and his men "erreichten das land das man Besilicam nempt . . . / und do fandt er leut in einer inseln die waren boeser dan die wilden thier." Münster, *Cosmographia*, 5:dcclxxii. On cannibalism see Bennassar and Marin, *Histoire du Brésil 1500–2000*, 13–20.

15. The Portuguese who "umbfahren das gantz Africam von Lisbona biß gehn Calicuth unnd vonn Calicuth wider biß . . . Portugall." "Die inner landschafft [of Africa] ist biß auff den heütigen tag noch nit allenthalben bekannt worden"; Münster, *Cosmographia*, dcclxxv.

16. "Ist es doch nichts gegen den schiffungen die jetzundt geschehen" during his lifetime to bring "gewürz unnd specerey für das gantz Europam." Münster, *Cosmographia*, xxvii, map: "Africa, Libya, Morland, mit allen künigreichen so zu unsern zeiten darin gefunden warden."

17. "Aber es hat sich erfunden / das dise schiffung den Teütschen / Frantzosen / Engellendern / Denmaerckern / etc. großen schaden thut." The Portuguese block "die straß in India / sunder sie macht auch daß das gewürtz zu unß kompt mit einem großen gewin der Portugalleser unnd unsern mercklichen schaden. Dann was gut ist behalten sie / und das nichts sol verkauffen sie uns auff das teüwrest." The Portuguese "suchen von disem scheyn iren großen nutz." Münster, *Cosmographia*, lxxviii.

18. "Sie [die Neue Welt, ist] der breite nach dieser Zeit noch nicht gar erkundigt." "Bresilien so über den equinoctial im Mittag gelegen, hat der Koenig von Portugal inne." See Meurer, "Der neue Kartensatz von 1588 in der Kosmographie Sebastian Münsters," 19–20.

19. Schreiber, *Atlas Selectus*, map: "Africa verfertiget von J. G. Schreibern in Leipzig."

20. "Wüste Hochebene": Stieler, *Hand Atlas*, map: "Afrika."

21. Examples in Angola are São Salvador, São Philippe de Benguella, and São Paulo de Luanda.

22. Schwabe and Prévosts, "L'Histoire Générale des Voyages," map by Jacques Nicolas Bellin, "Karte von dem Mittäglichen Meere"; see Ferreira, *Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World*.

23. Staden, *Warhaftige Historia*; Duffy and Metcalf, *The Return of Hans Staden*.

24. Gonsalves de Mello, "Cristovão Rausch"; contemporary Olinda was also included in the collection of city views of Meissner, *Sciographia Cosmica*: see Kupferstich: "Olinda de Phernambuco."

25. Quoted in Jürgen Schneider, "Le Brésil," 14–15.

26. Hunsche "Deutscher Beitrag zum Aufbau Brasiliens," 14–16, referring to Oberacker, *Der Deutsche Beitrag zum Aufbau der brasilianischen Nation*; on the arguments about "German labor" in Brazil see Conrad, *Globalisierung und Nation im Deutschen Kaiserreich*, 264–267.

27. Avé-Lallement, *Viagem pelo sul do Brasil no anno de 1858*.

28. Conrad, *Globalisierung und Nation*, 178.

29. Santos, "Historical Roots of the 'Whitening' of Brazil," 69.

30. *Ibid.*, 68.

31. Bideau and Nadalin, "Etude de la fécondité d'une communauté évangélique luthérienne à Curitiba (Brésil) de 1866 à 1939," 1037.

32. Santos, "Historical Roots of the 'Whitening' of Brazil," 72; 79, referring to Nilo Odália.

33. Bideau and Nadalin, "Etude de la fécondité d'une communauté évangélique luthérienne à Curitiba (Brésil) de 1866 à 1939," 1037.

34. Santos, "Historical Roots of the 'Whitening' of Brazil," 66, quoting the federal deputy Joaquim Nabuco.

35. *Ibid.*, 62; cf. Alencastro, "Le versant brésilien," 378–379.

36. Meding, "Von der Heydt'sches Reskript (Heydt Edict) and Brazil," 1105–1106.

37. Mortara, "The Development and Structure of Brazil's Population," 138. The Germans counted only among the "smaller contingents." The foreign immigration reached its peak in the decade prior to 1900 with 1,125,000 immigrants, and again in the interwar decade, 1920–1930, with 835,000 immigrants; see also the numbers quoted in Santos, "Historical Roots of the 'Whitening' of Brazil," 69–70, for the period 1884–1939; and Bideau and Nadalin, "Etude de la fécondité d'une communauté évangélique luthérienne à Curitiba (Brésil) de 1866 à 1939," 1038, for the period 1819–1970.

38. Bideau and Nadalin, "Etude de la fécondité d'une communauté évangélique luthérienne à Curitiba (Brésil) de 1866 à 1939," 1037–1038, tableau 1.

39. Nichols and Snyder, "Brazilian Elites and the Descendants of the German, Italian, and Japanese Immigrants," 321–344; Bennisar and Marin, *Histoire du Brésil 1500–2000*, 291f.

40. Mortara, "The Development and Structure of Brazil's Population," 121–122.

41. Willems, *Assimilação e populações marginais no Brasil*, 56–57.
42. Bideau and Nadalin, “Etude de la fécondité d’une communauté évangélique luthérienne à Curitiba (Brésil) de 1866 à 1939,” 1055.
43. Schoonover, “Central American Commerce and Maritime Activity in the Nineteenth Century,” 164; see also Hensel, “Die Handelsbeziehungen Preussens und des Zollvereins zu Brasilien 1815–1870.”
44. Jürgen Schneider, “Le Brésil,” 31.
45. Clarence F. Jones, “The United States and Its Chief Competitors in South American Trade,” 428.
46. Smith, “Britain and the Brazilian Naval Revolt of 1893–4,” 178.
47. Article 4 II, “Traité de commerce et de navigation entre l’Allemagne et le Portugal, 2.3.1872,” in Martens, *Nouveau Recueil Général de Traités*, 19:501.
48. Mauro, “Recent Works on the Political Economy of Brazil in the Portuguese Empire,” 95, referring to the research of Fernando A. Novais.
49. Brunn, *Deutschland und Brasilien (1889–1914)*, 232–273; Fluck, *Die Entwicklung der deutsch-brasilianischen Handelsbeziehungen von 1871–1939*; Clarence F. Jones, “The United States and Its Chief Competitors in South American Trade,” 410.
50. Conrad, *Globalisierung und Nation*, 232–233.
51. Ibid., 238; see also Srbik, *Die Auswanderungsgesetzgebung*.
52. Gründer, *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien*, 106–107, quoting Robert Janasch (Kolonialkongress 1902).
53. See, e.g., the denial of Germany’s ambassador to the United States: Speck von Sternburg, “The Phantom Peril of German Emigration and South-American Settlements”; the German ambassador to Great Britain, Count Metternich, remarked in 1894 “that Brazil appeared as if it were breaking into several republics and that this result ‘might be welcome to the United States, but it would not be favourable to European commercial interests.’” Quoted in Smith, “Britain and the Brazilian Naval Revolt of 1893–4,” 179.
54. On these subjects see the classical texts of Hell, “Die Politik des Deutschen Reiches zur Umwandlung Südbrasilien in ein überseeisches Neudeutschland (1890–1914)”; Brunn, *Deutschland und Brasilien (1889–1914)*; Gertz, *O perigo alemão*.
55. Santos, “Historical Roots of the ‘Whitening’ of Brazil,” 67.
56. See, e.g., the tragic descriptions of the “brasilianisches Fieber” in Pollack, *Kaiser von Amerika*, 212–223.
57. Willems, *Assimilação e populações marginais no Brasil*, 116.
58. However, it must be emphasized that the notion of Southern separatism dates back to nineteenth-century historians. See Jürgen Schneider, “Le Brésil,” 10, 23 (referring to João Ribeiro and his characterization of Brazilian regions: “dans la région de l’Amazonie et dans le Rio Grande une volonté de séparation, du a un sentiment d’abandon”).

59. Gertz, "Brasil e Alemanha," 131, referring to Romero, *O alemanismo no sul do Brasil*.
60. Nichols and Snyder, "Brazilian Elites and the Descendants of the German, Italian, and Japanese Immigrants," 329, 338–341; most famously, Willems, *Assimilação e populações marginais no Brasil*; Bennassar and Marin, *Histoire du Brésil 1500–2000*, 294.
61. E.g., Ilg, *Pioniere in Argentinien, Chile, Paraguay und Venezuela*; Lütge, Hoffmann, Körner, and Klingenfuss, *Deutsche in Argentinien 1520–1980*; Fromm, Ulrich Schmidl—Landsknecht, Geschichtsschreiber und Mitbegründer von Buenos Aires.
62. Keim, *Ulrich Schmidls Erlebnisse in Südamerika*; Bremer, *Unter Kannibalen*.
63. Corrêa da Costa, *Brésil, les silences de l'histoire*, 15–40.
64. Parish, *Buenos Ayres and the Provinces of the Rio de la Plata*, 337, 342.
65. Dodds, *Pink Ice*, 37–38; see also Platt, *Latin America and British Trade, 1806–1914*.
66. Halsey, *Investments in Latin America and the British West Indies*, 23–24.
67. Rippy, "German Investments in Argentina," 54n27.
68. Halsey, *Investments in Latin America and the British West Indies*, 25.
69. Rippy, "German Investments in Argentina," 53.
70. Dehne, "From 'Business as Usual' to a More Global War," 518–519.
71. *Ibid.*, 517. "In the early twentieth century, the British of South America probably numbered fewer than one hundred thousand on the whole continent"; Newton, *German Buenos Aires, 1900–1933*.
72. Saint Sauveur-Henn, *Un siècle d'émigration allemande vers l'Argentine 1853–1945*, 53, 56; see also Saint Sauveur-Henn, "Landwirtschaftliche Kolonisation deutsch-jüdischer Emigranten in Argentinien, 1933–1945"; Saint Sauveur-Henn, "Die deutsche Einwanderung in Argentinien, 1870–1933"; and Saint Sauveur-Henn, "Lateinamerika als Zuflucht."
73. Rippy, "German Investments in Argentina," 51; Nugent, *Crossings*; number of immigrants to Brazil and Argentina, 1919–1932, in Adam, *Germany and the Americas*, 30.
74. Jefferson, *Peopling the Argentine Pampa*, 193, 66; Saint Sauveur-Henn, *Un siècle d'émigration*, 252.
75. Potash, *The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1928–1945*, 4.
76. Healy, "Admiral William B. Caperton and United States Naval Diplomacy in South America, 1917–1919," 302.
77. Heyden, *Rote Adler an Afrikas Küste*; Klosa, *Die Brandenburgische-Africanische Compagnie in Emden*.
78. Gründer, *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien*, 82.
79. Kolbe, *Caput Bonae Spei Hodiernum d. i. vollständige Beschreibung des afrikanischen Vorburgs der guten Hoffnung*; see Guelke, "The Anatomy of a Colonial Settler Population," 453–473.
80. Hintrager, *Geschichte von Südafrika*, 493, 233, 335; see Schnell, *For Men Must Work*; Laband, "From Mercenaries to Military Settlers," 85–86.

81. Hintrager, *Geschichte von Südafrika*, 467; see also Bank, "The Great Debate and the Origins of South African Historiography," 272: "Any future hopes of seeing 'knowledge and talent flourish' were to rely not on African indigenes, but on 'the South Africans, a mixed multitude [of Dutch, French, Germans or New- Britons, and as such they all derive from the Old-German Stock. This race of men . . . has evinced a native excellence and a disposition for whatever is great and noble. Inured to fatigue and nerved by hardships of the North, they have changed the face of nature, and have transformed the wilderness into abodes of delight and plenty.'"

82. Hintrager, *Geschichte von Südafrika*, 508 (map: South Africa 1921).

83. Van-Helten, "German Capital, the Netherlands Railway Company and the Political Economy of the Transvaal 1886–1900," 376.

84. *Ibid.*, 375. German–South African trade in 1897, £1,054,226; British–South African trade in 1897, £14,778,017.

85. Van-Helten, "German Capital, the Netherlands Railway Company and the Political Economy of the Transvaal 1886–1900," 376, 387, 389.

86. Lugan, *La guerre des Boers 1899–1902*, 256–263; Dederer, "The Ferreira Raid of 1906"; Teulié, *Les Afrikaners et la guerre Anglo-Boer (1899–1902)*.

87. Fauvelle Aymar, *Histoire de l'Afrique du Sud*, 298–299.

88. Dederer, *Hate the Old and Follow the New*; Trüper, *Die Hottentottin: Das kurze Leben der Zara Schmelen* [*The Invisible Woman: Zara Schmelen*].

89. Hartmann, "Early Dutch–Namibian Encounters," 9–19.

90. Berat, *Walvis Bay*.

91. Leon, "The Conference at Berlin on the West-African Question," 135.

92. Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective*, 103; see Speitkamp, *Deutsche Kolonialgeschichte*, 30–35; Canis, *Bismarcks Aussenpolitik 1870–1890*, 222, 224.

93. Tiebel, *Die Entstehung der Schutztruppengesetze für die deutschen Schutzgebiete*, 62, 75–78; Kaulich, *Die Geschichte von Deutsch-Südwestafrika*, 204ff.; 217–218; Bley, *Namibia under German Rule*, 27–43.

94. *Kleiner Deutscher Kolonialatlas hg. v. der Deutschen Kolonialgesellschaft*, Annex: "Bemerkungen zu den Karten DSWA no. 5. The remainders were mostly British nationals or Boers. There were almost no women from Germany at the time.

95. Sprigade and Moisel, *Deutscher Kolonialatlas mit Jahrbuch*, 12.

96. *Verlust* has a double meaning in this context depending on the pronunciation: "loss" in German and "becoming Brazilian"—the German prefix *ver-* connected with the Portuguese *luso*. See Willems, *Assimilação e populações marginais no Brasil*, 116–117.

97. Kundrus, *Moderne Imperialisten*, 183–201; Axter, "Die Angst vor dem Verkaffern—Politiken der Reinigung im deutschen Kolonialismus."

98. Torp, *Die Herausforderung der Globalisierung*, 31, 78.

99. Brunschwig, *L'expansion Allemande Outre-Mer du XVe siècle à nos jours*, 188.
100. Birmingham, "Slave City: Luanda through German Eyes," 79n5.
101. Birmingham, "Carnival at Luanda," 94.
102. Heintze, *Deutsche Forschungsreisende in Angola*, 12, 91.
103. Brun, *Schiffahrten*, quoted in Heintze, *Deutsche Forschungsreisende*, 146–152; cf. Jones, "Samuel Brun's Voyages of 1611–1620," 44–96.
104. Johann Paul Augspurger, *Kurtze und wahrhafftige Beschreibung der See-Reizen von Amsterdam in Holland nacher Brasilien in America, und Angola in Africa. Vom 4. Novembris 1640. biß 10. Julii 1642* (Schleusingen: Joh. Michael Schalln, 1644), quoted in Heintze, *Deutsche Forschungsreisende*, 96–99.
105. S.v. "Georg Markgraf," in Adam, *Germany and the Americas*, 721.
106. Birmingham, "Slave City: Luanda through German Eyes," 92; see also Heintze, *Deutsche Forschungsreisende*, 378–380; about contemporary Luanda, see Curto, "The Anatomy of a Demographic Explosion: Luanda 1844–1850."
107. Bastian, *Ein Besuch in San Salvador, der Hauptstadt des Königreichs Congo*.
108. Heintze, *Deutsche Forschungsreisende*, 105–106.
109. *Ibid.*, 200–201, 13.
110. De Castro, March 1866, quoted and translated in Corrado, *Creole Elite*, 18 n. 18.
111. Mattenklodt, *A Fugitive in South West Africa 1908 to 1920*; Mattenklodt, *Verlorene Heimat*; Mattenklodt, *Afrikanische Jagden und Abenteuer*.
112. Wissmann, *Unter deutscher Flagge quer durch Afrika*.
113. Article 4 II, *Traité de commerce et de navigation entre l'Allemagne et le Portugal*, 2.3.1872, in Martens, *Nouveau Recueil Général de Traités*, 19:501; Leon, "The Conference at Berlin on the West-African Question," 124.
114. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (PAAA) (Berlin): Luanda 1, betr. Einrichtung, AA to Eisenlohr, London, 10 November 1813; AA to Consulate, Luanda, 13 December 1813; Consulate Luanda to AA, 23 December 1813, 24.1.14; German Envoy Lisbon to Consulate Luanda, 3 July 14. It was proposed by the German Foreign Office to decorate Prazeres for his service to the German empire. Eisenlohr supported the idea. However, according to the Portuguese constitution, Portuguese citizens were not allowed to accept foreign decorations.
115. Young, *The African State*, 152.
116. Birmingham, *Carnival at Luanda*, 100.
117. PAAA, Luanda 4 (Politisches) Governor General to German Consul Luanda, 4 August 1902.
118. PAAA, Luanda 4 (Politisches) Otto Peters to German Consul Luanda, 20 June 1902.
119. Canis, *Von Bismarck zur Weltpolitik*.

120. Bixler, "Anglo-Portuguese Rivalry for Delagoa Bay," 438. In 1872 the German government denied an attempt to purchase Delagoa Bay.
121. Gooch and Temperley, *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, 1:71-72, no. 90, sec. iv; 1:72-73, no. 91; 1:75, no. 93—Ed. Note; Clarence-Smith, "Slavery in Coastal Southern Angola, 1875-1913," 218: "The reis fell to about half of its value between 1891 and 1898, but then recovered to just under par and maintained itself up to the First World War." Bixler, "Angola-Portuguese Rivalry," 440.
122. Tschapek, *Bausteine eines zukünftigen deutschen Mittelafrika*, 251-269.
123. Stone, "The Official British Attitude to the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, 1910-45," 729n1. A Treaty of Alliance was first signed in 1373 and was repeatedly renewed.
124. Gooch and Temperley, *The End of British Isolation 1897-1904*, 1:75, no. 93—Ed. Note; 1:77, no. 96; 1:93, no. 118.
125. See Gooch and Temperley, *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, 6:651, no. 480; 6:664, no. 490; 6:684, no. 506; 6:710, no. 532. The Germans also attempted to negotiate directly with the Portuguese to open a coaling station in the Azores Islands or in Madeira. Negotiations about the cessation or exchange of colonial territories were not uncommon in the nineteenth century. In 1847 the distressed Portuguese Kingdom had suggested a possible cession to Great Britain of Madeira, but Prime Minister Lord Palmerstone refused it.
126. Vincent-Smith, "The Anglo-German Negotiations over the Portuguese Colonies in Africa, 1911-14," 620, 623.
127. Gründer, *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien*, 103-106.
128. Vincent-Smith, "The Anglo-German Negotiations over the Portuguese Colonies in Africa, 1911-14," 627, 625.
129. Southern, "German Border Incursions into Portuguese Angola prior to the First World War," 6.
130. Stone, "Official British Attitude," 731. A contemporary account: Pimenta, *Para a Historia das relações entre Portugal e a Alemanha (1884-1914)*; see also regarding Pimenta: Torgal, *Estados novos, estado novo*, 2:90-91, 2:521.
131. Vincent-Smith, "The Anglo-German Negotiations over the Portuguese Colonies in Africa, 1911-14," 629.
132. One member of the Comissão luso-alemão, Dr. Vageler, (under)estimated in 1914 that there were thirty-odd "Angoladeutsche": Bundesarchiv Berlin (BAB) R 1001/6634, p. 149; Vageler to RMW (10 November 1921), Annex 10 to "Memoire Allemand," 23 May 22; pp. 157, 154; Vageler to Governor of GSWA (apx. November 1914).
133. Portuguese "Whitebook," 1919 (no. 180, p. 63), quoted in BAB R 1001/6635, p. 47, "Memoire du Gouvernement Allemand concernant les réclamations portugaises," 1922.

134. Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (AHU) (Lisbon), MU DGC Angola, 5^a Rep., Pasta 5 (Cx 996), Campo de "Concentração de Angola," List of Prisoners, 16 September 1917 [SAM 0998].
135. PAAA Luanda 1, betr. Konsulat Lobito, Consul Lobito to AA, 30 October 34, "viele in äusserst traurigen Verhältnissen."
136. See Helbig, "Herzlichen Glückwunsch, DHPS," *Allgemeine Zeitung* [Windhoek], 16 January 2009.
137. One rather uncritical article on Krosigk's farmlife is riddled with colonial stereotypes: Klaubert, "Deutsche Farmer in Angola: Das Vermächtnis," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 27 June 12.
138. For a "firsthand account"—the letters of an East German development aide worker (cooperant) and his wife to their family—see Ronge, *Nach Süden, nach Süden*; Döring, "Es geht um unsere Existenz"; Engel and Schleicher, *Die beiden deutschen Staaten in Afrika*; Schleicher and Schleicher, *Die DDR im südlichen Afrika*.
139. "Beruhigt Ansiedler: Kriegsgefahr für die Kolonien besteht nicht": see, e.g., Klöckner in *Kolonialkriegerbund, Unvergessenes Heldentum*, 58.
140. BAB R 1001/6634: 158, Report of Governor ret. Seitz (10 May 1921), Annex 13 to "Memoire Allemand," 23 May 22.
141. Zollmann, "L'affaire Naulilaa entre le Portugal et l'Allemagne, 1914–1933"; Morlang, "Keine Schonung"; Stals, "Naulila," 186; Péliissier, *Les guerres grises*, 482–485; Péliissier, *Les campagnes coloniales du Portugal 1844–1941*, 262–265.
142. Quoted in Kennedy, "The Development of German Naval Operations," 72–73.
143. Dehne, "From 'Business as Usual,'" 526.
144. Hilfskreuzer, "Cap Trafalgar," in *Der Krieg zur See 1914–1918*, Teil 3: *Der Kreuzerkrieg in den ausländischen Gewässern*, 3:26–38; Walter, *Piraten des Kaisers—Deutsche Handelsstörer 1914–1918*, 47–51.
145. Baum, "German Political Designs with Reference to Brazil," 597.
146. Kennedy, "The Development of German Naval Operations," 73.
147. Eckenbrecher, *Was Afrika mir gab und nahm*, 167.
148. *Ibid.*, 179.
149. Segesser, *Der Erste Weltkrieg in globaler Perspektive*, 105; Meding, "Admiral Graf Spee," 45–47.
150. Stevenson, *Cataclysm*, 199.
151. Quoted in Dehne, "From 'Business as Usual,'" 524–525.
152. Dehne, "From 'Business as Usual,'" 531–532, 535.
153. Clarence F. Jones, "The United States and Its Chief Competitors in South American Trade," 428.

154. Healy, "Admiral William B. Caperton and United States Naval Diplomacy in South America, 1917-1919," 298.
155. Ibid., 309.
156. Ibid., 298, 310; Luebke, *Germans in Brazil*, 1987; Doß, *Das Auswärtige Amt im Übergang vom Kaiserreich zur Weimarer Republik*, 49n95; "Esel und Englands Freund."
157. Kaufman, preface to *Adam, Germany and the Americas*, xvii; for a critical overview, see O'Reilly, "Atlantic World and Germany," 35.
158. Sprigade and Moisel, *Deutscher Kolonialatlas mit Jahrbuch*, map no. 2 ("Afrika").
159. Alencastro, "South Atlantic Wars," 47.
160. Marshall, *The French Atlantic*.
161. Phaf-Rheinberger, *The "Air of Liberty"*.
162. O'Reilly, "Atlantic World and Germany," 35.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archives

Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (AHU, Lisbon): MU DGC Angola
Bundesarchiv Berlin (BAB, Berlin): R 1001—Reichskolonialamt
Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (PAAA, Berlin): Luanda

Publications

- Adam, Thomas, ed. *Germany and the Americas: Culture, Politics, and History*. Santa Barbara, 2005.
- Alencastro, Luiz Felipe de. "South Atlantic Wars: The Episode of Palmares." *Portuguese Studies Review* 19 (2011): 35-58.
- . "Le versant brésilien de l'Atlantique-Sud : 1550-1850." *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 61 (2006): 339-382.
- Avé-Lallement, Robert. *Viagem pelo sul do Brasil no anno de 1858*. Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Nacional do Livro, 1953.
- Axter, Felix. "Die Angst vor dem Verkaffern—Politiken der Reinigung im deutschen Kolonialismus." *Werkstatt Geschichte* 39, no. 1 (2005): 39-53.
- Bank, Andrew. "The Great Debate and the Origins of South African Historiography." *Journal of African History* 38 (1997): 261-281.
- Bastian, Adolf. *Ein Besuch in San Salvador, der Hauptstadt des Königreichs Congo*. Bremen, 1859.
- Baum, Loretta. "German Political Designs with Reference to Brazil." *Hispanic American Historical Review* 2 (1919): 586-610.
- Bennassar, Bartolomé, and Richard Marin. *Histoire du Brésil 1500-2000*. Paris: Fayard, 2000.

- Berat, Lynn. *Walvis Bay: Decolonization and International Law*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990.
- Bideau, Alain, and Sergio Odilon Nadalin. "Etude de la fécondité d'une communauté évangélique luthérienne à Curitiba (Brésil) de 1866 à 1939." *Population* (French Edition) 43 (1988): 1035–1064.
- Birmingham, David. "Slave City: Luanda through German Eyes." *Portuguese Studies Review* 19 (2011): 77–92.
- . "Carnival at Luanda." *Journal of African History* 29, no. 1 (1988): 93–103.
- Bixler, Raymond W. "Anglo-Portuguese Rivalry for Delagoa Bay." *Journal of Modern History* 6 (1934): 425–440.
- Bley, Helmut. *Namibia under German Rule*. Hamburg: Lit, 1996 [Kolonialherrschaft und Sozialstruktur, 1968].
- Bremer, Georg. *Unter Kannibalen: Die unerhörten Abenteuer der deutschen Konquistadoren Hans Staden und Ulrich Schmidel*. Zürich, 1996.
- Brunn, Gerhard. *Deutschland und Brasilien (1889–1914)*. Cologne: Böhlau, 1971.
- Brunschwig, Henri. *L'expansion Allemande Outre-Mer du XVe siècle à nos jours*. Paris, 1957.
- Canis, Konrad. *Bismarcks Außenpolitik 1870–1890*. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2004.
- . *Von Bismarck zur Weltpolitik: Deutsche Außenpolitik 1890–1902*. 2nd ed. Berlin: Akademie, 1999.
- Conrad, Sebastian. *Globalisierung und Nation im Deutschen Kaiserreich*. Munich: Beck, 2006 [Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010].
- Corrado, Jacopo. *The Creole Elite and the Rise of Angolan Protonationalism 1870–1920*. New York: Cambria, 2008.
- Corrêa da Costa, Sergio. *Brésil, les silences de l'histoire*. Paris: Rocher, 2003 [Brasil, segredo de Estado, 2001].
- Curto, José C. "The Anatomy of a Demographic Explosion: Luanda 1844–1850." *Journal of African Historical Studies* 32 (1999): 384–405.
- Dederling, Tilman. "The Ferreira Raid of 1906: Boers, Britons and Germans in Southern Africa in the Aftermath of the South African War." *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26 (2000): 43–60.
- . *Hate the Old and Follow the New: Khoekhoe and Missionaries in Early Nineteenth-Century Namibia*. Stuttgart (Franz Steiner) 1997.
- Dehne, Phillip. "From 'Business as Usual' to a More Global War: The British Decision to Attack Germans in South America during the First World War." *Journal of British Studies* 44 (2005): 516–535.
- Dodds, Klaus. *Pink Ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2002.

- Döring, Hans-Joachim. "Es geht um unsere Existenz": Die Politik der DDR gegenüber der Dritten Welt am Beispiel von Mosambik und Äthiopien. Berlin, Chr. Links, 1999.
- Doß, Kurt. Das Auswärtige Amt im Übergang vom Kaiserreich zur Weimarer Republik: Die Schülersche Reform. Düsseldorf: Droste, 1977.
- Duffy, Eve M., and Alida Metcalf. *The Return of Hans Staden: A Go-Between in the Atlantic World*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012.
- Dym, Jordana, and Karl Offen. "The Colonial Period: Explorations and Empires." In Jordana Dym and Karl Offen, eds., *Mapping Latin America: A Cartographic Reader*, 20–24. Chicago, 2011.
- Eckenbrecher, Margarethe von. *Was Afrika mir gab und nahm*. 8th ed. Berlin: Mittler, 1940.
- Engel, Ulf and Hans-Georg Schleicher, eds. *Die beiden deutschen Staaten in Afrika: Zwischen Konkurrenz und Koexistenz 1949–1990*. Hamburg, 1998.
- Fauvelle Aymar, Francois-Xavier. *Histoire de l'Afrique du Sud*. Paris: Seuil, 2006.
- Ferreira, Roquinaldo. *Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World: Angola and Brazil during the Era of the Slave Trade*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Fluck, Julius. *Die Entwicklung der deutsch-brasilianischen Handelsbeziehungen von 1871–1939*. Cologne, 1951.
- Fromm, Heinrich. Ulrich Schmidl—Landsknecht, Geschichtsschreiber und Mitbegründer von Buenos Aires. Wiefelstede, 2010.
- Gertz, René E. "Brasil e Alemanha: Os brasileiros de origem alemã na construção de uma parceria histórica." *Textos de História* 16, no. 2 (2008): 119–149.
- . *O perigo alemão*. Porto Alegre: Editora da Universidade/UFRGS, 1991.
- Gonsalves de Mello, José Antônio. "Cristovão Rausch, um ourives alemão em Olinda, 1617–1619." *Revista de Estudos Universitários* 13, no. 4 (1973): 5–20.
- Gooch, G. P., and Harold Temperley, eds. *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914*. Vol 1: *The End of British Isolation 1897–1904*. London, 1927. Vol. 4: *Anglo-German Tensions 1907–12*. London, 1930.
- Gründer, Horst. *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien*. Paderborn: Schöningh 2004.
- Guelke, Leonard. "The Anatomy of a Colonial Settler Population. Cape Colony 1657–1750." *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 21, no. 3 (1988): 453–473.
- Halsey, Frederic M. *Investments in Latin America and the British West Indies*. Washington, 1918.
- Hartmann, Wolfram. "Early Dutch-Namibian Encounters." In Huub Hendrix, ed., *Namibia and the Netherlands: 350 Years of Relation*, 9–19. Windhoek: John Meinert, 2006.
- Healy, David. "Admiral William B. Caperton and United States Naval Diplomacy in South America, 1917–1919." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 8, no. 2 (1976): 297–323.

- Hébert, John. "America." In Jordana Dym and Karl Offen, eds., *Mapping Latin America: A Cartographic Reader*, 29–32. Chicago, 2011.
- Heintze, Beatrix. *Deutsche Forschungsreisende in Angola: Ethnographische Aneignungen zwischen Sklavenhandel, Kolonialismus und Wissenschaft*. Frankfurt am Main: Lembeck, 2007.
- Helbig, Stefanie. "Herzlichen Glückwunsch, DHPS." *Allgemeine Zeitung (Windhoek)*, 16 January 2009.
- Hell, Jürgen. "Die Politik des Deutschen Reiches zur Umwandlung Südbrasilien in ein überseeisches Neudeutschland (1890–1914)." PhD diss., Rostock, 1966.
- Heyden, Ulrich van der. *Rote Adler an Afrikas Küste: Die brandenburgisch-preußische Kolonie Großfriedrichsburg in Westafrika*. Berlin: Selignow, 2001.
- Hensel, Erwin. "Die Handelsbeziehungen Preussens und des Zollvereins zu Brasilien 1815–1870." PhD diss., Berlin, 1943.
- Hintrager, Oskar. *Geschichte von Südafrika*. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1952.
- Hunsche, Carlos H. "Deutscher Beitrag zum Aufbau Brasiliens." *Zeitschrift für Kulturaustausch* 22, no. 2 (1972): 14–16.
- Ilg, Karl. *Pioniere in Argentinien, Chile, Paraguay und Venezuela: Durch Bergwelt, Urwald und Steppe erwanderte Volkskunde der deutschsprachigen Siedler*. Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 1976.
- Jefferson, Mark. *Peopling the Argentine Pampa*. New York, 1926.
- Jones, Adam. "Samuel Brun's Voyages of 1611–1620." In Adam Jones, ed., *German Sources for West African History 1599–1669*, 44–96. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1983.
- Jones, Clarence F. "The United States and Its Chief Competitors in South American Trade." *Economic Geography* 3 (1927): 409–433.
- Kaufman, Will. Preface to Thomas Adam, ed., *Germany and the Americas: Culture, Politics, and History*, xvii. Santa Barbara, 2005.
- Kaulich, Udo. *Die Geschichte von Deutsch-Südwestafrika*. Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2001.
- Keim, Josef, ed. *Ulrich Schmidts Erlebnisse in Südamerika: Nach dem Frankfurter Druck (1567)*. Straubing, 1962.
- Kennedy, P. M. "The Development of German Naval Operations: Plans against England, 1896–1914." *English Historical Review* 89 (1974): 48–76.
- Klaubert, David. "Deutsche Farmer in Angola: Das Vermächtnis." *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 27 June 2012.
- Kleiner Deutscher Kolonialatlas* hg. v. der Deutschen Kolonialgesellschaft. Berlin: Reimer, 1899. Reprint, Augsburg, 2003.
- Klosa, Sven. *Die Brandenburgische-Africanische Compagnie in Emden: Eine Handelscompagnie des ausgehenden 17. Jahrhunderts zwischen Protektionismus und unternehmerischer Freiheit*. Frankfurt, 2011.
- Kolbe, Peter. *Caput Bonae Spei Hodiernum d. i. vollständige Beschreibung des afrikanischen Vorgeburges der guten Hoffnung*. Nuremberg, 1719.

- Kolonialkriegerbund, ed. *Unvergessenes Heldentum: Das Kolonisationswerk der deutschen Schutztruppe und Marine*. Berlin, 1924.
- Kundrus, Birthe. *Moderne Imperialisten: Das Kaiserreich im Spiegel seiner Kolonien*. Cologne: Böhlau, 2003.
- Laband, John. "From Mercenaries to Military Settlers: The British German Legion, 1854–1861." In Stephen M. Miller, ed., *Soldiers and Settlers in Africa, 1850–1918, 85–102*. Leiden: Brill, 2009.
- Leon, Daniel de. "The Conference at Berlin on the West-African Question." *Political Science Quarterly* 1 (1886): 103–139.
- Luebke, Frederick C. *Germans in Brazil: A Comparative History of Cultural Conflict during World War I*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987.
- Lütge, Wilhelm, Werner Hoffmann, Karl Wilhelm Körner, and Karl Klingenfuss. *Deutsche in Argentinien 1520–1980*. Buenos Aires: Verlag Alemann, 1981.
- Lugan, Bernard. *La guerre des Boers 1899–1902*. Paris: Perrin, 1998.
- Maischak, Lars. *German Merchants in the Nineteenth-Century Atlantic*. Cambridge, 2013.
- Mantey, Eberhard von. *Die deutschen Hilfskreuzer*. Berlin: Mittler, 1937.
- Marshall, Bill. *The French Atlantic: Travels in Culture and History*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009.
- Martens, G. Fr., ed. *Nouveau Recueil Général de Traités*. Vol. 19. Göttingen: Dieterich, 1874.
- Mattenklodt, Wilhelm. *Afrikanische Jagden und Abenteuer*. Munich: F. C. Mayer, 1942.
- . *A Fugitive in South West Africa 1908 to 1920*. London: Thornton Butterworth, 1931.
- . *Verlorene Heimat: Als Schutztruppeler und Farmer in Südwest, mit einem Geleitwort von Hans Grimm*. Berlin: Paul Parey, 1928.
- Mauro, Frédéric. "Recent Works on the Political Economy of Brazil in the Portuguese Empire." *Latin American Research Review* 19, no. 1 (1984): 87–105.
- Meding, Holger M. "Von der =eydt'sches Reskript (Heydt Edict) and Brazil." In Thomas Adam, ed., *Germany and the Americas: Culture, Politics, and History*, 1105–1106. Santa Barbara, 2005.
- . "Admiral Graf Spee." In Thomas Adam, ed., *Germany and the Americas. Culture, Politics, and History*, 45–47. Santa Barbara, 2005.
- Meissner, Daniel. *Sciographia Cosmica*. Nuremberg: Fürst, 1638.
- Meurer, Peter H. "Der neue Kartensatz von 1588 in der Kosmographie Sebastian Münsters." *Cartographica Helvetica* 7 (1993): 11–20.
- Morlang, Thomas. "Keine Schonung: Der Naulila-Zwischenfall und die deutschen Strafexpeditionen gegen das neutrale Portugiesisch-Angola." *Militärgeschichte* 8 (1998): 43–48.
- Mortara, Giorgio. "The Development and Structure of Brazil's Population." *Population Studies* 8 (1954): 121–139.

- Münster, Sebastian. *Cosmographia*. 3rd German ed. Basel, 1556.
- Newton, Ronald C. *German Buenos Aires, 1900–1933: Social Change and Cultural Crisis*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977.
- Nichols, Glenn A., and Philip S. Snyder. "Brazilian Elites and the Descendants of the German, Italian, and Japanese Immigrants." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 23, no. 3 (1981): 321–344.
- Nugent, Walter. *Crossings: The Great Transatlantic Migrations, 1870–1914*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.
- Oberacker, Karl Heinrich. *Der Deutsche Beitrag zum Aufbau der brasilianischen Nation*. São Paulo, 1955.
- O'Reilly, William. "The Atlantic World and Germany: A Consideration." In Renate Pieper and Peer Schmidt, eds., *Latin America and the Atlantic World: El Mundo atlántico y América Latina (1500–1850)*, 35–56. Cologne: Böhlau, 2005.
- Phaf-Rheinberger, Ineke. *The "Air of Liberty": Narratives of the South Atlantic Past*. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2008.
- Parish, Woodbine. *Buenos Ayres and the Provinces of the Rio de la Plata*. London, 1839.
- Pélissier, René. *Les Campagnes coloniales du Portugal 1844–1941*. Paris: Pygmalion, 2004.
- . *Les guerres grises: Résistance et révoltes en Angola (1845–1941)*. Orgeval, 1977.
- Pimenta, Alfredo. *Para a Historia das relações entre Portugal e a Alemanha (1884–1914)*. Lisbon, 1941.
- Platt, D. C. M. *Latin America and British Trade, 1806–1914*. New York, 1973.
- Pollack, Martin. *Kaiser von Amerika: Die große Flucht aus Galizien*. Wien: Zolnay, 2010.
- Potash, Robert. *The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1928–1945: Yrigoyen to Peron*. Stanford, 1969.
- Rippy, J. Fred. "German Investments in Argentina." *Journal of Business* 21 (1948): 50–54.
- Romero, Sílvio. *O alemanismo no sul do Brasil: Seus perigos e meios de os conjurar*. Rio de Janeiro: Heitor Ribeiro & Co., 1906.
- Ronge, Marion. *Nach Süden, nach Süden . . . : Briefe aus Angola*. Leipzig: Engelsdorfer Verlag, 2004.
- Saint Sauveur-Henn, Anne. "Lateinamerika als Zuflucht." In F. Briesemeister, K. Kohut, and M. Siebenmann, eds., *Lateinamerika, Deutschland: Deutsche in Lateinamerika*. Frankfurt: Verwuert, 1996.
- . *Un siècle d'émigration allemande vers l'Argentine 1853–1945*. Böhlau, 1995.
- . "Die deutsche Einwanderung in Argentinien, 1870–1933: Zur Wirkung der politischen Entwicklung in Deutschland auf die Deutschen in Argentinien." In H. Meding, ed., *Nationalsozialismus und Argentinien—Einwirkungen, Einflüsse und Folgen*. Bern: Lang, 1995.

- . "Landwirtschaftliche Kolonisation deutsch-jüdischer Emigranten in Argentinien, 1933–1945." In K. Kohut and P. von Mühlen, eds., *Alternative Lateinamerika: Die deutsche Emigration in Lateinamerika, 1933–1945*. Frankfurt am Main: Verwuert, 1994.
- Samson, Jane. "Review of Klaus Dodds, *Pink Ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire, 2002*." *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 4, no. 3 (2003).
- Santos, Sales Augusto dos. "Historical Roots of the 'Whitening' of Brazil." *Latin American Perspectives* 29 (2002): 61–82.
- Schleicher, Ilona, and Hans-Georg Schleicher, eds. *Die DDR im südlichen Afrika: Solidarität und Kalter Krieg*. Hamburg, 1997.
- Schneider, Ute. "Tordesillas 1494—Der Beginn einer globalen Weltsicht." *Saeculum: Jahrbuch für Universalgeschichte* 54 (2003): 39–62.
- Schneider, Jürgen. "Le Brésil: Du cycle de l'or au cycle de café (1500–1850)." *Lateinamerika Studien* 4 (1979): 9–36.
- Schnell, E. L. G. *For Men Must Work: An Account of German Immigration to the Cape, with Special Reference to the German Military Settlers of 1857 and the German Immigrants of 1858*. Cape Town: Miller, 1954.
- Schoonover, Thomas. "Central American Commerce and Maritime Activity in the Nineteenth Century: Sources for a Quantitative Approach." *Latin American Research Review* 13, no. 2 (1978): 157–169.
- Schreiber, Johann Georg. *Atlas Selectus*. Leipzig, 1749.
- Schwabe, J., and J. Prévosts. *L'Histoire Générale des Voyages*. Leipzig: Arkstee & Merkus, 1746.
- Segesser, Daniel M. *Der Erste Weltkrieg in globaler Perspektive*. Wiesbaden: Matrix, 2010.
- Sheehan, James. "What Is German History? Reflections on the Role of the Nation in German History and Historiography." *Journal of Modern History* 53 (1981): 1–23.
- Smith, Joseph. "Britain and the Brazilian Naval Revolt of 1893–4." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 2, no. 2 (1970): 175–198.
- Southern, Paul. "German Border Incursions into Portuguese Angola prior to the First World War." *Portuguese Journal of Social Science* 6, no. 1 (2007): 3–32.
- Speck von Sternburg. "The Phantom Peril of German Emigration and South-American Settlements." *North American Review* (1906).
- Speitkamp, Winfried. *Deutsche Kolonialgeschichte*. Stuttgart: Reclam, 2005.
- Sprigade, Paul, and Max Moisel, eds. *Deutscher Kolonialatlas mit Jahrbuch*. Berlin: Reimer, 1914.
- Srbik, Franz von. *Die Auswanderungsgesetzgebung*. Vienna, 1911.
- Staden, Hans. *Warhaftige Historia: Zwei Reisen nach Brasilien (1548–1555): Historia de duas viagens ao Brasil: Kritische Ausgabe durch Franz Obermeier. Fontes Americanae 1*. Kiel: Westensee, 2007.

- Stals, Ernst L. P. "Naulila." *Historia* 13, no. 3 (1968): 186–191.
- Stevenson, David. *Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy*. New York: Basic, 2004.
- Stieler, Adolf. *Hand Atlas*. Gotha, 1828.
- Stone, Glyn A. "The Official British Attitude to the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, 1910–45." *Journal of Contemporary History* 10 (1975): 729–746.
- Tengall, David. "A Study in Military Leadership: The Sargento Mor in the Portuguese South Atlantic Empire." *Americas* 40 (1983): 73–94.
- Teulié, Gilles. *Les Afrikaners et la guerre Anglo-Boer (1899–1902): Étude des cultures populaires et des mentalités en présence*. Montpellier, 2000.
- Tiebel, André. *Die Entstehung der Schutztruppengesetze für die deutschen Schutzgebiete*. Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2008.
- Torp, Claudius. *Die Herausforderung der Globalisierung: Wirtschaft und Politik in Deutschland 1860–1914*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht, 2005.
- Trüper, Ursula. *Die Hottentottin: Das kurze Leben der Zara Schmelen (ca. 1793–1831): Missionsgehilfin und Sprachpionierin in Südafrika*. Cologne: Rüdiger Köppe, 2000. [The Invisible Woman: Zara Schmelen: African Mission Assistant at the Cape and in Namaland. Basel: BAB, 2006.]
- Torgal, Luís Reis. *Estados novos, estado novo: Ensaios de história política e cultural*. Vol. 2. Coimbra, 2009.
- Tschapek, Rolf Peter. *Bausteine eines zukünftigen deutschen Mittelafrika: Deutscher Imperialismus und die portugiesischen Kolonien*. Stuttgart: Steiner, 2000.
- Van-Helten, J. J. "German Capital, the Netherlands Railway Company and the Political Economy of the Transvaal 1886–1900." *Journal of African History* 19 (1978): 369–390.
- Vincent-Smith, J. D. "The Anglo-German Negotiations over the Portuguese Colonies in Africa, 1911–14." *Historical Journal* 17 (1974): 620–629.
- Wallisch, Robert. *Der Mundus Novus des Amerigo Vespucci: Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar*. Wien, 2006.
- Walter, John. *Piraten des Kaisers—Deutsche Handelsstörer 1914–1918, 47–51*. Stuttgart: Motorbuch, 1994.
- Wehler, Hans-Ulrich. "Transnationale Geschichte—der neue Königsweg historischer Forschung?" In Gunilla Budde, Sebastian Conrad, and Oliver Janz, eds., *Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*, 161–174. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht, 2006.
- Wessel, Günther. *Von einem, der daheim blieb, die Welt zu entdecken: Die Cosmographia des Sebastian Münster oder Wie man sich vor 500 Jahren die Welt vorstellte*. Frankfurt am Main, 2004.
- Willems, Emilio. *Assimilação e populações marginais no Brasil: Estudo sociológico dos imigrantes germanicos e seus descendentes*. São Paulo: Editora nacional, 1940.

- Wissmann, Hermann. *Unter deutscher Flagge quer durch Afrika*. Berlin: Walther und Apolant, 1889.
- Young, Crawford. *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994.
- Zechlin, Egmont. "Das Problem der vorkolumbianischen Entdeckung Amerikas und die Kolumbusforschung." *Historische Zeitschrift* 152: 1-47.
- Zollmann, Jakob. "L'affaire Naulilaa entre le Portugal et l'Allemagne, 1914-1933: Reflexions sur l'histoire politique d'une sentence arbitrale international." *Journal of the History of International Law* 15 (2013): 201-234.

JAKOB ZOLLMANN is research fellow at the Rule of Law Center of the Berlin Social Science Center. He studied history and law in Berlin, Paris, and San Francisco. His research focuses on the history of international law and colonial law. His recent publications include "L'affaire Naulilaa entre le Portugal et l'Allemagne, 1914-1933: Reflexions sur l'histoire politique d'une sentence arbitrale international," *Journal of the History of International Law* 15 (2013): 201-234; "Communicating Colonial Order. The Police of German South West Africa," *Crime, History and Society* 15, no. 1 (2011): 33-57; and "Slavery and the Colonial State in German South West Africa 1880s to 1918," *Journal of Namibian Studies* 7 (2010): 85-118.